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Constitution as a System 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Opening remarks 
Robert Alexy wrote in 2001: “The spirit of the constitution consists of three 
elements: of (1) principles, (2) the system that they build and (3) rational argu-
mentation that establishes the systematic unity and draws conclusions from it in 
respect of the existence of concrete rights and duties. These three elements are 
integral parts of the constitution. […] The constitution as a substantive or a 
material foundation does not stand unconnected to the constitution as a system of 
rules. Both together form a unity and, as this unity, the constitution.”1 This 
passage originates from the monograph on the constitutional rights in Estonia and 
it forms the starting point of the following analysis. The key message of the 
shown passage is the idea of the constitution as a system. A similar idea has also 
been expressed in Estonian political debate. For instance, President Lennart Meri 
stated in his speech in 1996: “The constitution is a system, an integral organism, 
the skeleton of our legislation.”2  
One might ask, why is the question of systematicity of the constitution an issue 
worth a closer look. The issue arose in the judgement of the Estonian Supreme 
Court en banc that established in 2008 somewhat surprisingly: “Even if we 
admitted that the regulatory provisions […] are not perfect, this in itself would 
not give rise to conflict with the constitution. Not everything imperfect is 
unconstitutional.”3 The latter view consists of two findings: First, the Supreme 
Court admitted that the legal regulation in question was deficient, and second, 
despite its deficiency, the Court held it for constitutional. The case dealt with the 
question whether the control mechanism of the party financing was sufficiently 
effective and met the constitutionally required minimum. The Supreme Court en 
banc summarised the core of the abstract norm control: “although the legislator 
has established legal regulation to check the sources of political party funding, it 
has chosen a mechanism which does not allow to ascertain the actual sources of 
political party funding.”4 The Court observed that the Parliament select 
committee of the implementation of the Anti-corruption Act was composed of 
the representatives of the political parties represented in the Parliament and one 
                                                 
1  R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 89. 
2  L. Meri. Vabariigi Presidendi ametivanne ja kõne. – VIII Riigikogu shorthand records, IV 
session, Monday, 7 October 1996, at 15:00 (https://www.riigikogu.ee; all internet links visited 
on 19 August 2019). For unexplicable reasons, this part of the speech has not been published 
in the collected speeches of Lennart Meri ‘Riigimured’ (ed. by T. Kiho. Tartu: Ilmamaa, 2001, 
p. 15). 
3  SCebj 21.05.2008, 3-4-1-3-07, para. 50. 
4  Ibid., para. 23. 
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of the tasks of this committee was to ensure the accessibility of election campaign 
funding.5 The Court agreed “that in regard to a body formed on political party 
bases […] it is difficult to achieve the body’s apparent independence through 
legal regulation.”6 But the Court did not ascertain any unconstitutionality.7 
Consequently, according to the Supreme Court, the control mechanism of the 
party financing was in accordance with the principle of democracy although the 
regulation did not ensure that all actual sources of political party funding were 
made public. In the context of this study the question of interest is not the 
contradiction in the reasoning of the Supreme Court but rather the broader issue 
that by tolerating considerable gaps in the control mechanism of the party 
financing the Supreme Court called the idea of the constitution as a system into 
question. If a serious inconsistency of a legal regulation is considered to be 
neutral from the perspective of the constitution, the constitution does not form 
any system. In case of an ineffectiveness or incoherence of the legal regulation, 
the assessment is more complicated. I shall argue that both cases would endanger 
the constitution as a system.  
Constitutional theory presupposes a relatively independent and stable set of 
norms without being a one-way street – the constitutional theory also helps to 
secure and to maintain an independent and a stable basic order. On that basis, the 
present study intends to contribute to the constitutional theory in order to help to 
secure and to maintain Estonian constitutional order. This study will confirm that 
the Estonian Constitution forms a system. This system requires a seamless frame-
work of constitutional norms and procedures and does not allow for significant 
gaps or deficiencies in interpretations of the constitutional norms. This introductory 
article will first analyse the two fundamental concepts – the concept of constitution 
(II) and the concept of system (III). Thereafter these ideas will be summarised 
(IV). 
 
                                                 
5  Ibid., paras. 40, 47. 
6  Ibid., para. 38. 
7  The Court simply presumed that “political parties who politically compete with each other 
are interested that none of the political parties achieved a competitive advantage thanks to 
uncontrollable funds.” It did not even discuss the possibility of a collusion. Furthermore, the 
Court stated despite the inquisitorial principle of the constitutional review proceedings that no 
evidence was presented to the Court “enabling the Supreme Court en banc to conclude that 
the described manner of setting up the committee does not guarantee the actual independence”. 
“Instead, the documents of this court case tend to indicate that the 11th Riigikogu, and thus also 
the select committee of the implementation of Anti-corruption Act set up by the 11th Riigikogu, 
do have the interest of ascertaining the actual sources of political party funding. Namely, The 
Estonian People’s Union faction, the faction of the Social Democratic Party, Estonian Green 
Party faction and Pro Patria and Res Publica Union faction consider the control mechanism of 
political party funding established in the Political Parties Act unconstitutional.” (SCebd 
21.05.2008, 3-4-1-3-07, para. 40). 
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II. On the concept of constitution 
The concept of constitution has not found much attention in Estonian legal 
literature until recent times.8 This deficiency cannot be fixed here but rather 
outlined. The concept of constitution shall first be analysed from the historical 
perspective. Next we shall turn to the descriptive concept and finally deal with 
the analytical concepts of constitution. 
 
 
1. Historical concept of constitution 
The historical approach is widespread first and foremost in German academic 
literature.9 Regarding the concept of constitution historically, it appears to be the 
result of a development that is aligned with the political reality, the phase of the 
development of philosophy and its important authors. Throughout centuries two 
methodologically different concepts can be distinguished. 
 
 
                                                 
8  The most comprehensive treatment until present is P. K. Tupay. Verfassung und 
Verfassungsänderung in Estland. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2015, p. 17 ff. Cf. 
T. Annus. Riigiõigus. 2. ed. Tallinn: Juura, 2006, p. 31 f.; R. Maruste. Põhiseadus ja selle 
järelevalve. Tallinn 1997, p. 13 ff.; U. Lõhmus. Põhiseaduse muutmine ja muutused 
põhiseaduses. – Juridica 2011/1, p. 12 ff. E.g. commentaries to the Estonian Constitution on 
more than 1000 pages do not treat the concept of Constitution at all, cf. Ü. Madise et al. 
(eds.).Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. 4. ed. Tallinn 2017. 
9  Cf. E.-W. Böckenförde. Geschichtliche Entwicklung und Bedeutungswandel der 
Verfassung. – E.-W. Böckenförde. Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 
1991, p. 29 ff.; D. Grimm. Der Verfassungsbegriff in historischer Entwicklung. – D. Grimm. 
Die Zukunft der Verfassung. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1991, p. 101 ff.; id. Ursprung und 
Wandel der Verfassung. – D. Grimm. Die Zukunft der Verfassung II. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhr-
kamp, 2012, p. 11 ff.; id. Entwicklung und Funktion des Verfassungsbegriffs. – D. Grimm. 
Die Zukunft der Verfassung II. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2012, p. 203 ff.; G. Jellinek. 
Allgemeine Staatslehre. 3. ed, 5. print. Berlin: Springer, 1929, p. 505 ff.; H. Mohnhaupt, 
D. Grimm. Verfassung. Zur Geschichte des Begriffs von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1995, p. 1 ff., 100 ff.; F. Renner. Der Verfassungsbegriff im staats-
rechtlichen Denken der Schweiz im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Zürich: Schultheiss, 1968, p. 77 
ff.; E. Schmidt-Aßmann. Der Verfassungsbegriff in der deutschen Staatslehre der Aufklärung 
und des Historismus. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1967, p. 27 ff.; P. Unruh. Der Verfas-
sungsbegriff des Grundgesetzes. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002, p. 39 ff.; C. Winterhoff. 
Verfassung – Verfassunggebung – Verfassungsänderung. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007, 
p. 8 ff. 
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1.1. From the antiquity to the enlightenment –  
empirical concept of constitution 
Hsü Dau-Lin defined the empirical concept – without calling it the empirical 
concept – as the concrete mode of existence of a state.10 In the early epoch, under-
standing the constitution as a perceived form of government can be viewed as the 
dominant position. During a quite long period – from the antiquity to the 
enlightenment – it was predominantly not an option to restrict the power of the 
ruler because the power was assumed to be of a divine origin and nothing divine 
can be limited. Therefore, the constitution was considered to be the form of the 
current government. For example according to Aristotle, the constitution is the 
government: 
“Now a constitution is the ordering of a state in respect of its various magistracies, 
and especially the magistracy that is supreme over all matters. For the government 
is everywhere supreme over the state and the constitution is the government.”11 
Although the empirical concept of constitution did not disappear with the 
enlightenment but lived on in the political science, the Estonian legal literature 
seems not to be aware of the empirical dimension of the concept of constitution. 
Instead, this concept still appears in political texts, for example the former President 
Toomas Hendrik Ilves wrote: “Constitution is the mode how to organise the 
relationship between citizens and political process into a lawbook.”12 
 
 
 1.2. From the enlightenment to the present –  
normative concept of constitution 
Although the normative concept existed already earlier13, it became dominant 
thanks to the changed political conditions over the course of the enlightenment. 
The change of the paradigm was caused by the need to limit the power of the 
absolutistic ruler. As a result, the function of the constitution changed – from a 
                                                 
10  H. Dau-Lin. Formalistischer und anti-formalistischer Verfassungsbegriff. – Archiv des 
öffentlichen Rechts NF 22 (1932), p. 43. 
11  Aristotle (English translation at Perseus Digital Library by H. Rackham). Politics. Book 
3, 1278b. 
12  T. H. Ilves. Eesti jõudmine. Tallinn: Varrak, 2006, p. 130. 
13  E.g. Cicero. On the Commonwealth. – Cicero. On the Commonwealth and On the Laws. 
Ed. by J. E. G. Zetzel. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Book 1, paras. 
41–45. Cicero sayd that next to monarchy, aristocracy and democracy there should stand a 
fourth type of constitution that would be the best because it constitutes a moderate 
(moderatum) mixture of all aforementioned three (para. 45). Cf. H. Mohnhaupt, D. Grimm. 
Verfassung. Zur Geschichte des Begriffs von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Berlin: Duncker 
& Humblot, 1995, p. 10 ff. 
17 
tool of the ruler became the basis, limitation and separator of the state powers.14 
The government of men was supposed to be replaced by the government of 
laws.15 The new understanding is best symbolised by the Article 16 of the French 
Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen of 1789: 
“Any society in which the guarantee of rights is not assured, nor the separation of 
powers determined, has no constitution.”16 
The basis of the new dominant concept of constitution was the presumption that 
all state power emanated from the people and only the constitution could create 
the basis for its exercise. The concept of constitution in the Declaration of the 
Rights of the Man and of the Citizen is also substantive because it included 
provisions on constitutional rights as well as on separation of powers. 
 
 
2. Descriptive concept of constitution 
A rather simple version of the modern concept of constitution is the descriptive 
concept.17 The key question for the creators of this concept was: What are the 
common characteristics of such sets of norms that are commonly considered as 
constitutions. The first influential and still relevant descriptive concept was the 
definition of a Swiss scholar Emer de Vattel from 1758: 
“The basic regulation which determines the manner in which the Public Authority 
is to be exercised is what forms the Constitution of the State. In it is seen the form 
in which the Nation acts as a Political Body; how and by whom should the people 
be governed, what are the rights and duties of those who govern. This constitution 
is essentially nothing else than the establishment of the order in which a Nation 
intends to work together to obtain the advantages for which the Political Society 
was established.”18 
                                                 
14  Cf. The Federalist Papers, No. 47, 48, 50 (Madison;  
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf); H. Heller. Staatslehre. – H. Heller. 
Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. III: Staatslehre als politische Wissenschaft. Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1992, p. 361 ff., 387 ff. 
15  “[…] to the end it may be a government of laws, not of men” is the final clause of the 
Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the first 
Chapter of the Constitution of Massachusetts from 1780. 
16  Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789  
(https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais/Constitution/Declaration-des-Droits-de-l-
Homme-et-du-Citoyen-de-1789): “Toute Société dans laquelle la garantie des Droits n’est 
pas assurée, ni la séparation des Pouvoirs déterminée, n’a point de Constitution.” 
17  P. Badura. Verfassung. – R. Herzog, H. Kunst, K. Schlaich, W. Schneelmelcher (eds.). 
Evangelisches Staatslexikon. Vol. II: N–Z. 3. ed. Stuttgart: Kreuz, 1987, col. 3741. 
18  E. de Vattel. De droit de gens (1758). Liv. I Chap. III, § 27  
(http://oll.libertyfund.org/Home3/Book.php?recordID=0586.01): “Le règlement fondamental 
qui détermine la manière dont l’Autorité Publique doit être exercée est ce qui forme la 
Constitution de l’État. En elle se voit la forme sous laquelle la Nation agit en qualité de Corps 
18 
Structurally on the same page were on the brink of the 20th century’s turn Thomas 
M. Cooley, Albert Venn Dicey and Georg Jellinek. The American legal scholar 
Thomas M. Cooley determined the constitution as follows: 
“The term constitution may be defined as the body of rules and maxims in 
accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised.”19 
The English constitutional law expert Albert Venn Dicey found that: 
“Constitutional law […] appears to include all rules which directly or indirectly 
affect the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign power in the state.”20 
The influential definition of the German scholar Georg Jellinek includes, likewise 
Emer de Vattel, also the rights determining the legal position of the individual: 
“Accordingly, the constitution of the state comprises as a rule the laws which 
designate the supreme organs of the state, the manner of their creation, their mutual 
relations and their sphere of action, and the fundamental position of the individual 
towards the authority of the state.”21 
As very successful appeared the descriptive definition of the Swiss consti-
tutionalist Werner Kägi, according to which the constitution is the legal or 
normative basic order of the state.22 Kägi’s definition expresses the normative as 
well as the empirical dimension of the constitution because the term ‘order’ may 
express both the norms and state of affairs. 
                                                 
Politique ; comment & par qui le Peuple doit être gouverné, quels sont les droits & les devoirs 
de ceux qui gouvernent. Cette Constitution n’est dans le fonds autre chose, que l’établissement 
de l’ordre dans lequel une Nation se propose de travailler en commun à obtenir les avantages 
en vue desquels la Société Politique s’est établie” (emphasis in original). De Vattel’s definition 
contains also an intentional element but this is not sufficient to turn it into a substantive 
concept. 
19  T. M. Cooley. The general principles of constitutional law in the United States of America. 
3. ed. Boston 1898, p. 22 (emphasis in original). 
20  Here cited: A. V. Dicey. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. 9. ed. 
London: MacMillan and Co., 1939, p. 23. 
21  G. Jellinek. Allgemeine Staatslehre. 3. ed, 5. print. Berlin: Springer, 1929, p. 505: “Die 
Verfassung des Staates umfaßt demnach in der Regel die Rechtssätze, welche die obersten 
Organe des Staates bezeichnen, die Art ihrer Schöpfung, ihr gegenseitiges Verhältnis und ihren 
Wirkungskreis festsetzen, ferner die grundsätzliche Stellung des einzelnen zur Staatsgewalt.” 
22  W. Kägi. Die Verfassung als rechtliche Grundordnung des Staates (1945). Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971, p. 9 ff. Cf. to the critique of Kägi’s concept in 
particular G. Lübbe-Wolff. Die “Verfassung für Europa” – ein Etikettenschwindel? – 
W. Baumann, H.-J. v. Dickhuth-Harrach, W. Marotzke (eds.). Gesetz, Recht, Rechtsge-
schichte. München: Sellier, 2005, p. 195 ff.; G. Lübbe-Wolff. Volk, Demokratie, Verfassung – 
Die “Verfassung für Europa” als Herausforderung an die Verfassungstheorie. – W. Kluth 
(ed.). Europäische Integration und nationales Verfassungsrecht. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007, 
p. 47 ff.; G. Lübbe-Wolff. Die Zukunft der europäischen Verfassung. – U. Davy, G. Lübbe-
Wolff (eds.). Verfassung: Geschichte, Gegenwart, Zukunft. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018, 
p. 134 ff. 
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These definitions are predominantly considered as expressions of the 
substantive concept of constitution.23 However, it is hard to agree with that. None 
of the above-mentioned definitions establishes substantive requirements for the 
constitution, they just describe the common features of most of the sets of norms 
commonly considered as constitutions. A description of common basic features 
does not constitute a substantive definition. Instead it remains a description of 
usual characteristics.24 The substantive concept presupposes an answer to the 
question why it should be so. 
If we would consider these definitions as substantive definitions, the result 
would be vagueness of the constitutional concept. Taking, for instance, the 
Jellinek’s definition because of its advanced precision as the initial point, then all 
norms that constitute the manner of creation, mutual relations and sphere of 
action of supreme organs of a state would belong to the constitution. For the 
Parliament, the electoral laws and laws on political parties, for the Government, 
all laws that regulate governing and legal acts of the executive power, and for 
judiciary, the regulation of staffing of the Supreme Court and all procedural laws 
would be included. However, for instance, in the context of this concept the 
position of independent administrative bodies that are partly not subordinated to 
the government remains questionable. If we add the regulation on the 
fundamental positions of the individuals to the authority of the state, the 
constitutional concept expands even more because the fundamental position of 
individuals does not necessarily have to be determined by the constitutional 
rights. Roman Herzog has consequently drawn the conclusion that the constitution 
in the (so called) substantive sense is congruent to the public law.25 And Herzog 
can be agreed with insofar that due to the definitions of de Vattel, Cooley, Dicey, 
Jellinek or Kägi it is very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between 
different levels of public law. However, on the other side, if we identified the 
constitution with the whole public law, we would just be one step away from the 
allegation that the constitution is an “egg of the world” (Weltenei) that involves 
everything from criminal code to the law about the production of the 
thermometers.26 Then again, if we considered these definitions just as formal 
                                                 
23  J. Isensee. Staat und Verfassung. – J. Isensee, P. Kirchhof (eds.). Handbuch des Staats-
rechts. Vol. I: Grundlagen von Staat und Verfassung. Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1987, § 13 
recital 139; A. W. Heringa. Constitutions Compared. 4. ed. Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: 
Intersentia, 2016, p. 3; K. Stern. Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vol. I: 
Grundbegriffe und Grundlagen des Staatsrechts, Strukturprinzipien der Verfassung. 2. ed. 
München: C. H. Beck, 1984, p. 72 f.; A. Weber. Europäische Verfassungsvergleichung. 
München: C. H. Beck, 2010, p. 23. 
24  Cf. M. Tushnet. Constitution. – M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 218; P. Badura. 
Verfassung. – R. Herzog, H. Kunst, K. Schlaich, W. Schneelmelcher (eds.). Evangelisches 
Staatslexikon. Vol. II: N–Z. 3. ed. Stuttgart: Kreuz, 1987, col. 3742: “im beschreibenden und 
theoretischen Sinn”. 
25  R. Herzog. Allgemeine Staatslehre. Frankfurt a.M.: Athenäum, 1971, p. 309. 
26  E. Forsthoff. Der Staat der Industriegesellschaft. München: C. H. Beck, 1971, p. 144. 
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descriptions, we would not face those difficulties because we would be able to 
apply a different substantive concept. 
Consequently, it is not recommendable to treat the definitions of de Vattel, 
Cooley, Dicey, Jellinek, Kägi and their followers as substantive definitions but 
as formal descriptive definitions. Thus, there are two strategies to define the 
constitution formally: One may describe its usual content or analyse the essential 
formal characteristics that distinguish the constitution from simple laws. The 
latter would be an analytical formal concept.  
 
 
3. Analytical concept of constitution 
The analytical concept of constitution distinguishes between the constitution and 
the legal act that expresses the constitution.27 This distinction corresponds to the 
distinction between a norm and a normative statement;28 it is the basis of the 
semantic concept of norm and means that a norm is either the meaning29 or the 
sense30 of the normative statement. 
We may call a text which is titled ‘Constitution’ a constitution. But it is 
recommended to search the real concept of constitution on the level of norms.  
                                                 
27  C. Schmitt. Verfassungslehre. München, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1928, p. 44; 
H. Dau-Lin. Formalistischer und anti-formalistischer Verfassungsbegriff. – Archiv des öffent-
lichen Rechts NF 22 (1932), p. 43 with references to the historical sources from the 19th 
century in fn. 26. 
28  Cf. R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002, p. 22 ff.; M. Borowski. Grundrechte als Prinzipien. 3. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2018, p. 215 f.; id. Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit. Tübingen: Mohr, 2006, p. 181 f.; 
P. Holländer. Rechtsnorm, Logik und Wahrheitswerte. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993, p. 64 ff.; 
H. Kelsen. The Pure Theory of Law. 2. ed. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of 
California Press, 1970, p. 5; P. Koller. Theorie des Rechts. 2. ed. Wien, Köln, Weimar: 
Böhlau, 1997, p. 66; A. Ross. Directives and Norms. London: Routledge &. Kegan Paul, 1968, 
p. 34; J.-R. Sieckmann. Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle des Rechtssystems. Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1990, p. 25 ff.; C. and O. Weinberger. Logik, Semantik, Hermeneutik. 
München: C. H. Beck, 1979, p. 20, 108; O. Weinberger. Rechtslogik. 2. ed. Berlin: Duncker 
& Humblot, 1989, p. 55. K. F. and H. C. Röhl underline that the term ‘norm’ is ambiguous in 
the legal language, K. F. and H. C. Röhl. Allgemeine Rechtslehre. 3. ed. Köln, München: 
Heymanns, 2008, p. 92. Despite that they also distinguish the norm and the normative 
statement, id. p. 189 ff., 195 f. See to different norm theories P. Holländer. Rechtsnorm, Logik 
und Wahrheitswerte. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993, p. 64 ff. 
29  E.g. R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002, p. 22; C. Weinberger, O. Weinberger. Logik, Semantik, Hermeneutik. München: 
C. H. Beck, 1979, p. 20, 108; O. Weinberger. Rechtslogik. 2. ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
1989, p. 55. Cf. A. Ross. Directives and Norms. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968, 
p. 34. 
30  E.g. H. Kelsen. The Pure Theory of Law. 2. ed. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1970, p. 5. 
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Analytic approaches are less frequent in the legal literature than the 
descriptive ones.31 The analytical concept of constitution is a normative one. The 
right place to search for it is the level of norms. In the normative sense the 
constitution must be determined by positively named characteristics that 
distinguish it from other sets of norms. On the level of norms, we can define the 
constitution either formally or substantively.32 The formal approach connects the 
concept to certain formal characteristics, the substantive one to substantive 
characteristics. Thereby the line between the form and substance may be 
disputable. 
 
 
3.1. Constitution in formal sense 
The formal concept of constitution is a suitable means for identifying the 
constitution in states where a certain determinable act exists that expresses the 
constitution. Characteristics that distinguish the constitution from simple statutes 
are in first order its supreme validity and the more difficult process of amending 
it.33 
 
3.1.1. Supreme validity 
The formal concept of constitution presupposes that the constitution of a state 
derives from a single legal act or at least from clearly identifiable legal acts. 
However, the requirement of a single act is rather a regulative idea because many 
states have more than one legal act that contains constitutional norms. For 
example the Constitution of the United States of America consists of the 
Constitution from 1789 and its 27 amendments.34 The textual basis of the Estonian 
Constitution also comprises of more than one legal act: The Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia,35 The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia Implementation 
                                                 
31  Cf. H. Heller. Staatslehre. – H. Heller. Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. III: Staatslehre als 
politische Wissenschaft. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992, p. 385 ff.; A. Ross. Theorie der 
Rechtsquellen. Leipzig, Wien: Franz Deuticke, 1929, p. 350 ff.; K. Stern. Das Staatsrecht der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vol. I: Grundbegriffe und Grundlagen des Staatsrechts, 
Strukturprinzipien der Verfassung. 2. ed. München: C. H. Beck, 1984, p. 69 ff. (§ 3 II); 
A. Weber. Europäische Verfassungsvergleichung. München: C. H. Beck, 2010, p. 13 ff. 
32  G. Jellinek. Allgemeine Staatslehre. 3. ed, 5. print. Berlin: Springer, 1929, p. 506 ff. Cf. 
A. Weber. Europäische Verfassungsvergleichung. München: C. H. Beck, 2010, p. 18 ff.; 
M. Kloepfer. Verfassungsrecht I. München: C. H. Beck, 2011, p. 20 ff. (§ 1 recital 107 ff., 
118 ff.). 
33  M. Kloepfer. Verfassungsrecht I. München: C. H. Beck, 2011, p. 22; A. Weber. Euro-
päische Verfassungsvergleichung. München: C. H. Beck, 2010, p. 18 ff. 
34  Cf. https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm. 
35  Riigi Teataja [State Gazette] (RT) RT 1992, 26, 349; I, 15.05.2015, 2. 
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Act,36 and The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia Amendment Act37.38 These 
three acts differ relatively clearly from the rest of the legal order so that they can 
be considered as the textual basis of the constitution. 
The supreme validity means that the constitutional norms are on the highest 
level in the hierarchy of norms and thus possess the highest validity or binding 
force (höchste Geltungskraft). According to the rule lex superior derogat legi 
inferiori, in the hierarchy of validity, the validity of a higher rank invalidates the 
validities of lower ranks if they contradict. Alexander Hamilton explained the 
idea of the supreme validity in 1788: “[…] where the will of the legislature declared 
in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people declared in the constitution, 
the judges ought to be governed by the latter, rather than the former.”39 He added 
that courts’ “duty […] must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor 
of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or 
privileges would amount to nothing.”40 Hamilton’s ideas became reality for the 
first time in 1803 in the case Marbury v. Madison where the US Supreme Court 
confronted the government of men with the government of laws and declared for 
the first time in history an act of parliament for null and void.41 
In the 20th century, Hans Kelsen was the most prominent defender of the idea 
of hierarchy of norms. He also emphasised the legal logical inevitability of the 
constitutional review: “As long as a constitution lacks the guarantee […] of the 
annullability of unconstitutional acts it also lacks the character of full legal 
bindingness in the technical sense. […] Any statute whatsoever, any simple 
degree – yes, even any general legal transaction of private parties – surpasses 
such a constitution in legal force […].”42 The sole remedy is to invalidate the 
contradicting inferior legal norm by the constitutional review court. 
                                                 
36  RT 1992, 26, 350. 
37  RT I 2003, 64, 429. 
38  The title of the legal commentaries of Estonian Constitution is therefore incorrect because 
it names only the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, leaving other parts of the 
constitution aside. The commentaries themselves, however, also include the implementation 
act and the amendment act. 
39  The Federalist Papers, No. 78 (1788, Hamilton;  
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf). 
40  Ibid. 
41  U.S. Supreme Court 23.02.1803, 5 U.S. 137 (163) – Marbury v. Madison.  
42  H. Kelsen. The Nature and Development of Constitutional Adjudication. – L. Vinx (ed. 
and transl.). The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of 
Constitutional Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 69. Original: H. Kelsen. 
Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit. – Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der 
Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 1929 (5), p. 78: “Solange eine Verfassung der […] Garantie der 
Vernichtbarkeit verfassungswidriger Akte ermangelt, fehlt ihr auch der Charakter voller 
Rechtsverbindlichkeit im technischen Sinne. […] Jedes beliebige Gesetz, jede einfache 
Verordnung, ja jedes generelle Rechtsgeschäft privater Parteien übertrifft eine solche Verfas-
sung, die über allen diesen Rechtsnormen steht, übertrifft sie, aus der alle diese niederen 
Stufen der Rechtsordnung ihre Geltung holen, an Geltungskraft” (emphasis in original). 
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Although Kelsen’s inevitability theses has also been sharply criticised,43 it is 
not necessary to go into the details here. For the first element of the formal 
concept of constitution it suffices to say that the constitutional validity or binding 
force is higher than that of the simple statutes. Instead, it should be distinguished 
between the supreme validity in a strong and in a weak sense. In the strong formal 
sense, the supreme validity exists in those states where functioning constitutional 
review exists. In the weak formal sense, the supreme validity exists also in those 
states where, although no functioning constitutional review exists, there is a 
common understanding that the constitution is more important or has a higher 
rank than simple statutes. 
 
3.1.2. More difficult amendability compared to ordinary statutes 
Paul Laband and Georg Jellinek called the more difficult amendability of the 
constitution the increased formal force of law (erhöhte Gesetzeskraft).44 The more 
difficult amendability means that the constitution may not be amended by any 
simple statute or applying the rule ‘lex posterior derogat legi priori’. According to 
Klaus Stern, the more difficult amendability is, as a rule, manifested in a qualified 
majority or in the requirement of approval of the member states of a federal 
state.45 He questions, whether a constitution that does not have such an increased 
formal force of law can qualify as a constitution at all.46 This difficulty points to 
the necessity of an adequate theory of legal system as a precondition to the 
analytic theory of the formal concept of constitution. If a legal system is not 
sufficiently theorised, it will be difficult to determine the constitution formally. 
For example, in a legal system where the hierarchy of norms is not recognised, the 
search for the constitution in the formal sense would remain fruitless. Therefore, 
the analytic formal theory only applies to developed legal systems. 
Jellinek points to the same direction. According to him, a constitution has no 
practical legal value in those states where it can be passed and amended by simple 
statutes or by simple parliamentary majority; it would be only consequent to deny 
the existence of the constitution in the formal sense altogether.47 Indeed, if the 
constitution could be amended by a simple parliamentary majority, there would 
                                                 
43  Particularly by C. Schmitt. Das Reichsgericht als Hüter der Verfassung (1929). – 
C. Schmitt. Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924-1954. Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1958, p. 73 ff.; C. Schmitt. Der Hüter der Verfassung. Tübingen: Mohr, 1931, 
p. 12 ff. 
44  P. Laband. Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches. Vol. 2. 5. ed. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911, 
p. 38 ff., 72 f.; G. Jellinek. Allgemeine Staatslehre. 3. ed, 5. print. Berlin: Springer, 1929, 
p. 534. 
45  K. Stern. Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vol. I: Grundbegriffe und 
Grundlagen des Staatsrechts, Strukturprinzipien der Verfassung. 2. ed. München: C. H. Beck, 
1984, p. 72. 
46  Ibid. 
47  G. Jellinek. Allgemeine Staatslehre. 3. ed, 5. print. Berlin: Springer, 1929, p. 534. 
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be no rational explanation why simple statutes cannot explicitly or implicitly give 
substance to the constitution.  
 
3.1.3. Interim result 
The constitution in the formal analytical sense is a set of norms that has the 
highest binding force (höchste Geltungskraft) in a legal system and a more 
difficult amendability (erhöhte Gesetzeskraft) compared to simple statutes. It is 
possible to distinguish between constitutions in a strong and in a weak formal 
sense. The constitution in the strong formal sense exists where also a functioning 
constitutional review exists. The constitution in the weak formal sense exists 
where just a set of norms exists that is commonly considered to be more important 
or on a higher level than simple statutes. 
 
 
3.2. Constitution in substantive sense 
In the substantive analytical sense, the question to ask is: What is the necessary 
content of any set of norms in order to deserve the label ‘Constitution’? Any 
answer to that question presupposes a metatheory of a set of norms that is capable 
imposing requirements to the basic mechanisms for exercising the power. As will 
be shown below, the best candidate for such set of norms is human rights. The 
debates about the existence,48 the concept49 and the justification50 of human rights 
are fundamental debates of legal philosophy. Therefore, it is not possible to go 
into more detail here. Instead, based on the Robert Alexy’s theory of the 
                                                 
48  E.g. Alasdair MacIntyre’s famous quote: “[…] there are no such rights, and belief in them 
is one with belief in witches and unicorns.” (A. MacIntyre. After Virtue. 2. ed. London: 
Duckworth 1985, p. 69.) Cf. R. Alexy. The Existence of Human Rights. – U. Neumann, 
K. Günther, L. Schulz (eds.). Law, Science, Technology. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013, p. 9 ff.; 
id. Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights. – Ratio Juris 25 (2012), p. 8 ff. 
49  E.g. Marie-Bénédicte Dembour distinguishes four schools of the concept of human rights: 
(1) natural or orthodoxic, (2) deliberative, (3) protest and (4) discursive schools of thought. 
(M.-B. Dembour. What Are Human Rights? Four Schools of Thought. – Human Rights 
Quarterly 32 (2010), p. 1 ff.; Cf. id. Who Believes in Human Rights? Cambridge et al.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 232 ff., 253 ff.) Robert Alexy distinguishes eight 
approaches to human rights: (1) religious, (2) intuitionistic, (3) consensual, (4) socio-
biological, (5) instrumentalistic, (6) cultural, (7) explicative and (8) existential. (R. Alexy. 
Discourse Theory and Fundamental Rights. – A. J. Menéndez, E. O. Eriksen (eds.). Arguing 
Fundamental Rights. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006, p. 18 ff.) 
50  Cf. R. Alexy. The Existence of Human Rights. – U. Neumann, K. Günther, L. Schulz 
(eds.). Law, Science, Technology. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013, p. 9 ff.; id. Law, Morality, 
and the Existence of Human Rights. – Ratio Juris 25 (2012), p. 10 ff.; id. Grund- und 
Menschenrechte. – J.-R. Sieckmann (ed.). Verfassung und Argumentation. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2005, p. 61 f.; id. Menschenrechte ohne Metaphysik? – Deutsche Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie 2004, p. 16 ff.; id. Diskurstheorie und Menschenrechte. – R. Alexy. Recht, 
Vernunft, Diskurs. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1995, p. 144 ff. 
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connection between human rights and the democratic constitutionalist state or 
democratic constitutionalism (demokratischer Verfassungsstaat)51, I shall draft 
the connection between the human rights and the constitution. 
 
3.2.1. Robert Alexy’s theory of the connection between human rights and 
democratic constitutionalism 
According to Robert Alexy, there is a normative type of connection between the 
human rights and the democratic constitutionalism.52 Alexy explains his 
argument in two steps. First, he argues that the human rights require their 
transformation into the positive law and this transformation is only possible in 
the context of a state. Furthermore, because the enforcement of human rights 
                                                 
51  According to Walton H. Hamilton, the rise of modern constitutionalism may be dated from 
1776 (W. H. Hamilton. Constitutionalism. – E. R. A. Seligman, A. Johnson (eds.). Encyclo-
paedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. 4. New York: Macmillan, 1931, p. 255). The English 
expression ‘democratic constitutionalism’ has been already in use in the end of the 19th century 
(cf. G. P. Gooch. History of English Democratic ideas in the Seventeenth Century. Cambridge 
1898, p. 105). In the English-speaking literature constitutionalism is predominantly 
considered as an US-American invention (e.g. L. Henkin. A New Birth of Constitutionalism: 
Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects. – Cardozo Law Review 14 (1992), p. 533 ff., 536; 
G. A. Billias. American Constitutionalism Heard Round the World, 1776–1989. New York, 
London: New York University Press, 2009, p. XI ff., 51 ff. Cf. for a more differentiated 
approach e.g. D. Grimm. Constitutionalism. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2016, p. 41 ff., 53 ff.; V. Sellin. Restorations and Constitutions. – K. L. Grotke, M. J. Prutsch 
(eds.). Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power. Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014, p. 85 f.). Immanuel Kant formulated the idea of constitutionalism or consti-
tutionalist state in the end of 18th century as “a union of a multitude of human beings under 
laws of right” (I. Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals. – I. Kant. Practical Philosophy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 456 (§ 45; 6:313). Original: I. Kant. Die 
Metaphysik der Sitten. Königsberg 1797/1798, p. A 165/B 195 (§ 45): “Vereinigung einer 
Menge von Menschen unter Rechtsgesetzen”.) The German equivalent concept to the 
constitutionalism ‘Verfassungsstaat’ did not occur by Kant but has been in use in the 19th 
century literature (e.g. J. C. Bluntschli. Lehre vom modernen Staat. Vol. 1: Allgemeine Staats-
lehre. 5. ed. Stuttgart 1875, p. 68, 75 f.). The German concept ‘demokratischer Verfassungs-
staat’ originates – as far as can be seen – from the judgement of the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court in 1952 about the prohibition of the Socialist Reich Party (BVerfG 23.10.1952, 
1 BvB 1/51, para. 37 (BVerfGE 2, 1, 12)). In Estonian, the term ‘konstitutsionalism’ has been 
used partly in a similar meaning like here (cf. R. Maruste. Konstitutsionalism ning põhiõiguste 
ja -vabaduste kaitse. Tallinn: Juura, 2004, p. 17 ff.), partly in a different sense according to 
which from the supreme level of the legal system, i.e. from the constitution, are “streaming 
out” all other norms of the system (B. Aaviksoo. Riigi otsustusruumi ahenemine: kodakondsus 
nüüdisaegses Euroopas. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli kirjastus, 2013, p. 92 ff.). To avoid confusion, 
it is preferable to use in Estonian for constitutionalism the term ‘põhiseadusriik’ (consti-
tutionalist state) instead. 
52  R. Alexy. Die Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechte im demokratischen Verfas-
sungsstaat. – S. Gosepath, G. Lohmann (eds.). Philosophie der Menschenrechte. Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1998, p. 254. 
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causes the necessity of a state, there is a human right to the existence of a state.53 
As a second step, Alexy argues that not only the state as such is necessary but a 
state of a certain kind, namely the democratic constitutionalism.54 Alexy explains 
this argument in three steps. First, he argues that implementation of human rights 
presupposes legality of the administration, independence of the judiciary and the 
separation of powers because otherwise the enforcement of a right would depend 
on the political will of those in power.55 Second, the human rights should be 
included into the constitution as constitutional rights and the legislator should be 
controlled by the democratic process since there is also a human right to 
participate in the process of political decision-making.56 Third, democracy alone 
does not guarantee human rights for all but only for the respective majority. In 
order to protect the rights of minorities, constitutional review over decisions of 
the legislator is necessary as well.57  
 
3.2.2. Conclusions from Robert Alexy’s theory 
Alexy does not formalise his conclusions in this article. However, a formalisation 
of some key lines of his thought might throw some new light on the substantive 
concept of constitution. To do this, I shall first formalise Alexy’s main 
conclusion, then extend it and then establish a connection between human rights 
and the concept of constitution. 
Alexy comes to the result that the democratic constitutionalism (DC) is a 
necessary condition of human rights (HR): 
(1) ¬DC  ¬HR 
Consequently, human rights are sufficient condition for the democratic 
constitutionalism: 
(2) HR  DC 
Martin Kriele follows Alexy’s line of thought and points out that the separation 
of powers (SoP) is not a sufficient condition for human rights but a necessary 
condition.58 Along similar lines, the independence of judiciary (IoJ) is for Kriele 
                                                 
53  Ibid., p. 255. 
54  Ibid., p. 258. 
55  Ibid., p. 258 f. 
56  Ibid., p. 250 f., 259 ff. 
57  Ibid., p. 262 ff. 
58  M. Kriele. Einführung in die Staatslehre. 6. ed. Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln: Kohlhammer, 2003, 
p. 101, 107 f. Elsewhere, Kriele suggests that important institutions of the constitutionalism 
are validity of statutes, constitution-binding of state powers, human rights, separation of 
powers, democratic elections etc. (Ibid., p. 47.) However, the concept of institution is 
somewhat undetermined. Furthermore, Kriele also maintains that human rights and 
constitutionalism are conditional upon one another. (Ibid., p. 107.) The latter statement needs 
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a necessary condition for human rights, too.59 This idea shall be formalised as 
follows: 
(3) ¬(SoP ˄ IoJ)  ¬HR 
To turn this around, human rights are a sufficient condition for separation of 
powers and independence of judiciary: 
(4) HR  (SoP ˄ IoJ) 
Thus, Kriele brings exactly the same argument as Alexy in respect to the 
separation of powers and the independence of judiciary.60 To complete the 
formula with Alexy’s other features, we must add the legality of administration 
(LoA), constitutional rights (CR), democracy (Dem) and constitutional review 
(Rev). All these elements together form, according to Alexy, the democratic 
constitutionalism: 
(5) DC   (SoP ˄ IoJ ˄ LoA ˄ CR ˄ Dem ˄ Rev) 
Therefore, if we replace the democratic constitutionalism, which is a necessary 
condition for human rights by its elements, the formula looks like follows: 
(6) ¬(SoP ˄ IoJ ˄ LoA ˄ CR ˄ Dem ˄ Rev)  ¬HR 
Consequently, human rights are a sufficient condition for the separation of 
powers, the independence of judiciary, the legality of administration, 
constitutional rights, democracy and constitutional review: 
(7) HR  (SoP ˄ IoJ ˄ LoA ˄ CR ˄ Dem ˄ Rev) 
Moreover, Alexy’s conclusions that human rights require their transformation 
into constitutional rights and a constitutional review over decisions of the 
legislator mean that democratic constitutionalism presupposes the existence of a 
constitution.61 Since democratic constitutionalism is not possible without a 
constitution – written or unwritten –, which necessarily includes human rights in 
                                                 
a clarification. As we have seen above, there is no biconditional relation between the two. 
Instead, human rights are a sufficient condition for democratic constitutionalism but 
democratic constitutionalism is a necessary condition for human rights.  
59  Ibid., p. 107 f. 
60  One might be tempted to argue with Kriele that the separation of powers together with the 
independence of the judiciary are more important than the existence of a catalogue of 
constitutional rights (M. Kriele. Einführung in die Staatslehre. 6. ed. Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln: 
Kohlhammer, 2003, p. 108). But for the pursued conclusion here it does not matter which of 
the both is more important. It is sufficient to state that both are necessary. 
61  Cf. to the necessity of law in general R. Alexy. Discourse Theory and Human Rights. – 
Ratio Juris 9 (1996), p. 220 f. 
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the form of constitutional rights and stipulates also constitutional review, a 
constitution (Con) is also necessary in relation to human rights: 
(8) ¬Con  ¬HR 
Consequently, human rights are a sufficient condition for a constitution: 
(9) HR  Con 
 
3.2.3. The substantive concept of constitution 
In Alexy’s model a constitution cannot succeed without democratic consti-
tutionalism and vice versa because human rights are sufficient conditions for 
both. Moreover, constitutional rights and constitutional review conceptually and 
systematically presuppose constitutional level legal norms because their main 
function is to mark the limits of the legitimate space of legislative decision-
making. The democratic character of the creation of a democratic will is a con-
stitutional level question. It cannot be left to be decided by the simple parlia-
mentary majority to guarantee the sustainability of the whole legitimisation 
process. The separation of powers and the independence of judiciary must be 
constitutional level questions as well because they constitute primary guarantees 
against decisions of the democratically elected legislative body.62 What is left, is 
the legality of administration. If the legality of administration was not stated in 
the constitution, there would be a permanent conflict between the legislator and 
the administration about the determination of the scope of mutual competencies. 
The constitutional statement determines that the administration can act within the 
framework set by the legislator and restricts significantly the space for potential 
conflicts. Secondly, the constitutional statement of the legality of administration is 
also necessary in order to guarantee the enforcement and thus the validity of 
legislative acts. Without a clear constitutional statement, the legality of 
administration would either presuppose a process of interpretation in order to 
establish it as a constitutional principle by the case law or it would only be 
contingent, i.e. dependent from the decision of the legislator. Thirdly, if human 
rights require democratic constitutionalism and a constitution, there is a strong 
assumption that all necessary elements of the democratic constitutionalism must 
be included in the constitution. Thus, all principles of the democratic consti-
tutionalism are either logically or at least for other good reasons principles of 
constitutional level. Therefore, there is a logical connection between the democratic 
constitutionalism and the substantive concept of constitution within this 
paradigm: no (proper) constitution without democratic constitutionalism and no 
democratic constitutionalism without a constitution: 
                                                 
62  Constitutional Rights and the separation of powers were considered as necessary elements 
of the Constitution already by the Article 16 of the French Declaration of the Rights of the 
Man and of the Citizen of 1789 (see above). 
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(10) (¬DC  ¬Con) ˄ (¬Con  ¬DC) 
This is equivalent to the following formula: 
(11) ¬DC   ¬Con 
This in turn is equivalent to the following formula which expresses the equi-
valence of the constitution with the democratic constitutionalism within this 
paradigm:63 
(12) Con   DC 
If the constitution in the substantive sense equals to the democratic consti-
tutionalism, we may replace the latter with its elements: 
(13) Con   (SoP ˄ IoJ ˄ LoA ˄ CR ˄ Dem ˄ Rev) 
This formula expresses the substantive concept of constitution relative to human 
rights. It includes necessarily the following elements: separation of powers, inde-
pendence of judiciary, legality of administration, constitutional rights, democracy 
and constitutional review. Consequently, constitution in a substantive sense are 
norms that regulate the fundamentals of separation of powers, independence of 
judiciary, legality of administration, constitutional rights, democracy and 
constitutional review. The difference to the descriptive definitions is that instead 
of referring to constitutional bodies and competencies, it consists of substantive 
principles that derive from human rights. 
The presented substantive concept of constitution has been developed essen-
tially with the help of Robert Alexy’s theory of the normative connection between 
human rights and democratic constitutionalism but the idea as such is not new. 
According to Article 2 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen of 1789 the goal of any political association is the conservation of the 
natural and imprescriptible rights of Man.64 A similar idea was also expressed by 
James Madison, one of the founding fathers of the United States, who named the 
                                                 
63  According to the traditional understanding, the democratic constitutionalism includes the 
statehood (of certain kind). The logical consequence of that is that the existence of a state (St) 
is a necessary condition for the existence of a constitution (¬St  ¬Con). Cf. to the critique 
and to the debate about the possibility of a constitution without a state instead of many 
G. Lübbe-Wolff. Volk, Demokratie, Verfassung – Die “Verfassung für Europa” als Heraus-
forderung an die Verfassungstheorie. – W. Kluth (ed.). Europäische Integration und nationales 
Verfassungsrecht. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007, p. 52 ff. with further references in fn. 7 and 
11. 
64  Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789,  
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais/Constitution/Declaration-des-Droits-de-l-
Homme-et-du-Citoyen-de-1789: „Le but de toute association politique est la conservation des 
droits naturels et imprescriptibles de l’Homme.“ Furthermore, the above cited Article 16 
emphasised the necessity to include the guarantee of rights and the separation of powers into 
the Constitution. 
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constitution as charters of power granted by liberty opposed to charters of liberty 
granted by power.65 These thoughts from the era of enlightenment formulate the 
regulative idea that still remains actual: The intrinsic goal of any political 
association or any public power is the protection of human rights and human 
rights lead to a certain kind of state, namely to the democratic constitutionalism. 
This idea has been labelled by Carl Schmitt as the ideal concept of constitution 
(Idealbegriff)66 levelling a charge of lack of realism. Peter Badura criticises it as 
a battle cry (Kampfbegriff)67 meaning that it is a polemically used political slogan. 
Likewise, Paloma Krõõt Tupay names it an enlightening-ideologised concept of 
constitution (“aufklärerisch-ideologisierter” Verfassungsbegriff).68 The attempt 
to define fundamental concepts of the system of government established to 
organise the society entails the allegation of being political or ideologised. 
According to Alexy, human rights are universal, fundamental, abstract, and moral 
rights that are established with priority over all other kinds of rights.69 If the 
demand for something universal, fundamental and moral is political, then this 
theory is political. The allegation of lacking the realism can only be refuted by 
demonstrating the practical usability. This will be essentially demonstrated in the 
following chapters. 
Since according to Alexy the human rights have only moral validity,70 the 
connection between the human rights and the constitution is a moral connection. 
In contrast to legal validity one may call this connection a weak one because it 
does not legally invalidate a constitution that does not include the elements of the 
democratic constitutionalism. However, the substantive concept still opens the 
                                                 
65  J. Madison. Charters. – National Gazette, 19 January 1792  
(http://www.constitution.org/jm/17920119_charters.htm): “In Europe, charters of liberty have 
been granted by power. America has set the example and France has followed it, of charters 
of power granted by liberty.” Cf. A. Somek. The Cosmopolitan Constitution. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014, p. 1. 
66  C. Schmitt. Verfassungslehre. München, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1928, p. 36 ff. 
67  P. Badura. Verfassung. – R. Herzog, H. Kunst, K. Schlaich, W. Schneelmelcher (eds.). 
Evangelisches Staatslexikon. Vol. II: N–Z. 3. ed. Stuttgart: Kreuz, 1987, col. 3741. 
68  P. K. Tupay. Verfassung und Verfassungsänderung in Estland. Berlin: Berliner Wissen-
schafts-Verlag, 2015, p. 21. On the other hand, Tupay claims that a scientifically relevant 
treatment of Estonian Constitution presupposes the recognition of its substantial democrati-
cally legitimating effect (ibid., p. 22: “Eine wissenschaftlich relevante Auseinandersetzung 
mit der estnischen Verfassung […] kann […] nur unter der Bedingung geleistet werden, dass 
dieser auch inhaltlich eine legitimierende Wirkung zukommt.”) The present study is based on 
the view that conceptual questions have to be strictly distinguished from the questions of 
legitimation. 
69  R. Alexy. Die Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechte im demokratischen Verfas-
sungsstaat. – S. Gosepath, G. Lohmann (eds.). Philosophie der Menschenrechte. Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1998, p. 246–254; id. The Existence of Human Rights. – U. Neumann, 
K. Günther, L. Schulz (eds.). Law, Science, Technology. Stuttgart: Nomos, 2013, p. 10–12. 
70  R. Alexy. Die Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechte im demokratischen Verfassungs-
staat. – S. Gosepath, G. Lohmann (eds.). Philosophie der Menschenrechte. Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1998, p. 249 f. 
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possibility to evaluate such a constitution. As Alexy expresses it, the best doctrine 
of human rights can be implemented in a democratic constitutionalism.71 To 
rephrase it, the best doctrine of human rights can be implemented in a 
constitution. With other words, states that have constitutions implementing better 
doctrines of human rights are better states. To go even further, a legal system that 
does not recognise human rights as its fundamental elements runs the risk to end 
up as a rogue state.72 
The substantive concept of constitution is a non-positivistic concept in contrast 
to the purely positivistic descriptive concepts. By non-positivism I mean, likewise 
Robert Alexy, the thesis according to which, by crossing a certain threshold of 
injustice, law ceases to be law.73 Moreover, the substantive concept of 
constitution is connected with the thesis that there is a necessary connection 
between law and the correct morality (the strong morality thesis).74 If there is on 
the one hand a necessary connection between the correct morality and law and, 
on the other hand, between human rights and democratic constitutionalism and 
we seek – from the moral point of view – the best fundamental order for a state, 
then there is a necessary connection between human rights and law. Human rights 
are the best version of morality that determines a legal system, mainly through 
principles.75 Thus, human rights as the correct morality in the Alexyian sense help 
                                                 
71  Ibid., p. 244. 
72  Cf. R. Alexy. The Argument from Injustice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, p. 50 f., 62. 
73  Ibid., p. 4, 28; R. Alexy. On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality. – Ratio Juris 
2 (1989), p. 173 ff. Alexy’s theory of non-positivism is based on the Radbruch’s Formula. 
(G. Radbruch. Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law (1946). – Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 26 (2006), p. 7.) In later articles Alexy differentiates between three versions of 
non-positivism. (R. Alexy. On the Concept and the Nature of Law. – Ratio Juris 21 (2008), 
p. 286 ff.; id. The Dual Nature of Law. – Ratio Juris 23 (2010), p. 175 ff.; id. Law, Morality, 
and the Existence of Human Rights. – Ratio Juris 25 (2012), p. 4 ff.) According to this, “the 
most radical version of non-positivism” is the ‘exclusive non-positivism’ according to which 
“every moral defect, every injustice, yields legal invalidity”. (Id. Law, Morality, and the 
Existence of Human Rights. – Ratio Juris 25 (2012), p. 5.) The other extreme is called the 
‘super-inclusive non-positivism’ and means that “legal validity is in no way whatever affected 
by moral defects”. (Ibid., p. 5 f.) The moderate form, called the ‘inclusive non-positivism’ 
“claims neither that moral defects always undermine legal validity nor that they never do”; 
instead it “maintains that moral defects undermine legal validity if and only if the threshold of 
extreme injustice is transgressed”. (Ibid., p. 6.) The viewpoint defended here corresponds to 
the inclusive non-positivism in Alexyian sense. 
74  R. Alexy. The Argument from Injustice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, p. 75; id. On 
Necessary Relations between Law and Morality. – Ratio Juris 2 (1989), p. 167 ff.; id. On the 
Thesis of a Necessary Connection between Law and Morality: Bulygin’s Critique. – Ratio 
Juris 13 (2000), p. 138 ff. 
75  Cf. to the argument from principles R. Alexy. The Argument from Injustice. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2002, p. 68 ff. 
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to determine the threshold of injustice,76 the crossing of which results in the 
defectiveness of law.77 
According to some authors, the scope of application of the substantive concept 
of constitution is restricted to those cases where the formal criteria are not 
fulfilled, i.e. cases where no constitution in formal sense exists.78 But there is 
another way of approaching it. A consequence of the presented theory is that if we 
accept the necessary connection between human rights and democratic consti-
tutionalism, we must also accept that states not fulfilling this premise and not 
implementing the principles of the democratic constitutionalism have no 
constitution in the substantive sense at all. However, they will most probably still 
have a constitution in the descriptive sense and perhaps in the formal analytical 
sense. The lack of the constitution in the substantive sense means however that 
their legal order is defective and needs – from the moral point of view – some 
substantial improvement. In this way the substantive concept is usable even if a 
constitution in formal sense exists. 
 
 
3.3. Mixed concepts 
Several authors combine the descriptive and formal and/or substantive analytical 
elements of the concept of constitution.79 These concepts shall be called mixed 
concepts. One example is the concept of Andrei Marmor, according to which 
constitutional documents have five main features: supremacy, longevity, rigidity, 
                                                 
76  Cf. R. Alexy. Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights. – Ratio Juris 25 (2012), 
p. 9. According to Alexy, the connection between human rights and justice can be seen in two 
different ways. First, according to the ‘core thesis’ “human rights represent the core of justice” 
in the way that: “Every violation of human rights is unjust, but not every injustice is a violation 
of human rights”. (Ibid.) According to the ‘equivalence thesis’: “Every violation of human rights 
is unjust, and every injustice is a violation of human rights.” (Ibid.) 
77  Cf. to the qualifying connection between morality and law R. Alexy. The Argument from 
Injustice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, p. 79. 
78  Cf. G. Jellinek. Allgemeine Staatslehre. 3. ed, 5. print. Berlin: Springer, 1929, p. 506 ff.; 
R. Smend. Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht. – R. Smend. Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen. 
Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1955, p. 237 j. 
79  K. Stern. Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vol. I: Grundbegriffe und Grund-
lagen des Staatsrechts, Strukturprinzipien der Verfassung. 2. ed. München: C. H. Beck, 1984, 
p. 69 ff., 78; D. Grimm. Die Zukunft der Verfassung II. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2012, 
p. 298; P. Unruh. Der Verfassungsbegriff des Grundgesetzes. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002, 
p. 9 ff., 380 ff., 450 ff.; C. Winterhoff. Verfassung – Verfassunggebung – Verfassungsände-
rung. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007, p. 95 ff.; G. Stourzh. Vom aristotelischen zum 
liberalen Verfassungsbegriff. – F. Engel-Janosi, G. Klinenstein, H. Lutz (eds.). Fürst, 
Bürger, Mensch. Wien: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1975, p. 97 ff.; P. K. Tupay. 
Verfassung und Verfassungsänderung in Estland. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 
2015, p. 17 ff., 20. 
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moral content and generality and abstraction.80 This concept has descriptive 
elements (longevity, generality and abstraction), formal analytical elements 
(supremacy and rigidity) and substantive analytical element (moral content). 
In order to define a constitution, there is no need for a mixed concept. If we 
consider the mixed concept as a description of some essential elements of the 
democratic constitutionalism, it has a heuristic value. The mixed concept can also 
be regarded as an attempt to achieve more rationality. In this case, the mixed con-
cept has a similar function as the substantive concept but because of the integrated 
formal elements it would not be able to determine the constitution in those states 
where no written document exists or where it is vague or too extensive. 
Mixed concepts point to an important aspect: A constitution of a democratic 
constitutionalist state has necessarily formal and substantive features because the 
rule of law principle deriving from human rights requires the formal features. 
Despite that, it remains recommendable to distinguish the descriptive from the 
analytical concepts and the formal from the substantive concepts. Different 
concepts of constitution have different functions and provide us with different 
information. 
 
 
3.4. Interim result 
Analytical concepts are either formal or substantive. Mixed concepts that also 
occur in theoretical literature are not sufficiently theorised and will be let aside here.  
The formal concept of constitution is determined by two elements: the 
supreme validity or binding force and the more difficult amendability. It enables 
to determine the constitution in those states where a written document which 
serves as the origin of the constitution exists. Since Estonia belongs to those 
states, it also enables us to determine the type of constitution in Estonia. The 
formal concept of constitution is content neutral, i.e. it enables us to determine 
the supreme level of norms in any legal system with a certain kind of hierarchy 
of norms regardless of their content. The formal concept makes even possible to 
classify states in those where a constitution in the strong formal sense exists, like 
e.g. in Estonia, and those where only a constitution in the weak formal sense 
exists. The formal concept of constitution is a positivistic concept. 
The rediscovered substantive concept sets a number of conditions to a proper 
constitution. The constitution in substantive sense includes necessarily separation 
of powers, independence of judiciary, legality of administration, constitutional 
rights, democracy and constitutional review. If a constitution includes these 
elements, then those are more important than other, optional elements of 
constitution. 
                                                 
80  A. Marmor. Interpretation and Legal Theory. 2. ed. Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2005, p. 142 f. 
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The most important elements of any constitution are its fundamental prin-
ciples,81 i.e. the principles without which any constitution would lose its 
essence.82 The substantive concept of constitution links human rights with its 
fundamental principles: The core of constitutional rights are formed by human 
rights and by human dignity and social state principles; separation of powers, 
independence of judiciary, legality of administration and constitutional review 
form the backbone of Rechtsstaat, whereas democracy remains democracy. Thus, 
human rights are the reason why human dignity, democracy, Rechtsstaat and 
social state are fundamental principles of a constitution. Without a proper 
guarantee of human dignity, democracy, Rechtsstaat or social state, a constitution 
would be deprived of its essence. Estonian legal system is, according to the 
Supreme Court, determined by five fundamental constitutional principles: human 
dignity,83 democracy,84 rule of law,85 social state86 and Estonian identity87.88 Thus, 
the Estonian constitutional doctrine corresponds to the conclusion from the 
substantive concept of constitution. This is a strong indication for the validity of 
the substantive concept of constitution for Estonian legal system. 
The substantive concept is a non-positivistic concept. In this way the 
substantive concept enables not only to answer the question whether there is a 
                                                 
81  The first treatment of the catalogue of fundamental principles of Estonian constitution 
originates from R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 89. 
82  This definition goes back to J. Laffranque. A Glance at the Estonian Legal Landscape in 
View of the Constitution Amendment Act. – Juridica International 12 (2007), p. 57. 
83  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 14; 05.05.2014, 3-4-1-67-13, para. 49; ALCSCr 
04.05.2011, 3-3-1-11-11, para. 10. 
84  SCebj 01.07.2010, 3-4-1-33-09, para. 52, 67; ALCSCr 16.01.2003, 3-3-1-2-03, para. 11; 
27.01.2003, 3-3-1-6-03, para. 11. 
85  CRCSCr 07.11.2014, 3-4-1-32-14, para. 28. Cf. CRCSCj 19.03.2009, 3-4-1-17-08, para. 
26; 06.01.2015, 3-4-1-34-14, para. 33; ALCSCr 16.01.2003, 3-3-1-2-03, para. 11; 27.01.2003, 
3-3-1-6-03, para. 11. 
86  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 14; 05.05.2014, 3-4-1-67-13, para. 49. 
87  CRCSCj 04.11.1998, 3-4-1-7-98, para. III. 
88  To the debate about fundamental principles of the Constitution see: W. Drechsler, 
T. Annus. Die Verfassungsentwicklung in Estland von 1992 bis 2001. – Jahrbuch des öffent-
lichen Rechts der Gegenwart NF 50 (2002), p. 473 ff.; M. Ernits. 20 Jahre Menschenwürde, 
Demokratie, Rechtsstaat, Sozialstaat. – S. Hülshörster, D. Mirow (eds.). Deutsche Beratung 
bei Rechts- und Justizreformen im Ausland. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2012, 
p. 126 ff.; R. Maruste. The Role of the Constitutional Court in Democratic Society. – Juridica 
International 13 (2007), p. 8 ff.; R. Maruste. Democracy and the Rule of Law in Estonia. – 
Review of Central and East European Law 26 (2000), p. 311 ff.; J. Laffranque. A Glance at 
the Estonian Legal Landscape in View of the Constitution Amendment Act. – Juridica 
International 12 (2007), p. 55 ff.; R. Narits. About the Principles of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia from the Perspective of Independent Statehood in Estonia. – Juridica 
International 16 (2009), p. 56 ff. See compilation of the sources in Estonian and presentation 
of the debate: M. Ernits. Põhiõigused, demokraatia, õigusriik. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 
2011, p. 5 fn. 9, p. 6 ff., 23 f. 
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constitution, but also to evaluate whether there is good or proper constitution, 
depending on the degree of compliance with the substantive concept. 
  
4. Result – the concept of constitution 
Historically the prevailing concept of constitution from the antiquity to the 
enlightenment was the empirical concept. According to the empirical concept, a 
constitution is how the powers are exercised. From the enlightenment on, the 
normative concept prevails. 
The normative concept can be determined in different ways. The simplest way 
is to describe the core of the vast majority of the valid constitutions. According 
to the most abstract descriptive definition, a constitution is the normative basic 
order of the state. In contrast to the descriptive approach, the concept of 
constitution shall be preferably determined by analysis. In the formal analytical 
sense, the concept has two main defining features: supreme validity and more 
difficult amendability. This is a positivistic definition. In the substantive 
analytical sense, a constitution has a necessary connection with human rights and 
consists of following defining features: separation of powers, independence of 
judiciary, legality of administration, constitutional rights, democracy and 
constitutional review. This is the non-positivistic concept of constitution. In some 
cases, a state might not have a constitution in the substantive sense but only in 
formal and/or descriptive sense. The conclusion that a state lacks a constitution 
in substantive sense, provides us the information that the particular legal system 
has some issues with implementation of human rights. 
 
III. On the concept of system 
According to Immanuel Kant, the system is “the unity of the manifold cognitions 
under one idea”89 or “a whole of cognition ordered according to principles”90 and 
the opposite of a system is rhapsody91.92 
                                                 
89  I. Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 691 
(A 832/B 860). (Original: I. Kant. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 1. ed. Riga 1781, p. 832; 2. ed. 
Riga 1787, p. 860: “die Einheit der mannigfaltigen Erkenntnisse unter einer idee”). 
90  I. Kant. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004, p. 3 (467). (Original: I. Kant. Metaphysische Anfangssgründe der Naturwis-
senschaft. 1. ed. Riga 1786, p. IV: “ein nach Prinzipien geordnetes Ganzes der Erkenntnis”). 
91  I. Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 282 
(A 156), 691 (A 832/B 860). 
92  Cf. M. Klatt. Robert Alexy’s Philosophy of Law as a System. – M. Klatt (ed.). 
Institutionalized Reason. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 1 fn. 4;  
C.-W. Canaris. Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz. 2. ed. Berlin: Duncker 
& Humblot, 1983, p. 11; C. Strub. System; Systematik; systematisch. System II. – J. Ritter, 
K. Gründer, G. Gabriel (eds.). Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Vol. 10. Basel: 
Schwabe, 1998, col. 837 ff. 
36 
In the following subsections, we focus on the concept of system. At this point, 
we do not explore the abstract concept of the system but the concept of the legal 
system. The idea of a system has fascinated legal scholars since the year dot.93 
One of the major legal theoretical works of the 19th century was coined by 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny, comprising of eight volumes, and deals with the 
system of the modern Roman law.94 According to Savigny, the system is the 
intrinsic link that combines legal institutions and legal rules to a bigger unity95 
that foremost allows us to fully understand them.96 The background of Savigny’s 
concept is a three level hierarchical construct where the rules on the first level are 
followed by legal institutions on the second and the system as a whole on the 
third. This system is not static but continuously changing and developing but 
nevertheless all the time recognisable in its essence.  
A century later, Wilhelm Sauer exclaimed in his methodology: “Only a system 
guarantees knowledge, guarantees culture. Only in the system is true knowledge, 
true action possible.”97 After the Second World War Hans J. Wolff stated: “The 
legal science is systematical or it does not exist.”98 On the opposite side was for 
example Eugen Ehrlich who denied the systematicity of the legal science and 
consequently its scientific nature and came, therefore, to the conclusion that 
dealing with law is a technical artistic theory.99 Since the claim to the scientificity 
is inherent to the present thesis – in the words of Carlos E. Alchourrón and 
                                                 
93  Already Aristotle considered the polis as a societal organisation to be a system (Aristotle: 
Eth. Nic. IX, 8, 1168 b 32) Cf. to this and to the following: F.-P. Hager. System; Systematik; 
systematisch. System I. – J. Ritter, K. Gründer, G. Gabriel (eds.). Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie. Vol. 10. Basel: Schwabe, 1998, p. 824. 
94  F. C. v. Savigny. System des heutigen Römischen Rechts. Vol. 1.–8. Berlin 1840–1849. 
95  F. C. v. Savigny. System des heutigen Römischen Rechts. Vol. 1. Berlin 1840, p. 214: 
“Das systematische Element endlich bezieht sich auf den inneren Zusammenhang, welcher 
alle Rechtsinstitute und Rechtsregeln zu einer großen Einheit verknüpft” (emphasis in 
original); Cf. p. XXXVI, 262 ff. 
96  F. C. v. Savigny. System des heutigen Römischen Rechts. 1. Vol. Berlin 1840, p. 10: “In 
fernerer Betrachtung aber erkennen wir, daß alle Rechtsinstitute zu einem System verbunden 
bestehen, und daß sie nur in dem großen Zusammenhang dieses Systems, in welchem wieder 
dieselbe organische Natur erscheint, vollständig begriffen werden können.” Under the organic 
nature Savigny meant the connection between the different elements of a legal institute and 
the development of this legal institute. (F. C. v. Savigny. System des heutigen Römischen 
Rechts. 1. Vol. Berlin 1840, p. 9: “Denn auch die Rechtsregel, so wie deren Ausprägung im 
Gesetz, hat ihre tiefere Grundlage in der Anschauung des Rechtsinstituts, und auch dessen 
organische Natur zeigt sich sowohl in dem lebendigen Zusammenhang der Bestandtheile, als 
in seiner fortschreitenden Entwicklung” (emphasis in original). 
97  W. Sauer. Juristische Methodenlehre. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1940, p. 171: “Nur das 
System verbürgt Erkenntnis, verbürgt Kultur. Nur im System ist möglich wahres Wissen, 
wahres Wirken.” 
98  H. J. Wolff. Typen im Recht und in der Rechtswissenschaft. – Studium Generale 1952, 
p. 205: “Rechtswissenschaft ist systematisch oder sie ist nicht.” 
99  E. Ehrlich. Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts. München, Leipzig: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1913, p. 1 ff., 198. 
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Eugenio Bulygin, the “systematization is one of the legal scientist’s fundamental 
tasks”100 – the denier of systematicity of legal science shall not be discussed here. 
These quotes illustrate that legal science is something systematical in its very 
essence. The idea of systematicity of law forms the basis of the systematic 
interpretation which is central in legal argumentation.101 The functioning of the 
systematic interpretation and its central role again constitute an argument pro 
systematicity of law. Another argument for the systematicity of law is the 
tendency of legal science to filter out general principles of law102 which constitute 
overarching principles of the legal system. Finally, law is a system also because 
of the imperatives in positive law. In Estonian Constitution the systematicity 
requirement follows mainly from the general legal reservation (§ 3(1)1 of the 
Estonian Constitution), establishing the system in hierarchical or vertical 
dimension, from the general right to equal treatment (§ 12(1) of the Estonian 
Constitution), establishing the system in horizontal or comparative dimension, 
and the principle of legal certainty (§ 10 of the Estonian Constitution), 
establishing the system in temporal dimension. For constitutional rights, the 
requirement of systematicity follows from the general limiting clause (§ 11 of the 
Estonian Constitution), too, drawing the system of the formal and substantive 
limits of the rights. 
 
 
1. Participant’s, not observer’s perspective 
It makes a difference from what perspective we seek to determine a set of norms 
as a system. From the observer’s perspective, the system relates only to results of 
concrete cases: The legal system would be a structured set of the post-conflict 
solutions.103 Thus, the system would concern only the individual norms that have 
come to existence as conflict solutions. The observer does not participate in the 
scientific debate. 
  
                                                 
100  C. E. Alchourrón, E. Bulygin. Normative Systems. Wien, New York: Springer, 1971, p. 53. 
101  Cf. to the systematic interpretation R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica 
eriväljaanne 2001, p. 8 ff.; id. Juristische Interpretation. – R. Alexy. Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1995, p. 84, 86 f.; id. R. Dreier. Statutory Interpretation in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. – N. MacCormick, R. S. Summers (eds.). Interpreting Statutes. 
Aldershot et al.: Dartmouth, 1991, p. 88; J. Wróblewski. Statutory Interpretation in Poland. – 
N. MacCormick, R. S. Summers (eds.). Interpreting Statutes. Aldershot et al.: Dartmouth, 
1991, p. 269 ff. 
102  Cf. C.-W. Canaris. Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz. 2. ed. Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1983, p. 14. 
103  O. Ballweg. Rechtswissenschaft und Jurisprudenz. Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1970, 
p. 100 ff. Cf. N. Luhmann. Rechtssystem und Rechtsdogmatik. Stuttgart et al.: Kohlhammer, 
1974, p. 24. 
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In contrast to that, from the participant’s perspective, the system includes 
universal and/or more abstract norms too: The system is a linked, i.e. structured 
set of norms that determine how to decide or behave.104 The participant’s 
perspective includes all legal norms, i.e. the universal and/or more abstract norms 
as well as the individual and/or more concrete norms. 
The perspective of this thesis is the participant’s perspective because the 
author seeks to offer interpretations to valid constitutional norms and to 
participate in the debate of constitutional interpretation. 
 
 
2. Systasis, not systatic 
From the participant’s perspective, a system can be approached in two different 
ways. Firstly, one can maintain that a set of norms constitutes a system only when 
it is totally consistent. For example according to Hans Kelsen, only consistent 
sets of norms can be regarded as systems.105 
On the other hand, it is possible to maintain that seeking for consistency 
suffices in order to assume the existence of a system. In opposition to Kelsen, for 
example Carlos E. Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin regard as systems sets of 
norms that seek for consistency.106 This position goes back to Nicolai Hartmann, 
according to whom the system “means no given systatic but seeking for it, 
systasis”.107 Thus, according to this view, the system is not the starting point of 
an inquiry but its end. Contradictions are possible in a system of norms, but they 
shall be eliminated with the help of the system. 
In this thesis, the system as systasis is assumed because probably every human 
made set of norms contains at least some contradictions. If we required the 
systatic, we would have to deny the system already when the first contradiction 
occurs. 
Since consistency is a rational ideal, an inconsistent set of norms would be 
irrational.108 I shall argue that law being a system means necessarily raising a 
                                                 
104  Cf. J.-R. Sieckmann. Recht als normatives System. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009, p. 120. 
105  H. Kelsen. The Pure Theory of Law. 2. ed. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of 
California Press, 1970, p. 205 ff., 276, 328 f.; H. Kelsen. General Theory of Law and State. 
New York: Russell & Russell, 1945, p. 374 f. According to Joseph Raz, Kelsen later retracted 
his claim that valid norms are necessarily consistent (J. Raz. Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic 
Norm. – The American Journal of Jurisprudence 19 (1974), p. 106 fn. 29). 
106  C. E. Alchourrón, E. Bulygin. Normative Systems. Wien, New York: Springer, 1971, 
p. 53 ff. 
107  N. Hartmann. Systematische Methode. – Logos. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie 
der Kultur 3/2 (1912), p. 122: “System bedeutet keine gegebene Systatik, sondern das Suchen 
nach ihr, die Systasis.” Cf. C. Strub. System; Systematik; systematisch. System II. – J. Ritter, 
K. Gründer, G. Gabriel (eds.). Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Vol. 10. Basel: 
Schwabe, 1998, col. 849. 
108  C. E. Alchourrón, E. Bulygin. Normative Systems. Wien, New York: Springer, 1971, p. 63. 
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claim to consistency.109 Otherwise the contradicting rules would lead to partly 
absurd results, the conclusions of courts would be merely unpredictable and 
would form a sort of a chain novel.110 However, it is the fundamental task of legal 
scientists and of courts to eliminate the contradictions and to make the set of 
norms in question more rational.111 Thus, the claim to consistency follows from 
the claim to correctness raised by law in general.112 
 
 
3. Principles and rules 
A system as a unified whole can be formed by different interacting or interrelated 
entities. Legal systems, including constitutions, consist in the first place of norms. 
A norm is the meaning of a normative statement.113 Norms are either rules or 
principles.114 Rules are norms which are always either fulfilled or not whereas 
principles are norms which require that something be realised to the greatest 
extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities.115 
The constitution as a system contains both types of norms: principles and 
rules.116 Since most constitutional level normative statements are highly abstract 
and vague and contain norms that have a dimension of weight or importance117, 
                                                 
109  Cf. to the concept of raising a claim R. Alexy. Law and Correctness. – M. D. A. Freeman 
(ed.). Legal Theory at the End of the Millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 
p. 206 ff.; id. My Philosophy of Law: The Institutionalisation of Reason. – L. J. Wintgens 
(ed.). The Law in Philosophical Perspectives. Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer, 1999, p. 24.  
110  R. Dworkin. Law’s Empire. Cambridge Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 1986, 
p. 228 ff. 
111  Cf. C. E. Alchourrón, E. Bulygin. Normative Systems. Wien, New York: Springer, 1971, 
p. 53. 
112  Cf. to the claim to correctness in general R. Alexy. Law and Correctness. – 
M. D. A. Freeman (ed.). Legal Theory at the End of the Millennium. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998, p. 205 ff. Cf. to the principle of correctness of content id. Legal 
Certainty and Correctness. – Ratio Juris 28 (2015), p. 442 f. Cf. to the necessity of the claim 
to correctness id. On the Thesis of a Necessary Connection between Law and Morality: 
Bulygin’s Critique. – Ratio Juris 13 (2000), p. 139 ff.; id. Law and Correctness. – 
M. D. A. Freeman (ed.). Legal Theory at the End of the Millennium. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1998, p. 209 ff. The claim to correctness is for the claim to consistency an 
sufficient, not a necessary condition. 
113  See above. 
114  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002, p. 48. 
115  Ibid., p. 47 f. Cf. the first chapter of the present thesis. 
116  Cf. to the reasons why a legal system contains not only rules but also principles R. Alexy. 
Rechtssystem und praktische Vernunft. – R. Alexy. Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1995, p. 219 ff.; id. The Argument from Injustice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, 
p. 71 ff. 
117  Cf. R. Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Mass.: Oxford University Press, 
1977, p. 26.  
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they are more likely sources of principles. E.g. § 19(1) of the Estonian Consti-
tution states: “Everyone has the right to free self-realisation.” This is a classic 
wording of a normative statement that is a source for a principle-norm. But 
constitutions contain rules, too, as does the Estonian Constitution. E.g. § 60(1)1 
of the Estonian Constitution states: “The Riigikogu comprises of one hundred and 
one members.” This normative statement contains clearly a rule because there 
can either be exactly one hundred and one members or not. 
 
 
4. Coherence 
A system does not need to be wholly consistent but it needs to raise a claim to 
consistency as we have seen above. Coherence goes further, being however an 
extremely disputable topic.118 It expresses the idea that the whole is more than the 
sum of its parts. 
According to Robert Alexy, the concept of coherence has a principle’s like 
structure: “The better the structure of a reasoning of a class of statements is, the 
more coherent this class of statements is.”119 According to this, a class of 
statements can be more or less coherent. The coherence is a matter of degree and 
the quality of the structure of reasoning depends on the grade of fulfilment of the 
criteria of coherence.120 Furthermore, since the criteria of coherence may conflict, 
the coherence is also a matter of balancing.121 It is possible that, as a result of 
balancing, one of the conflicting criteria has to withdraw. A detailed presentation 
and analysis of the criteria of coherence would be beyond the scope of this 
thesis.122 Instead, we shall restrict us to the three main elements of coherence – 
consistency, connection and comprehensiveness – named by Robert Alexy in a 
                                                 
118  Cf. instead of many S. Bracker. Kohärenz und juristische Interpretation. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2000, p. 16 ff. 
119  R. Alexy. Juristische Begründung, System und Kohärenz. – O. Behrens, M. Dießelhorst, 
R. Dreier (eds.). Rechtsdogmatik und praktische Vernunft. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1990, p. 97: “Je besser die Begründungsstruktur einer Klasse von Aussagen ist, 
desto kohärenter ist diese Klasse von Aussagen.” 
120  Ibid.; R. Alexy, A. Peczenik. The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for 
Discursive Rationality. – Ratio Juris 3 (1990), p. 145. 
121  R. Alexy. Juristische Begründung, System und Kohärenz. – O. Behrens, M. Dießelhorst, 
R. Dreier (eds.). Rechtsdogmatik und praktische Vernunft. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1990, p. 97; id., A. Peczenik. The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for 
Discursive Rationality. – Ratio Juris 3 (1990), p. 131, 145. 
122  Cf. to the criteria of coherence: R. Alexy. Juristische Begründung, System und Kohärenz. – 
O. Behrens, M. Dießelhorst, R. Dreier (eds.). Rechtsdogmatik und praktische Vernunft. 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, p. 97 ff.; id., A. Peczenik. The Concept of 
Coherence and Its Significance for Discursive Rationality. – Ratio Juris 3 (1990), p. 132 ff.; 
S. Bracker. Kohärenz und juristische Interpretation. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000, p. 170 ff. 
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later article.123 Furthermore, Neil MacCormick interconnects the concept of 
coherence with principles.124 Alexander Somek speaks of coherence in the 
context of the system of values, puts forth the incapability of rules to indicate 
which of several applicable rules ought to be applied in a particular case at hand, 
and stresses the need to provide equality of application as the main purpose of the 
coherence.125 According to Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, the task of the concept of 
system is to present and to implement the evaluation-related congruousness and 
inner unity of a legal order.126 These ideas altogether bring us to the inter-
connection between the coherence and the principles.  
Indeed, it seems that the coherence has a similar function for the system of 
principles as the consistency for a system of rules. Rules may conflict in the strict 
sense, i.e. in the way that the conflict can only be solved by invalidating one of 
the rules. Therefore, elimination of contradictions is what establishes the system. 
Principles cannot conflict in the strict sense but only collide or compete. A 
collision of principles will be solved by weighing the principles against each other 
while both principles remain valid. A system will be established by creating a 
sound balance between the principles. The German Federal Constitutional Court 
has since its early days spoken of the “unity of the constitution”127 expressing the 
idea of coherence of principles within the constitution. According to that, the 
coherence equals to the claim that all principles of a system have to be in a sound 
balance to each other. This shall suffice for the purposes of the present paper. 
Consequently, the task of legal science that deals with legal system is, besides 
avoiding contradictions, also to offer harmonious solutions to legal issues 
concerning the system of principles. Contradicting rules lead to an inconsistency 
while incoherence occurs where a connection between principles is disregarded 
or weighing is based on incomprehensive set of arguments. According to Robert 
Alexy, justice requires the embedment of the legal reasoning into a possibly 
coherent system.128 In case of a constitution, human rights (externally) and 
fundamental constitutional principles (internally) require the embedment of the 
                                                 
123  R. Alexy. Coherence and Argumentation or the Genuine Twin Criterialess Super Criterion. – 
A. Aarnio, R. Alexy, A. Peczenik, W. Rabinowicz, J. Wolenski (eds.). On Coherence Theory of 
Law. Lund: Juristförl., 1998, p. 41 f. Cf. S. Bracker. Kohärenz und juristische Interpretation. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000, p. 170. 
124  N. MacCormick. Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, 
p. 107. Cf. R. Alexy. My Philosophy of Law: The Institutionalisation of Reason. – L. J. Wintgens 
(ed.). The Law in Philosophical Perspectives. Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer, 1999, p. 40. 
125  A. Somek. The Cosmopolitan Constitution. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014, p. 108, 114 f.  
126  C.-W. Canaris. Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz. 2. ed. Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1983, p. 18. 
127  Since BVerfG 23.10.1951, 2 BvG 1/51, para. 76 (BVerfGE 1, 14 (32)). Cf. BVerfG 
10.12.1980, 2 BvF 3/77, para. 73 (BVerfGE 55, 274 (300)). 
128  R. Alexy. Juristische Begründung, System und Kohärenz. – O. Behrens, M. Dießelhorst, 
R. Dreier (eds.). Rechtsdogmatik und praktische Vernunft. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1990, p. 106. 
42 
constitutional reasoning into a possibly coherent system.129 Since the consti-
tutional set of norms includes rules and principles, raising a claim to consistency 
will not suffice in order to establish a system. A purely consistency-oriented 
system that also involves principles would be faulty because it would ignore the 
mutual relations between the elements of the system and because of the 
incomprehensiveness. Therefore, a system – in order to be a system – necessarily 
raises a claim to coherence, too.130 
 
 
5. Procedural dimension 
“As a system of norms, the legal system is a system of results or products of 
norm-creating procedures, whatever the origin or character of these 
procedures.”131 If we considered the system consisting only of principles and 
rules, we would put ourselves into the observer’s perspective. Thus, consti-
tutional principles and rules are necessary but not sufficient conditions of the 
constitutional system. They cannot form a system by themselves.132 According to 
Robert Alexy, the principles and rules belong to the passive dimension of the 
legal system because they do not regulate their application.133 The participant’s 
perspective requires additionally a modus operandi. In order to complete the 
system, we need to add the active, i.e. the procedural dimension which includes 
the institutionalised legal application as well as the not institutionalised process 
                                                 
129  This will be more closely dealt in fourth Chapter using the example of the principle of 
equality. 
130  Cf. to the idea of coherence already by F. C. v. Savigny. System des heutigen Römischen 
Rechts. Vol. 1. Berlin 1840, p. XXXVI: “Ich setze das Wesen der systematischen Methode in 
die Erkenntnis und Darstellung des inneren Zusammenhangs […], wodurch die einzelnen 
Rechtsbegriffe und Rechtsregeln zu einer großen Einheit verbunden werden.“ Cf. p. 214, 262 
ff. More recently Ronald Dworkin has put the integrity which is considered to be 
methodologically identical with the coherence (R. Alexy. My Philosophy of Law: The 
Institutionalisation of Reason. – L. J. Wintgens (ed.). The Law in Philosophical Perspectives. 
Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer, 1999, p. 40 fn. 57) into the centre of his theory, R. Dworkin. Law’s 
Empire. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1986, p. 245: “Law as integrity, then, 
requires a judge to test his interpretation of any part of the great network of political structures 
and decisions of his community by asking whether it could form part of a coherent theory 
justifying the network as a whole.” In contrast to the theories of von Savigny and Dworkin, 
according to the point of view presented here the coherence is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition of the systematicity. 
131  R. Alexy. The Argument from Injustice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, p. 24 (emphasis 
in original). 
132  R. Alexy. My Philosophy of Law: The Institutionalisation of Reason. – L. J. Wintgens 
(ed.). The Law in Philosophical Perspectives. Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer, 1999, p. 40. 
133  R. Alexy. Rechtssystem und praktische Vernunft. – R. Alexy. Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1995, p. 228. 
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of thought and argumentation.134 “As a system of procedures, the legal system is 
a system of processes or actions based on and governed by rules, actions by means 
of which norms are issued, justified, interpreted, applied, and enforced.”135 
The procedural dimension of the legal system faces two main challenges. 
Firstly, a legal methodology is required in order to organise the process of 
application.136 This means that particularly the modi of application of principles 
and rules have to be developed.137 Since a constitution as a system is to a large 
extent determined by principles which tend to collide or compete with each other 
in concrete cases, particularly an adequate method of solving the principles colli-
sions is necessary. For this reason, we need an adequate theory of propor-
tionality.138 
Secondly, since the solution of every more complicated legal case presupposes 
evaluations that cannot be deduced from authoritatively given material the 
rationality of the procedure of legal application depends considerably on whether 
and to what degree these additional evaluations are accessible to a rational 
control.139 This again depends on whether and to what extent the practical moral 
statements are justifiable.140 A substantive moral theory that would be able to give 
every moral question an intersubjectively compelling answer is impossible.141 
Instead, it appears to be possible to develop a procedural moral theory that  
would formulate rules or conditions for a rational moral discourse.142 According 
to Alexy, a particularly promising version for such procedural moral theory is  
the theory of rational practical discourse143 that has been founded by Alexy  
                                                 
134  Ibid.; R. Alexy. Diskurstheorie und Rechtssystem. – Synthesis philosophica 5 (1988), 
p. 307 ff. 
135  R. Alexy. The Argument from Injustice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, p. 24 (emphasis 
in original). 
136  R. Alexy. Rechtssystem und praktische Vernunft. – R. Alexy. Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1995, p. 229. 
137  Cf. R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 7 ff.; 
M. Ernits. Põhiõigused, demokraatia, õigusriik. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2011, p. 86 ff. 
138  R. Alexy. Kollisioon ja kaalumine kui põhiõiguste dogmaatika põhiprobleemid. – Juridica 
2001/1, p. 5 ff.; id. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 66 ff. Cf. the first chapter of the present thesis. 
139  R. Alexy. Rechtssystem und praktische Vernunft. – R. Alexy. Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1995, p. 229. 
140  R. Alexy. Oikeusjärjestelmä, oikeusperiaate ja käytännöllinen järki. – Lakimies 87 (1989), 
p. 631. 
141  Ibid.; R. Alexy. Rechtssystem und praktische Vernunft. – R. Alexy. Recht, Vernunft, 
Diskurs. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1995, p. 230. 
142  R. Alexy. Oikeusjärjestelmä, oikeusperiaate ja käytännöllinen järki. – Lakimies 87 (1989), 
p. 631. 
143  R. Alexy. Rechtssystem und praktische Vernunft. – R. Alexy. Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1995, p. 229. 
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himself together with Aulis Aarnio and Aleksander Peczenik144 and by Jürgen 
Habermas145. 
Thus, the procedural dimension of the system consists of both, the institutio-
nalised legal application as well as the not institutionalised process of thought 
and argumentation. In case of constitution, the institutionalisation consists in 
constitutional review. Theoretically even more important is the not institutio-
nalised process. In general, the legal discourse is concerned with the question 
“what is correct within the scope of a specific legal system.”146 The minimum of 
systematicity will be established hereby by raising the claims to consistency and 
to coherence in the process of application.  
 
 
6. Overarching idea or common principles 
According to Kant, a system is determined by either an overarching idea147 or 
common principles148. The overarching idea of a legal system is disputable in 
legal theory. For example according to Jan-Reinard Sieckmann, a legal system is 
determined by four formal criteria: institutionalisation, objectivity (i.e. claim to 
bindingness), authoritative character and claim to legitimacy.149 This would also 
                                                 
144  A. Aarnio, R. Alexy, A. Peczenik. The foundation of legal reasoning. – Rechtstheorie 12 
(1981), p. 133 ff., 257 ff., 423 ff.; A. Peczenik. Grundlagen der juristischen Argumentation. 
Wien, New York: Springer, 1983, p. 167 ff.; A. Aarnio. The Rational as Reasonable. 
Dordrecht et al.: Reidel, 1987, p. 185 ff.; id. Õiguse tõlgendamise teooria. Tallinn: Juura, 
1996; R. Alexy. A Theory of Legal Argumentation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 177 ff.; 
id. Diskurstheorie und Rechtssystem. – Synthesis philosophica 5 (1988), p. 299 ff.; id. 
Probems in Discursive Rationality in Law. – W. Maihofer, G. Sprenger (eds.). Law and the 
States in Modern Times. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1990, p. 174 ff.; id. Idee und Struktur eines 
vernünftigen Rechtssystems. – R. Alexy, R. Dreier, U. Neumann (eds.). Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie in Deutschland heute. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1991, p. 30 ff.; id. A 
Discourse-Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason. – Ratio Juris 5 (1992), p. 232 ff.; id. 
Legal Argumentation as Rational Discourse. – Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto 70 
(1993), p. 165 ff., 171 ff.; id. Law and Correctness. – M. D. A. Freeman (ed.). Legal Theory 
at the End of the Millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 205 ff.; id. The 
Special Case Thesis. – Ratio Juris 12 (1999), p. 374 ff.; id. My Philosophy of Law: The 
Institutionalisation of Reason. – L. J. Wintgens (ed.). The Law in Philosophical Perspectives. 
Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer, 1999, p. 23 ff. Cf. C. Bäcker. Begründen und Entscheiden. 2. ed. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012, p. 30 ff., 175 ff., 207 ff., 287 ff. 
145  J. Habermas. Diskursethik – Notizen zu einem Begründungsprogramm. – J. Habermas. 
Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1983, p. 53 ff. 
146  R. Alexy. My Philosophy of Law: The Institutionalisation of Reason. – L. J. Wintgens 
(ed.). The Law in Philosophical Perspectives. Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer, 1999, p. 41. 
147  I. Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 691 
(A 832/B 860). 
148  I. Kant. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004, p. 3 (467). 
149  J.-R. Sieckmann. Recht als normatives System. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009, p. 120 ff., 
127. 
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apply to a part of a legal system or a subsystem, i.e. to a constitution. On the other 
hand, it is also possible to determine a legal system with the help of substantive 
ideas. The substantive overarching idea of a constitution, which constitutes the 
top of a legal system, may be either formed by human rights which determine the 
substantive concept of constitution (external idea) or by fundamental principles 
of the constitution which determine the unchangeable core of it (internal idea). 
Firstly, a legal system is a system and its constitution constitutes the top part 
of it. Secondly, there are formal criteria as well as substantive ideas that are 
candidates for the overarching idea. In a comprehensive theory of a legal system, 
both formal as well as substantive ideas have to be followed. For the present thesis 
it suffices to state that for a constitution being a comprehensive system there are 
formal and substantive common principles to be followed. 
 
 
7. Result – the concept of system 
We approach the legal system from the participant’s perspective. As a system of 
rules, a legal system necessarily raises the claim to consistency. As a system of 
principles that may contain rules, too, a legal system necessarily raises a claim to 
coherence. The system of procedures determines particularly the modi of 
application of principles and rules. Thus, a legal system exists where all three 
elements – legal principles, rules and procedures – exist and the claims to 
consistency and to coherence are being raised. 
 
 
IV. The constitution as a system 
Constitution being a legal system is a system in the Kantian sense. A constitution 
is a system of norms and procedures, especially of principles that compete and 
require an adequate theory of proportionality. Inherent to the constitutional 
system are the claims to consistency and to coherence. The latter presupposes, 
apart from the consistency, also connection between norms and comprehen-
siveness of argumentation. 
The systematicity is highly relevant for practical application of the consti-
tution. Three most typical examples should be named in this context. Firstly, the 
limits of unconditionally granted constitutional rights are a consequence of that 
idea. The Estonian Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that a constitutional 
right with no legal reservation “may be interfered with in order to protect other 
fundamental rights or values provided in the Constitution”.150 As a result, the 
principle of proportionality applies in order to determine whether the interference 
is constitutional or not. Weighing being the central method of application of 
                                                 
150  SCebj 03.07.2012, 3-3-1-44-11, para. 72; cf. SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 28; 
19.04.2005, 3-4-1-1-05, para. 24; 02.06.2008, 3-4-1-19-07, para. 23; SCebr 28.04.2004, 
3-3-1-69-03, para. 28; CRCSCj 05.03.2001, 3-4-1-2-01. 
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proportionality is an important means in order to reach the unity of the 
constitution and therefore a particularly important systematic argument.151 
Secondly, also in case of a collision of other constitutional principles than con-
stitutional rights the idea of the systematicity of the constitution has to be taken 
into account. Such a collision may occur between basic principles of state 
structure like democracy or rule of law and/or constitutional principles called 
‘state objectives’ like environmental protection (§ 5 in conjunction with § 53 of 
the Estonian Constitution).152 As a consequence of the systematicity of the con-
stitution, such collisions will be solved by means of the principle of proportio-
nality as well.153 Thirdly, the systematicity of the constitution is also relevant for 
the application of the principle of equality. The Supreme Court has recently 
reiterated the idea of coherence in context of the principle of equality: “the 
Legislature is indeed free to decide which social guarantees to create, but once it 
has created a system, the persons entitled to the benefits must not be treated 
unequally without reason.”154 As a consequence, the constitutional system has to 
be taken into account not only in infringement cases but also in cases where the 
state takes positive measures and treats beneficiaries differently. 
We may distinguish between the real and the ideal system. The real system is 
the product of the really existing doctrine of the constitutional law which 
continuously becomes more complete. The ideal system is the product of the ideal 
constitutional law doctrine, i.e. of the doctrine that is performed by infinite 
number of constitutional scholars who have infinite resources of time, cases and 
intellect. In the ideal system, all contradictions between rules are eliminated and 
its principles are perfectly balanced out. The real system never reaches the ideal 
system. However, the ideal system constitutes the regulative idea towards which 
we must continue to move uninterruptedly. Every new critical approach might 
bring out a new valuable connection and make another step toward the 
comprehensiveness of argumentation. 
In the legal practice no constitutional court should stop seeking for the 
systematicity of the constitutional law, because doing so we may become 
problems not only with unsound relations between principles but even with 
avoiding the contradictions between rules. In the end the constitutional system 
may cease to exist entirely. If the legislator does not fulfil its positive obligations 
and the enforced set of norms contains significant caps and does not serve its 
inherent purpose, i.e. is ineffective, the legal regulation is, from systematic point 
of view, unconstitutional. Tolerating this, the constitutional court violates the 
                                                 
151  R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 9. 
152  Cf. to the terminology R. Herzog. Staatszielbestimmungen. – R. Pitschas, A. Uhle (eds.). 
Wege gelebter Verfassung in Recht und Politik. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2007, p. 219 ff.; 
K.-P. Sommermann. Staatsziele und Staatszielbestimmungen. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997, 
p. 199 ff., 223 ff., 359 ff., 411 ff. Cf. J.-R. Sieckmann. Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle 
des Rechtssystems. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990, p. 141. 
153  SCebj 12.07.2012, 3-4-1-6-12, paras. 170 f.; 16.03.2010, 3-4-1-8-09, para. 64. 
154  SCebj 26.06.2014, 3-4-1-1-14, para. 118. Cf. the fourth chapter of the present thesis. 
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constitution itself by ignoring the claim to coherence. If a legal scientist does not 
stand up against such a tendency, with the disappearance of the constitutional 
system, the constitutional legal science would disappear, too. In this case we 
would have a constitutional rhapsody in Kantian sense instead of a constitutional 
system.155 In the contemporary language, we may also simply call it a 
constitutional rap. 
 
 
V. Research task, statements presented for  
the doctoral defence and methodology 
According to the Procedure for awarding doctorates,156 the thesis must contain 
inter alia the formulation of the research task, the statements presented for 
defence and a description of methodology. 
 
 
1. Research task 
The aim of the following chapters is to confirm the idea that the constitution is a 
system and to demonstrate the advantages of the systematic approach. The author 
considers that every new critical approach might bring a new valuable connection 
of the constitutional system to light and help to broaden the scope of available 
arguments. In the first chapter the author will defend central theoretical 
foundations of the systematicity of the constitution. In the following chapters the 
author will demonstrate that the idea of the constitution being a system enables 
us to achieve consistent and coherent doctrine of constitutional law and therefore 
better solutions for practical constitutional cases. 
The first chapter157 defends the principles theory. Principles theory is the 
theory of different logical structures of norms as principles and rules and their 
various application doctrines, especially in relation to balancing colliding or 
competing principles. Estonian Supreme Court started to apply the principles 
theory and to balance colliding constitutional principles in 1997.158 The starting 
point and basis for this case law was the first systematic monograph concerning 
fundamental rights in the Estonian Constitution from Robert Alexy published in 
2001,159 however, its text was available to the Supreme Court already in 1997. 
                                                 
155  I. Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 282 
(A 156), 691 (A 832/B 860). 
156  Adopted by the Senate of the University of Tartu Regulation no. 23 of 20.12.2013, 
amended by the Senate of the University of Tartu Regulation no. 12 of 29.05.2015 (no. 14.2–
14.4). 
157  M. Ernits. A response to Estonian critics of principles theory. – M. La Torre, L. Niglia, 
M. Susi (eds.). The Quest for Rights. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019, p. 88−108. 
158  CRCSCj 06.10.1997, 3-4-1-3-97, para. I. 
159  R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 5–96. 
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The first chapter discusses six main arguments presented by Estonian critics 
against continued application of the principles theory by the Supreme Court, and 
especially against the balancing. According to the critics, (1) the constitution 
exists only as a plain framework and not as a foundation, what is more, viewing 
the constitution as a system of values leads to over-constitutionalisation. (2) The 
distinction between rules and principles is inadequate, (3) application of the 
principles theory leads to a disentanglement from the constitution, and (4) the 
principle of proportionality leads to suspension of the constitution. (5) The 
principle of proportionality is a purely formal guideline, therefore, the demand to 
balance competing principles equals to the demand of simply deciding. (6) 
Finally, they argue, as there is no universal ‘theory of blue items’, there shall be 
no universal theory of fundamental rights. Most of these arguments also occur in 
international debate about the principles theory. The purpose of the first chapter 
is to reply to the critics, to link the arguments to the international debate and to 
defend the principles theory. 
The second chapter160 analyses the use of international and foreign law as 
comparative arguments in the case law of the Supreme Court of Estonia. This 
chapter analysis the comparative dimension of the constitutional system. The aim 
of the chapter is to find out how open the Estonian constitutional system is 
towards other legal systems that are based on democratic constitutionalism. We 
will see that the general principles of legal doctrine, especially the principle of 
proportionality have similarities with many other developed European legal 
systems, e.g. to Germany. The links to other legal systems, especially links to the 
Constitutions of other European states, witness the openness of the system and 
the comparison is immanent to Estonian constitutional doctrine.  
In the focus of the third chapter161 is one of the most important early judge-
ments of the Supreme Court from 1994.162 The chapter analysis the relevance of 
this judgement for the Estonian constitutional system. It traces how the Supreme 
Court developed the principle of parliamentary prerogative and the general 
constitutional right to organisation and procedure, and how the court established 
its competence to lay positive obligations on the legislator. 
Finally, the fourth chapter163 will work out the principle of equality in Estonian 
Constitution from the systematic perspective and demonstrates how the principle 
of equality has emerged and evolved in relation to Estonian constitutional law. 
The aspects taken under scrutiny are questions whether the principle of equality 
is an enforceable subjective right which is binding for the legislature, whether the 
                                                 
160  M. Ernits. Use of Foreign Law by Estonian Supreme Court. – G. F. Ferrari (ed.). Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism. The Use of Foreign Law in Contemporary Constitutional Systems. Leiden: 
Brill, 2019, p. 501−527. 
161  M. Ernits. An Early Decision with Far-reaching Consequences. – Juridica International 12 
(2007), p. 23−35. 
162  CRCSCj 12.01.1994, III-4/1-1/94. 
163  M. Ernits. The Principle of Equality in the Estonian Constitution. – European Consti-
tutional Law Review 10 (2014), p. 444−480. 
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equality requires legal or factual equality, whether it requires unequal treatment 
of non-equals, what kind of statutory reservation it has, whether the 
incomparability is a suitable criterion for determining the scope of the right to 
equality, how to form comparison groups, are there any special equality rights, 
should we distinguish original from the ancillary equality application, are there 
different intensities of judicial review while applying the equality principle, and 
finally, the question of coherence. According to the argument advanced here, the 
principle of equality is a requirement for the equal implementation of 
(constitutional) law. 
 
 
2. Statements presented for defence 
2.1. Chapter 1 
Firstly, the constitution is neither a plain framework nor does viewing the 
constitution as a system of values lead to over-constitutionalisation. 
Secondly, the distinction between rules and principles is adequate. 
Thirdly, the application of the principles theory does not lead to a dis-
entanglement from the constitution. 
Fourth, the principle of proportionality does not suspend the constitution. 
Fifth, the principle of proportionality is not a purely formal guideline and the 
demand to balance competing principles does not equal the demand of simply 
deciding. 
Sixth, a universal theory of fundamental rights is possible.  
 
 
 2.2. Chapter 2 
Comparative arguments have played a significant role in the development of 
Estonian constitutional review, mainly as a catalyst to help to boost the Estonian 
constitutional law doctrine to a contemporary one. 
 
2.3. Chapter 3 
Firstly, Estonian Constitution contains the principle of parliamentary prerogative 
according to which the legislator is obliged to regulate important matters by itself 
and cannot delegate them to the executive. 
Secondly, the general constitutional right to organisation and procedure has 
played an important role in the development of the rule of law. 
Thirdly, next to the infringements caused by the legislator also legislative 
omissions may be subject to the constitutional review. 
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2.4. Chapter 4 
Firstly, the principle of equality is fully enforceable and may be used as a 
constitutional right by a rights-holder and at the same time being binding for the 
legislature, too. 
Secondly, it is not recommendable to deduce the factual equality from the 
principle of equality but rather from the social state principle. 
Thirdly, the requirement to treat non-equals unequally is better not interpreted 
as a normative requirement deriving from the principle of equality. 
Fourth, the principle of equality shall be interpreted as the requirement to treat 
legally equals equally. 
Fifth, the correct legal reservation for the principle of equality is the simple 
legal reservation. 
Sixth, the comparison pairs or groups must always consist of persons, but not 
of situations. 
Seventh, relevant is the concrete unequal treatment which is most likely 
questionable. 
Eighth, the principle of equality can be applied originally or ancillarily. 
Ninth, the coherence is an important requirement of the principle of equality. 
 
 
3. Description of methodology 
The method of the present thesis is based on legal methodology, mainly on the 
theory of interpretation164 and argumentation165 of Robert Alexy. The unifying 
idea of all parts is the idea of the constitution of a democratic constitutionalism. 
 
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
Constitution being a system means that it includes principles, rules, and proce-
dures and raises necessarily claims to consistency and coherence. If the situation in 
real life does not entirely correspond to that ideal, the real situation is criticisable.  
As we have seen in the first chapter, Robert Alexy’s distinction between prin-
ciples and rules provides a working basic model for the Estonian constitutional 
review. Based on the principles theory, the substantive core of constitutionality 
is, in most cases, the principle of proportionality and the central method for 
solving constitutional cases is balancing. The Estonian critics have not been able 
to raise an issue that would give cause to be sceptical regarding the correctness 
of this practice in general. The six main arguments presented by them proved to 
be unconvincing. Firstly, the constitution is neither a plain framework nor does it 
                                                 
164  R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 7 ff. Cf. M. Ernits. 
Põhiõigused, demokraatia, õigusriik. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2011, p. 86 ff. 
165  R. Alexy. A Theory of Legal Argumentation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 211 ff. 
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lead to viewing the constitution as a system of values to over-constitutio-
nalisation. The constitution constitutes a framework as well as a foundation. 
Secondly, the distinction between rules and principles is adequate. The determi-
nation of the structure of the Ought (Sollen) is a part of the interpretation process. 
Thirdly, the application of the principles theory does not lead to a disentangle-
ment from the constitution. Normative statements of the constitution still remain 
relevant. Fourth, the principle of proportionality does not suspend the consti-
tution. Fifth, the principle of proportionality is not a purely formal guideline and 
the demand to balance competing principles does not equal the demand of simply 
deciding. And finally, there is a universal theory of fundamental rights. A good 
example of such a theory is Robert Alexy’s principles theory that provides the 
constitutional court with a structure that makes the reasoning more rational. 
In the second chapter the use of comparative arguments by the Supreme Court 
was in the centre of attention. It appears that the Supreme Court does use the 
foreign law but mostly does not do so explicitly. Nevertheless, comparative argu-
ments have played a significant role in the development of Estonian constitutional 
review, mainly as a catalyst to help to boost the Estonian constitutional law 
doctrine to a contemporary one. The general principles of law doctrine, especially 
the principle of proportionality, have similarities with many other developed 
European legal systems, e.g. to Germany. The links to other legal systems, 
especially links to the Constitutions of other European states, prove the openness 
of the Estonian system. However, the sceptical statement of the Supreme Court 
from 2009 towards the German Constitution166 remains a rather disputable step 
in other direction. Hopefully the Supreme Court finds a way to clarify it.  
The third chapter analysed critically the relevance of a ground-breaking 
judgement of the Supreme Court from 1994167 and its subsequent practice. Three 
important elements of the constitutional system originate from this judgement. 
Firstly, the principle of parliamentary prerogative was established according to 
which the legislator is obliged to regulate important matters by itself and cannot 
delegate them to the executive. Secondly, the Supreme Court established the 
general constitutional right to organisation and procedure which has – except for 
some serious issues168 – played an important role in the development of the rule of 
law in Estonia. Thirdly, the Supreme Court found already in 1994 that next to the 
infringements caused by the legislator also legislative omissions may be subject 
to scrutiny. Thus, Estonian constitution contains also enforceable positive 
obligations of the legislator.  
  
                                                 
166  CRCSCr 22.12.2009, 3-4-1-16-09, para. 42. 
167  CRCSCj 12.01.1994, III-4/1-1/94. 
168  SCebj 25.10.2004, 3-4-1-10-04; 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05; 27.06.2005, 3-3-1-1-05; 
CRCSCj 10.12.2004, 3-4-1-24-04. 
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The object of the fourth chapter is the principle of equality in the Estonian 
constitution. In contrast to the previous chapters, the last chapter deals with the 
system of a single constitutional right. It resulted that the principle of equality is 
fully enforceable and may be used as a constitutional right by a rights-holder and 
at the same time being binding for the legislature, too. The analysis revealed that 
it is not recommendable to deduce the factual equality from the principle of 
equality but rather from the social state principle. It also resulted that the 
requirement to treat non-equals unequally is better not interpreted as a normative 
requirement deriving from the principle of equality. The principle of equality 
shall be interpreted as the requirement to treat legally equals equally. Further-
more, we found out that the correct legal reservation for the principle of equality 
is the simple legal reservation. We saw that the comparison pairs or groups must 
always consist of persons, but not of situations, and that relevant is the concrete 
unequal treatment which is most likely questionable. We also saw that the 
principle of equality can be applied originally or ancillarily and that the coherence 
is also an important requirement of it. 
The fundamental idea of the thesis is the idea of the constitution as a system. 
This idea is the methodological basis of all chapters in order to reach better results 
in interpretation and balancing. The thesis is an attempt to establish more system 
and the author considers that every new critical approach might bring a new 
valuable connection of the constitutional system to light and help to broaden the 
scope of available arguments. In doing so, the ultimate objective of the thesis is 
to strengthen the democratic constitutionalism. Democratic constitutionalism, i.e. 
a state where the fundamental principles of human dignity, democracy and rule 
of law apply, where constitutional rights, separation and balance of powers and 
functioning constitutional review exist, is the most significant realisation of the 
ancient principle of sub lege rex throughout the history.169 The democratic 
constitutionalism is systematically the institutionalisation of human rights170 and 
since 1992 empirically also the reality in Estonia.  
Throughout the history the tension between the normativity and reality of 
human rights has varied. Lately this tension has grown again worldwide.171 In the 
framework of a single state democratic constitutionalism, it corresponds to the 
tension between the normativity and reality of the constitution. The task to defend 
the normative force of the normativity against the popular readiness to obediently 
recognise the normative force of the facts seems to be never-ending.172 To stand 
                                                 
169  Cf. W. Kägi. Die Verfassung als rechtliche Grundordnung des Staates (1945). Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971, p. 42. 
170  R. Alexy. Die Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechte im demokratischen Verfas-
sungsstaat. – S. Gosepath, G. Lohmann (eds.). Philosophie der Menschenrechte. Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1998, p. 246 ff.  
171  Cf. A. Sajó, R. Uitz. The Constitution of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, 
p. 52 ff. 
172  Cf. W. Kägi. Die Verfassung als rechtliche Grundordnung des Staates (1945). Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971, p. 2. 
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up for the normative force of normativity means also to stand up for freedom and 
democracy. A legal order which does not uphold the principles deriving from 
human rights tends, sooner or later, to slip toward authoritarianism which in turn 
abolishes the democratic constitutionalism. Without democratic constitutio-
nalism the life would be unfree, unsecure and poorer. Therefore, the present thesis 
is also a defence of freedom, democracy and good life. 
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A Response to Estonian Critics of Principles Theory1 
‘Principles theory’ is an abbreviation. The full name could be the theory of the 
different logical structures of norms as principles and rules and their various 
application doctrines, especially in relation to balancing competing principles. 
In 1967, Ronald Dworkin introduced the logical distinction between rules and 
principles.2 In 1979,3 and in his major work of 1985, Robert Alexy developed this 
idea further and presented the even more profoundly elaborated logical 
distinction of legal norms into two groups.4 According to Alexy, 
“principles are norms which require that something be realized to the greatest 
extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities. Principles are optimization 
requirements, characterized by the fact that they can be satisfied to varying 
degrees, and that the appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not only on what 
is factually possible but also on what is legally possible. The scope of the legally 
possible is determined by opposing principles and rules. By contrast, rules are 
norms which are always either fulfilled or not. If a rule validly applies, then the 
requirement is to do exactly what it says, neither more nor less. In this way rules 
contain fixed points in the field of the factually and legally possible. This means 
                                                 
1  An earlier version of this chapter was published with the title ‘Constitutional Review in 
the Age of Balancing. Estonian Perspective’ in: Collection of Research Papers in Conjunction 
with the 6th International Scientific Conference of the Faculty of Law of the University of 
Latvia ‘Constitutional Values in Contemporary Legal Space I. 16–17 November 2016’. Riga: 
University of Latvia, 2016, p. 127–150. The author is grateful to Ms. Andra Laurand and Ms. 
Katrin Prükk for valuable help in preparation of the final version. 
2  R. Dworkin. The Model of Rules. – University of Chicago Law Review 35 (1967), p. 25; 
id. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977, p. 24. 
Cf. R. Alexy. Zum Begriff des Rechtsprinzips. – W. Krawietz, K. Opalek, A. Peczenik (eds.). 
Argumentation und Hermeneutik in der Jurisprudenz. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1979, 
p. 59–87, published again in: id. Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1995, 
p. 177–212; id. Rechtsregeln und Rechtsprinzipien. – N. MacCormick, S. Panou, L. Vallauri 
(eds.). Geltungs- und Erkenntnisbedingungen im modernen Rechtsdenken. Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner, 1985, p. 13–29, published again in: R. Alexy, H.-J. Koch, L. Kuhlen, H. Rüßmann 
(eds.). Elemente einer juristischen Begründungslehre. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003, p. 217–
233; M. Borowski. Grundrechte als Prinzipien. 3. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018, p. 118 ff.; 
J.-R. Sieckmann. Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle des Rechtssystems. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1990, p. 54 ff., 199 ff. About the earlier theoretical attempts, see M. Borowski. Ibid., 
p. 117 f. 
3  R. Alexy. Zum Begriff des Rechtsprinzips. – W. Krawietz, K. Opalek, A. Peczenik (eds.). 
Argumentation und Hermeneutik in der Jurisprudenz. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1979, 
p. 59 ff. 
4  R. Alexy. Theorie der Grundrechte. 1. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1985, p. 71 ff.; id. 
A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 44 ff. Cf. 
furthermore, id. Zum Begriff des Rechtsprinzips. – W. Krawietz, K. Opalek, A. Peczenik 
(eds.). Argumentation und Hermeneutik in der Jurisprudenz. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
1979, p. 59 ff.; id. On the Structure of Legal Principles. – Ratio Juris 13 (2000), p. 294 ff.; id. 
The Construction of Constitutional Rights. – Law and Ethics of Human Rights 4 (2010), 
p. 20 ff. 
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that the distinction between rules and principles is a qualitative one and not one of 
degree. Every norm is either a rule or a principle.”5 
Based on his ‘principles theory’,6 Alexy presented an influential analysis about the 
constitutional rights of Estonian Constitution in 1997.7,8 Therein, Alexy brought 
forward the idea of the comprehensive legal science of constitutional rights. 
According to this idea, there are three aspects of why the theory of constitutional 
rights exceeds the national doctrines: the substantial, the institutional and the 
systematic. Substantially, all constitutional rights are linked to human rights. The 
institutional aspect refers, in the first place, to the European Court of Human 
Rights and to the European Court of Justice, which add the international and 
supranational institutionalisations to the national institutionalisations. The 
systematic aspect refers to similar systematic questions in all constitutional 
reviews, for example, the principle of proportionality.9 The thesis of the 
comprehensive legal science of constitutional rights allowed Alexy to focus on 
the systematic aspects and to lay down the cornerstone for the Estonian doctrine 
of constitutional rights. 
The Estonian Supreme Court (SC) started following the main systematic ideas 
of Alexy’s analysis as early as in 1997 and held that a restriction on the freedom 
of movement was justifiable, “if it is proportional with the desired goal and it is 
impossible to achieve the desired goal by other means”.10 In 1998, the SC 
reformulated the core of the principle of proportionality – “Pursuant to the 
principle of proportionality, valid in a state based on the rule of law, the measures 
taken must be proportionate to the objectives to be achieved”11 – and delivered 
the following authoritative justification: 
“It is a principle of constitutional jurisdiction that when assessing the conflicting 
rights or competencies, a solution has to be found that does not damage consti-
tutional stability, that would restrict rights as little as possible, and would maintain 
the constitutional nature of law, and guarantee a justified and constitutional 
exercise of rights.”12 
The next milestone was the judgement of the SC in 2000, where the SC for the 
first time clearly applied the scheme of infringement and limits, as well as all 
three levels of the principle of proportionality and stated: “Restrictions must not 
                                                 
5  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 47 f. 
6  R. Alexy. The Construction of Constitutional Rights. – Law and Ethics of Human Rights 4 
(2010), p. 22. 
7  Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus [Constitution of Republic of Estonia] (PS). 
8  Published in: R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001. 
9  Ibid., p. 5 f. 
10  CRCSCj 06.10.1997, 3-4-1-3-97, para. I. 
11  CRCSCj 30.09.1998, 3-4-1-6-98, para. III. 
12  CRCSCj 14.04.1998, 3-4-1-3-98, para. IV. 
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prejudice legally protected interests or rights more than is justifiable by the 
legitimate aim of the provision. The means must be proportional to the desired 
aim […]. The legislators, as well as those who apply law, must take the 
proportionality principle into consideration.”13 From 2002 onwards, the SC has 
applied the fully developed three-level principle of proportionality: 
“The principle of proportionality arises from the second sentence of §11 of the 
Constitution, pursuant to which the restrictions on rights and freedoms must be 
necessary in a democratic society. The compliance with the principle of pro-
portionality is reviewed by the courts on three consecutive levels – first the 
suitability of a measure, then the necessity of the measure and, if necessary, also 
the proportionality of the measure in the narrower sense; that is, its reasonableness. 
If a measure is manifestly unsuitable, it is needless to review the necessity and 
reasonableness of the measure. A measure that fosters the achievement of a goal 
is suitable. For the purposes of suitability, a measure, which in no way fosters the 
achievement of a goal, is undisputedly disproportional. The requirement of 
suitability is meant to protect a person against the unnecessary interference of 
public power. A measure is necessary, if it is not possible to achieve the goal by 
some other measure, which is less burdening on a person, but is at least as effective 
as the former measure. In order to determine the reasonableness of a measure, the 
extent and intensity of the interference with a fundamental right on the one hand, 
and the importance of the aim on the other hand have to be weighed. The more 
intensive the infringement of a fundamental right the weightier the reasons 
justifying it have to be.”14 
In a procedure of 2003, the principles theory was explicitly referred to by the 
Chancellor of Justice and criticised in a dissenting opinion of Justice Eerik 
Kergandberg.15 Nevertheless, the SC en banc maintained it. However, it has 
recently also been criticised by another Estonian author Hent Kalmo.16 
The following sections discusses six main arguments presented by Estonian 
critics against principles theory – the backbone of Estonian constitutional review. 
The purpose of the chapter is to reply to the critics, to link the arguments to the 
international debate and to defend principles theory. 
 
                                                 
13  CRCSCj 28.04.2000, 3-4-1-6-00, para. 13. 
14  Formulation from CRCSCj 17.07.2009, 3-4-1-6-09, para. 21 and 15.12.2009, 3-4-1-25-09, 
para. 24. Beginning with CRCSCj 06.03.2002, 3-4-1-1-02, para. 15; cf. CRCSCj 12.06.2002, 
3-4-1-6-02, para. 12; 30.04.2004, 3-4-1-3-04, para. 31; 16.11.2016, 3-4-1-2-16, paras. 98 ff.; 
judgement of the Supreme Court en banc (SCebj) 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 30; 
17.06.2004, 3-2-1-143-03, paras. 20 ff.; 03.01.2008, 3-3-1-101-06, para. 27; 07.12.2009,  
3-3-1-5-09, para. 37; 21.01.2014, 3-4-1-17-13, paras. 32 ff. 
15  SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 9 and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Eerik Kergand-
berg. Cf. E. Kergandberg. Natuke privaatsusest ja mõnevõrra enam selle jälitustegevuslikust 
riivest isikuandmeid töötleva avaliku võimu poolt. – Juridica 2005/8, p. 545 f.; E. Kergand-
berg, M. Sillaots. Kriminaalmenetlus. Tallinn: Juura 2006, p. 43 fn. 42. 
16  H. Kalmo. Põhiseadus ja proportsionaalsus – kas pilvitu kooselu? – Juridica 2013/2, 
p. 79 ff. 
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I. The constitution is not a plain framework and  
the principles theory is not a track  
to over-constitutionalisation 
The constitution is, for Kalmo, solely a framework of constitutional prohibitions, 
which guarantees a wide range of discretion for political decision-making. 
Because of that, constitutional review should be concentrated, in his view, upon 
the question of whether the legislator has exceeded its limits, instead of dealing 
with the question of whether it has correctly balanced collective goods within the 
framework.17 
According to Kalmo, every legal rule is a result of a democratic balancing act 
that has been made considering different principles. Constitutionalism is charac-
terised by the rule that neither the legislator nor the constitutional court may 
decide the balance of values in the framework questions of the affairs of the state. 
In his opinion, the balance has been written directly into the democratically 
passed norms of the constitution.18 The role of the constitution is solely to 
distribute the decision-making powers.19 
Despite that, Kalmo seems to assume that the constitution contains values, 
too. He argues that the constitutional value system tends to expand like the 
universe. When the constitution imposes a value that is instrumentally related to 
another value, then, according to Kalmo, one can reasonably argue that the 
constitution imposes the other value too.20 But when legal protection can always 
be extended – by indirect methods – to new objects, it is difficult to understand 
what will be excluded at all.21 Therefore, the combination of arbitrary values with 
constitutional values and their transformation into constitutional values is, 
according to Kalmo, a further sin of principles theory. 
Moreover, Kalmo claims that the principles theory would also lead to 
expansionism of the constitutional value system at the level of limits. According 
to him, the possible legitimate aims of infringements are only loosely tied to the 
text of the constitution. In most cases, the text of the norm does not contain any 
aims. They stand behind the text. Therefore, the aforementioned rule is also valid 
here: when promoting an aim favours at least one other aim, then the constitution 
also imposes the other aim.22 Therefore, the catalogue of potential aims would be 
limitless. 
Both lines of Kalmo’s arguments are mutually connected – they maintain the 
over-constitutionalisation and stress the framework function of the constitution. 
The argument of over-constitutionalisation against the principles theory has been 
                                                 
17  Ibid., p. 90 fn. 41. 
18  Ibid., p. 89, 94. 
19  Ibid., p. 93. 
20  Ibid., p. 84. 
21  Ibid., p. 85. 
22  Ibid., p. 84 f. 
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put forward many times in the past.23 One of the most prominent representatives 
of this argument is Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde.24 Beyond that, Kalmo’s 
argument that the role of the constitution is solely to distribute decision-making 
power is reminiscent of John Hart Ely’s representation-reinforcing approach to 
judicial review, as Ely himself calls it.25 This argument questions the possibility 
of substantial constitutional review. 
The criticism of Böckenförde has already been answered by Alexy with his 
theory of discretion. Alexy distinguishes between the concepts of constitution as 
a framework (Rahmenordnung) and constitution as a foundation (Grund-
ordnung).26 Whereas the framework aspect leaves the legislator room for 
discretion, the foundation aspect in the qualitative sense determines these 
fundamental questions of society that can and must be decided by the constitution 
itself. The two paradigms are compatible and exist at the same time. Furthermore, 
Alexy has distinguished between two different kinds of discretion left for 
decision-makers: structural and epistemic discretion.27 “Structural discretion 
exists when the constitution neither commands nor prohibits a specific action.”28 
Epistemic discretion exists when the knowledge of what is commanded, prohibited 
or left free by the constitution is uncertain.29 According to Julian Rivers: 
“Epistemic discretion arises on account of the fact that we suffer relative ignorance 
about the world, so we do not always know to what extent policies will be 
successful or how significant a particular breach of rights is. In spite of such 
relative ignorance we still need to decide what to do.”30 
                                                 
23  E.g. E.-W. Böckenförde. Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1991, 
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24  E.-W. Böckenförde. Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1991, 
p. 159 ff., 185 ff. 
25  J. H. Ely. Democracy and Distrust. Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 
1980, p. 87 f., 181. 
26  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 390; id. Verfassungsrecht und einfaches Recht – Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Fachge-
richtsbarkeit. – Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 61 
(2002), p. 14 f. 
27  Ibid. 
28  M. Klatt, M. Meister. The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012, p. 79; R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 394 f.; J. Rivers. Proportionality, Discretion and the Second Law of 
Balancing. – G. Pavlakos (ed.). Law, Rights and Discourse. Oxford, Portland: Hart, 2007, p. 170 
ff.; M. Borowski. Grundrechte als Prinzipien. 3. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018, p. 175. 
29  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 414; J. Rivers. Proportionality, Discretion and the Second Law of Balancing. – G. Pavlakos 
(ed.). Law, Rights and Discourse. Oxford, Portland: Hart, 2007, p. 169, 177 ff. 
30  J. Rivers. Proportionality, Discretion and the Second Law of Balancing. – G. Pavlakos 
(ed.). Law, Rights and Discourse. Oxford, Portland: Hart, 2007, p. 169. 
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The legislator has structural discretion concerning setting the goals, selecting the 
means and balancing; in addition, epistemic discretion concerning empirical and 
normative knowledge also exists.31 Summing up, structural discretion demon-
strates the limits of the substantial content of the constitution and epistemic 
discretion points to the uncertainties of constitutional decision-making.32 There-
fore, there is no reason to worry about over-constitutionalisation on account of 
the principles theory. The constitution is neither a pure foundation nor a plain 
framework. At the same time, the room for discretion guarantees the decision 
prerogative of the parliament and avoids over-constitutionalisation. A consti-
tutional court may bindingly decide only as far as the constitution extends – in 
the sense of a foundation in the qualitative sense. Everything beyond that lies in 
the competence of other constitutional bodies, mainly in that of the parliament.  
Ely’s theory has been responded to by Hans Kelsen, who can be considered 
the theoretical founder of the European model of constitutional review, long 
before Ely wrote his criticism. There is no doubt that in democratic consti-
tutionalism legislation is a prerogative of the parliament. A rational justification 
of this prerogative is the direct democratic legitimisation of the parliament. While 
the supreme power of a state is vested in the people, the parliament exercises this 
power between elections. According to the legal logic, the legal force of an act of 
the parliament is stronger than that of a regulation, and also stronger than that of 
a judgement. It would be unthinkable that a court itself, instead of the legislator, 
would decide upon issues of, for example, judicial proceedings or judicial 
organisation. In short, a court is established to keep watch that all subjects of law 
observe the legislator’s word. The legislator’s word may be put aside only in 
exceptional circumstances. The constitutional review procedure constitutes such 
an exceptional procedure as it is only within this procedure that a court can place 
itself above an act of the parliament, who has directly been legitimised by the 
people. Kelsen argues that ordinary measures would be insufficient. It would be 
inappropriate to convict and punish members of a parliament for passing an 
unconstitutional law, because the parliament is a collective body. As for 
ministers, Kelsen argues that in theory they can be held liable but this would be 
ineffective since the unconstitutional law would remain in force. Therefore, the 
only option is destruction (Vernichtung); that is, the annulment of the 
                                                 
31  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
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unconstitutional act. This, in turn, could not be left for the parliament itself. 
Kelsen calls the latter possibility a political naivety.33 
Kelsen stresses the inevitability of the constitutional review from the 
standpoint of legal logic:  
“As long as a constitution lacks a guarantee of invalidating unconstitutional acts, 
the full legal force in the technical sense does not exist either. […] Any law, any 
ordinary regulation, even a general legal transaction between private persons is 
superior to such a constitution which should stand above all these legal forms and 
from which all lower levels should draw their validity, superior by its force.”34 
The only remedy against this is the invalidation of an unconstitutional act by an 
independent court of constitutional review. “Only a body different from the 
legislator and independent from the legislator, and therefore from all state 
influence, must be set up to invalidate the legislator’s unconstitutional acts. This 
is the institution of a constitutional court.”35  
Although Kelsen’s argument is mainly of a procedural nature, it concerns the 
substantial aspect, too: “Acts of parliament should not just be created following 
the prescribed procedures but may also not have a content that violates equality, 
liberty, property etc.”36 Therefore, as far as substantial questions like conformity 
with equality, liberty, property and others are concerned, the constitution is a 
foundation. To enforce it, substantial constitutional review is inevitable within 
democratic constitutionalism. Therefore, the review cannot be restricted solely to 
the distribution of the decision-making powers but must cover all substantial 
constitutional questions in the qualitative sense. 
 
 
II. The distinction between rules and principles is adequate 
According to Kalmo, principles theory does not help us to sieve out those 
provisions that are objectively principles. Every rule may, according to him, be 
reinterpreted into a balanceable principle. Kalmo takes the rule ‘it is prohibited 
to drive faster than 90 km/h’ and argues that even this norm may be reinterpreted 
into a principle according to which the obligation prevails only if no weightier 
counter-arguments justify driving faster. Somebody would not violate the 
provision if, it is true, he drives faster than 90 km/h, but only as far as this is 
necessary to respect other legal values, for example, to perform an urgent task. 
Accordingly, there is no norm at all, no matter how categorically formulated, that 
                                                 
33  H. Kelsen. Wesen und Entwicklung der Staalsgerichtsbarkeit. – Veröffentlichungen der 
Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 5 (1929), p. 53 and in general p. 51 ff. Kelsen’s 
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34  Ibid., p. 78. 
35  Ibid., p. 53. 
36  Ibid., p. 37. 
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those applying the law and desiring to apply the principle of proportionality could 
not reinterpret into a principle.37 
According to Kergandberg, the clear classification of norms into rules and 
principles is just one of many possible theoretical hypotheses and has not been 
sufficiently founded by its proponents.38 
As formulated by Martin Borowski, the principles theory as a theoretical legal 
theory alone does not classify concrete norms – such as, for example, the 
fundamental rights of the constitution – as rules or principles but can rather only 
show which theoretical norm structures are available for use.39 There are three 
possible ways to characterise the distinction of rules and principles. First, one can 
maintain that there is no logical difference at all – rules and principles are 
logically identical norms.40 This can be called the identity thesis.41 Second, one 
can maintain that the distinction between rules and principles is a matter of 
degree, not logic.42 This can be called the weak separation thesis.43 Third, it can 
be asserted that there is a logical difference between rules and principles.44 This 
is the strict separation thesis.45 
Kergandberg and Kalmo reject the thesis of strict separation. Kergandberg 
barely sees it as a conceivable classification without presenting his own view-
point; Kalmo, on the other hand, maintains that any rule can be reformulated as a 
principle. Therefore, Kalmo seems to be in favour of the identity thesis that has 
been explicitly brought up earlier by Aulis Aarnio. Aarnio also rejects the 
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possibility of a fundamental distinction between rules and principles.46 The 
starting point of Aarnio’s discourse is the level of language.  
According to Aarnio, the meaning that is assigned to a normative statement 
before interpreting on the grounds of the general knowledge of the language is a 
‘prima facie-meaning’.47 The ‘all-things-considered-meaning’ is, however, the 
one meaning that is assigned to the normative statement after interpreting.48 The 
interpretation can lead to the point where the original meaning changes because 
better reasons speak for excluding the norm from the legal system that comes into 
question as prima facie. In short, this process is the same for all norms, and 
therefore solely because of the wording of the norms, it is not possible to draw an 
abstract distinction between rules and principles. Rules and principles are, 
according to Aarnio, not deontic but axiological phenomena.49 
Aarnio refers to the decisive meaning of interpretation. The before/after 
approach is insofar accurate, since barely any normative statement can be treated 
as a source of a rule or a principle before interpretation. Indeed, it is conceivable 
that the normative statement contains a wording that can be unmistakably 
classified as a rule or a principle. This, however, in practice would occur only 
rarely. In most cases, the structural distinction between a rule and a principle can 
only be determined after interpretation. The determination of the structure of the 
Ought (Sollen) is therefore, as Borowski accurately emphasises, part of the 
interpretation process.50 
In his criticism, Aarnio also makes another important point: one normative 
statement can be assigned both to a rule and to a principle. This thesis is correct 
since one normative statement can embody several norms. For example, Alexy 
differentiates between the rule of human dignity and the principle of human 
dignity.51 One can also find provisions to which both types of norms correspond 
in the Estonian Constitution. For example, §9(1) PS: “The rights, freedoms and 
duties of each and every person, as set out in the Constitution, shall be equal for 
Estonian citizens and for citizens of foreign states and stateless persons in 
Estonia.” This normative statement expresses a rule, as well as a principle. First 
of all, it provides the rule that all natural persons are entitled to fundamental 
rights. Simultaneously, the normative statement also provides a principle of a 
specific fundamental right to equality.52 The possibility that a normative 
statement can be assigned to several norms also explains the view of Kalmo about 
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the norms that can be reformulated. However, at the same time, the rule will 
neither be reformulated into a principle nor the other way around – a principle 
into a rule. If it is clear that a normative statement is assigned to a rule, then this 
rule cannot be converted into a principle. Then the norm at hand is a rule-norm. 
The necessary prerequisite of the semantic concept of a norm53 is that the 
normative statement (the wording of the law) and the norm itself are strictly held 
apart. The distinction between rules and principles concerns the level of the norm 
and not of the normative statement. 
Moreover, having identified a rule does not mean that the Ought is absolute. 
An exception from a rule may result from another rule, but it may also result from 
a balancing of competing principles. In the latter case, we do not balance the rule 
itself but the principle(s) that justify the rule in question with principle(s) that 
demand the exception. For example, all norms of special parts of criminal law are 
clearly rules. According to the established doctrine of criminal law, the method of 
assessment of a criminal offence has several levels. If the criteria of the offence 
are met, the offence is, as a rule, punishable. However, exceptions like state of 
emergency or lack of guilt may apply and abolish the punishment. The 
complicated assessment structure is a good example of a doctrine that deals mostly 
with rules. Returning to the example offered by Kalmo, if there is a speed limit of 
50 km/h within towns and villages and 90 km/h outside towns and villages, then 
this is a rule according to which it is forbidden to drive faster than the 
corresponding speed limit. The rule-character of the prohibition on driving faster 
than the speed limit can be determined through interpretation of the normative 
statement. To determine the character of the concrete norm, the different abstract 
logical characteristics of rules and principles must be taken into account. The 
prohibition on driving faster than the speed limit is a rule and not a principle 
because its legal consequence does not depend on counter-reasons and the norm 
itself lacks the dimension of weight or importance. The correct way to apply it is 
the subsumption and not balancing. However, exceptions still may apply, if a 
police car follows an escaping criminal, a fire engine drives to a burning house 
or an ambulance brings a seriously injured patient to a hospital. Beyond that, it 
may be that a principle or some principles justify another exception. For example, 
it may be that a pregnant woman starts giving birth and needs to get to a hospital, 
there is no time or no opportunity to call the ambulance and there is little traffic 
on the streets. In this case, the violation of the speed limit rule may be justified 
by the state of emergency, which constitutes another exception. To introduce the 
exception, we do not weigh the speed limit itself, but the reasons behind it with 
reasons that will justify the faster driving – i.e. life, physical integrity and 
property of traffic participants versus life and physical integrity of the mother and 
child.  
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III. No disentanglement from the constitution 
Third, according to Kalmo, the application of the principle of proportionality 
presupposes a conversion of constitutional rules into principles. The principles 
theory is, according to him, tempted to convert clear prohibitions with predictable 
legal consequences into vague prima facie guidelines.54 
As maintained by Kalmo, the above consideration results in the situation 
where those who apply the law by the means of the principle of proportionality 
do not rely on constitutional guidelines anymore – instead, they rely on their own 
opinion of reasonable behaviour.55 Consequently, those applying the law will be 
exempted from the text of the constitution, and they will take the place of the 
constitutional legislator.56 Furthermore, Kalmo maintains that, according to the 
principles theory, constitutional amendments would no longer be necessary; even 
the constitution itself would no longer be necessary because the value doctrine 
would make values directly applicable and a written constitution superfluous or 
at least compatible with any proportional measure.57 Therefore, according to him, 
the principles theory would necessarily offer the constitutional legislator the 
possibility to pass a list of protected values instead of detailed provisions. The 
constitutional legislator could just add that, in the case of any combination of 
these values, the principle of proportionality applies.58 
Moreover, the application of the principle of proportionality converts, 
according to Kalmo, the meaning of words into momentary bubbles that those 
applying the law blow out every time in a different manner depending on the 
weight that they attribute to different legal values during decision-making. This 
leads to disentanglement from the constitution.59 
Kalmo seems to assert that the principles theory would make it possible to 
disregard the ratio legis completely and to lead to a full disentanglement from the 
written text of the constitution. Kalmo claims that the applier of the norm who 
will balance the reasons behind a norm practically annuls the normative decision 
and replaces it with his own.60 Based on these reasons, he denies the principles 
theory and wants to replace it with a theory that guarantees a better tie to the text 
of the constitution.61 
Kalmo’s thesis reminds one of Jürgen Habermas: it contains the view that the 
principles’ construction of constitutional rights eliminates their strict validity as 
                                                 
54  H. Kalmo. Põhiseadus ja proportsionaalsus – kas pilvitu kooselu? – Juridica 2013/2, p. 79. 
55  Ibid., p. 83, cf. p. 89. 
56  Ibid., p. 80. 
57  Ibid., p. 86, 97. 
58  Ibid., p. 83. 
59  Ibid., p. 96. 
60  Ibid., p. 89. 
61  Ibid., p. 95. 
68 
rules.62 As stated by Habermas, if in the case of a conflict we allow all reasons to 
be included in the class of arguments defining an end, it would allow the firewall 
that has been erected in the legal discourse by a deontological understanding of 
legal norms and principles to collapse.63 
Borowski has directly responded to this criticism. According to him, the con-
stitution contains strict determinations, non-strict determinations and determina-
tions of reason for limits.64 Based on this distinction, a strict determination would 
be, for example, §38(1) PS: “Science and art and their teachings are free.” There 
is no space for balancing at the level of the scope of constitutional rights – if we 
can determine that a particular action must be understood as science or art, it must 
be free (prima facie). However, strict does not mean definite. Therefore, not every 
science or art can be entirely free because the constitutional limits of the freedom 
may still apply. A non-strict determination would be, for example, §5 PS: “The 
natural wealth and resources of Estonia are national riches which must be used 
economically.” This is rather a constitutional end that has to be taken into account 
within a constitutional reasoning concerning natural wealth or natural resources. 
There is much less clarity on the field of determinations of reasons for limits. 
As possible classes of determinations of reasons for limits, Borowski dis-
tinguishes between positive constitutional ends, relative constitutional ends and 
negative constitutional ends.65 A positive constitutional end would be, for 
example, nature protection that can serve as a principle of constitutional rank to 
justify an infringement of a constitutional right without any legal reservation like 
the freedom of science and art. Relative constitutional ends are defined by the 
legislator. Their legitimacy depends on the correctness of the use of the consti-
tutional authorisation by the legislator. Finally, negative constitutional ends lay 
down constitutional prohibitions; for example, §12(2)1 PS: “Incitement to ethnic, 
racial, religious or political hatred, violence or discrimination is prohibited and 
punishable by law.” Negative constitutional ends have to be considered by the 
question of whether the end of the infringement is legitimate. If we dug deeper 
and looked behind the three different paradigms of the limits of constitutional 
rights – simple, qualified and zero legal reservation – the system would get much 
more complex.  
However, to respond to Kalmo, this outline must suffice at this point. There 
are still strict determinations in the constitution that must be followed. And, as 
far as the text of the constitution is linguistically or structurally open, the prin-
ciples theory offers a method to reduce the openness significantly. Alexy goes 
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further and presents a weight-formula to reduce the openness even more.66 But 
this shall not be made a subject of discussion here. 
 
 
IV. The demand to balance is more than just  
a demand to simply decide 
The principle of proportionality is, in Kalmo’s opinion, a purely formal guide-
line.67 The formulation of a legal problem as a question of balancing of values or 
principles, in his view, puts very different and, at first glance, incommensurable 
considerations like obligations, prohibitions, needs, interests, among others, on 
an equal footing. A comparison works out only because of the transformation of 
economic theory into constitutional law.68 
Then Kalmo turns explicitly to Robert Alexy’s principles theory, which, 
according to him, is one of the most thorough and systematic principles theories. 
Since Alexy’s reasoning is, according to Kalmo, parallel to economic theory, the 
conclusions of economic theory without further treatment apply to the consti-
tutional rights doctrine. In the principles theory, values perform the same role as 
goods in economic theory. The central role in the principles theory is played by 
Pareto-optimality because the first two levels of the principles theory are nothing 
but the application of Pareto-optimality.69 
The first two levels of the proportionality test – suitability and necessity – are 
of a rather technical nature; that is, they guarantee ‘the best use of legal pro-
duction technology’ in such a way that no constitutional right or collective good 
will be interfered with without reason.70 Kalmo brings up the example of whether 
the available resources would allow producing the optimal amount of bread and 
weapons together. On the third level, we have to weigh whether we will reduce 
the production of bread to increase the production of weapons. The requirement 
                                                 
66  R. Alexy. On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison. – Ratio Juris 16 
(2003), p. 433–449; id. Balancing, constitutional review, and representation. – I•CON 3 
(2005), p. 572–581; id. The Weight Formula. – J. Stelmach, B. Brożek, W. Załuski (eds.). 
Studies in the Philosophy of Law: Frontiers of the Economic Analysis of Law. Vol. 3. Krakow: 
Jagiellonian University Press, 2007, p. 9–27; id. Constitutional Rights and Proportionality. – 
Revus 22 (2014), p. 51–65. Cf. M. Klatt, M. Meister. The Constitutional Structure of 
Proportionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 10 ff.; M. Borowski. Robert 
Alexy’s Reconstruction of Formal Principles. – J. Aguiar de Oliveira, S. L. Paulson, A. T. G. 
Trivisonno (eds.). Alexy’s Theory of Law. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2015, p. 99 ff.; id. 
Grundrechte als Prinzipien. 3. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018, p. 129 ff.; J.-R. Sieckmann. 
Zur Prinzipientheorie Robert Alexys. Gemeinsamkeiten und Differenzen. – M. Klatt (ed.). 
Prinzipientheorie und Theorie der Abwägung. Tübingen: Mohr, 2013, p. 282 ff. 
67  H. Kalmo. Põhiseadus ja proportsionaalsus – kas pilvitu kooselu? – Juridica 2013/2, p. 83. 
68  Ibid., p. 87. 
69  Ibid., p. 88 f. 
70  Ibid., p. 89. 
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to weigh corresponds to the requirement to decide because the goods themselves 
do not allow us to decide between the goods.71 
Kalmo’s standpoint that Pareto-optimality does not cover the balancing, that 
is, proportionality in the narrower sense, is correct. The first two levels of the 
principle of proportionality “are concerned with the question of whether the 
factual possibilities allow the avoidance of costs to constitutional rights without 
bringing about costs contrary to the aims of the legislator.”72 Therefore, the 
principles of suitability and necessity will not be discussed here. 
Kalmo’s conclusion that balancing corresponds to the requirement to decide 
is again reminiscent of Habermas, this time his thesis that balancing lacks ‘rational 
standards’ and “takes place either arbitrarily or unreflectively, according to 
customary standards and hierarchies.”73 Kalmo’s conclusion is essentially 
another type of the irrationality allegation. To respond to this, we shall once again 
turn to Alexy74 and Borowski75. According to Borowski, the thesis of Habermas 
should be termed ‘radical balancing scepticism’.76 The radical antithesis to that 
would be – in terms of Alexy – that “balancing leads in a rational way to one 
outcome in every case.”77 This evokes Dworkin’s famous judge Hercules, who 
would always come to the one right answer,78 and should, according to Borowski, 
be called ‘radical balancing optimism’.79 Kalmo, as a sceptic regarding balancing, 
criticises the radical balancing optimism. However, there is, logically, a third 
way. According to Alexy, there is also a moderate antithesis, according to which 
“one outcome can be rationally established through the use of balancing, not in 
every case, but at least in some cases, and the class of these cases is interesting 
enough to justify balancing as a method.”80 It is impossible not to agree with 
                                                 
71  Ibid. 
72  R. Alexy. The Construction of Constitutional Rights. – Law and Ethics of Human Rights 4 
(2010), p. 28. 
73  J. Habermas. Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996, p. 259.  
74  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 401 ff. 
75  M. Borowski. Grundrechte als Prinzipien. 3. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018, p. 173 f.; id. 
Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit des Grundgesetzes. Tübingen: Mohr, 2006, p. 209 f.; id. On 
Apples and Oranges. Comment on Niels Petersen. – German Law Journal 14 (2013), p. 1412 
f. 
76  M. Borowski. Grundrechte als Prinzipien. 3. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018, p. 173; id. 
On Apples and Oranges. Comment on Niels Petersen. – German Law Journal 14 (2013), 
p. 1412. 
77  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 401. 
78  R. Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977, 
p. 119 ff., 279. 
79  M. Borowski. On Apples and Oranges. Comment on Niels Petersen. – German Law 
Journal 14 (2013), p. 1412. 
80  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 402. 
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Borowski that, besides the hard cases, there are also plain cases, like the 
disproportionality of the following punishment: cutting off a person’s feet for 
stepping onto the lawn in public parks.81 Between the two extremes, there is a 
broad spectrum of cases that are neither plain nor structurally hard. According to 
Borowski, it depends on how sceptical or optimistic one is with an eye to the 
number of cases in which a single outcome can be rationally established by means 
of balancing. One might be tempted to refer to this moderate thesis as either 
‘moderate scepticism toward balancing’ or ‘moderate optimism toward 
balancing’.82 
Furthermore, Borowski points out that ‘radical balancing optimism’ is no 
more than an artificial position often mistakenly ascribed to the supporters of the 
doctrine of proportionality by sceptics of balancing and that ‘radical balancing 
scepticism’ is, on closer reading, rarely supported by critical sceptics.83 There-
fore, the discussion about the rationality of balancing often misses the point. On 
the other hand, both moderate theses on the rationality of balancing are supported 
by most authors and they are by far the most plausible.84 
The allegation of irrationality against balancing may also target the level of 
justification of a balancing decision. In this case, the question is whether the 
outcome of the argumentation in favour of one of the competing principles can 
be rational. On the level of the justification of balancing decisions, a justification 
model instead of a decision-taking model is preferable.85 According to Alexy: 
“The point that values play a role in balancing exercises does not of itself represent 
an objection to the rational justification of balancing decisions, unless one is 
prepared to say that the legal argument is always non-rational or irrational the 
moment one enters the arena of non-authoritatively binding predetermined 
evaluations.”86 
This would be an extremely radical position that questions the rationality of legal 
science as such. “So the problem of the rationality of balancing principles leads 
to the question of the rationality of establishing statements which determine 
conditional preferential statements between competing values or principles.”87 To 
establish rationality at the level of the justification of non-balanced statements of 
conditional preference, all groups of rules and forms of external justification are 
                                                 
81  M. Borowski. Grundrechte als Prinzipien. 3. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018, p. 173; id. 
On Apples and Oranges. Comment on Niels Petersen. – German Law Journal 14 (2013), 
p. 1412. 
82  M. Borowski. On Apples and Oranges. Comment on Niels Petersen. – German Law 
Journal 14 (2013), p. 1412 f. 
83  Ibid. 
84  Ibid. 
85  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 100. 
86  Ibid., p. 106. 
87  Ibid., p. 101. 
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applicable,88 insofar as the rationality of the decision depends on the rationality 
of the argumentation; that is, on following the rules of the argumentation. 
 
 
V. No suspension of the constitution 
Furthermore, Kalmo claims that the principles theory leads to the suspension of 
the constitution because the infringement of personal freedoms would not be 
prevented by a general rule that inhibits assaults on the protected sphere of 
freedom but merely by the disproportionality of the infringement in a concrete 
case. Kalmo maintains that it would be equivalent to saying that the use of 
personal freedom interferes with collective goods. According to him, both sides – 
the subjects of constitutional freedom and the state authorities – have a right to 
proportionality. No side is more important or better protected than the other. 
Uncertainty remains in regard to what the constitution contributes to this formula. 
Kalmo presumes that a solution will be found by way of balancing after hearing 
both sides. It would also be possible to reach a solution without the constitution 
because balancing is what every rational man would do if there were no 
constitution.89 
Here are two assumptions. First, Kalmo maintains that constitutional rights 
prima facie have equal weight or importance as collective goods and are therefore 
equally protected. Second, he asserts that, because balancing is reasonable, the 
constitution is redundant. 
First of all, it is true that constitutional norms are formally (mostly) on the 
same level.90 However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the democratic 
state is the bearer of collective goods. There is no bearer of collective goods. 
Collective goods can be a reason for restrictions on constitutional rights but they 
can also be a reason for individual rights.91 Collective goods serve society and 
individuals, and not the state as such. The state is no bearer of collective goods 
but just their enforcer. The democratic constitutionalism is itself a collective good 
that serves constitutional rights. Therefore, it is only a means to an end – for a 
human being. No constitution of democratic constitutionalism puts the 
constitutional rights and collective goods substantially on an equal level because 
                                                 
88  Ibid.; R. Alexy. A Theory of Legal Argumentation. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989, p. 231 
ff. Cf. a modified list of forms of arguments in: id. Juristische Interpretation. – R. Alexy. 
Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1995, p. 84 ff.; id. Põhiõigused Eesti 
põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 8 ff. According to the modified list, there are 
four main groups of arguments: linguistic, genetic, systematic and general practical 
arguments. 
89  H. Kalmo. Põhiseadus ja proportsionaalsus – kas pilvitu kooselu? – Juridica 2013/2, p. 86. 
90  It is disputable, whether it is so under the Estonian Constitution, because different parts of 
the Constitution have significantly different rules of amendment (see §162 PS and §4 of 
Constitution of Republic of Estonian Amendment Act). 
91  R. Alexy. Individuelle Rechte und kollektive Güter. – R. Alexy. Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1995, p. 234. 
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they have different functions. Instead, constitutions contain constitutional rights 
primarily to guarantee the sphere of freedom and to restrict public power, while 
the state enforces the collective goods and individual rights of other persons. It 
would be a logical mistake to scrutinise an infringement of a collective good and 
try to justify it with a constitutional right. 
Second, from the assumption that balancing is reasonable, it does not follow 
that the constitution is redundant.92 It is easy to agree that balancing is reasonable, 
but without constitutional rights or a constitutional command to balance 
competing principles, the balancing would be contingent. People do not always 
behave reasonably and they are inclined to arbitrariness. Moreover, the right to 
be arbitrary is a human right. That is why the law is necessary. Since modern 
society is complex, a hierarchical legal order with a constitution at the top 
determining the most important questions in society is needed. The aforemen-
tioned circumstance becomes even more complicated when taking into account 
European Union law. The constitution, that would logically be more difficult to 
amend,93 guarantees constitutional rights and collective goods. Because of the 
principle-character of (most) constitutional rights, the principle of proportio-
nality, in turn, commands balancing the aforementioned rights. To question the 
necessity of the constitution in this paradigm means to question democratic 
constitutionalism as such. 
 
 
VI. Feasibility of a universal theory of fundamental rights 
Last but not least, Kalmo questions the possibility of a universal theory of 
constitutional rights. Kalmo names three groups of cases: first, cases where the 
constitution contains a clear prohibition; second, cases where there is no clear 
constitutional prohibition but a law seems to interfere with a constitutionally 
protected good; and third, cases where the question lies in the limits of consti-
tutional rights. The first two groups of cases will be solved without the use of the 
principle of proportionality. The first is a clear case of unconstitutionality. In the 
second case, Kalmo applies the rule ‘everything that is not prohibited is allowed’. 
However, Kalmo does not apply it to individual freedom, but to the universal 
competence of the parliament; that is, according to him, if the constitution does 
not prohibit the parliament from doing something, the parliament may freely 
decide.94 
Although in the third case the application of the principle of proportionality 
seems to be inevitable, Kalmo denies its applicability in the context of the 
Estonian constitution. His main argument is that every substantial theory shall be 
                                                 
92  For an overview of the concept of the constitution in the Estonian context, see P. K. Tupay. 
Verfassung und Verfassungsänderung in Estland. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 
2015, p. 17 ff. 
93  H. Kelsen. Reine Rechtslehre. 2. ed. Wien: Deuticke, 1960, p. 229. 
94  H. Kalmo. Põhiseadus ja proportsionaalsus – kas pilvitu kooselu? – Juridica 2013/2, p. 90. 
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dependent on the text of the constitution.95 The concentration on the substance – 
that is, on the value system behind the norms – causes us to forget, in his view, 
that under the democratic rule of law it is not unimportant who assigns the 
importance of different values in society. According to him, the constitution 
cannot distribute the competencies properly if the norm-technical meaning for 
that – the prohibition of substantial balancing – is made null and void by some 
theory and replaced by a principle that allows substantial balancing.96 
Article 11 PS would lead to no different conclusion. This article is, according 
to Kalmo, like a gateway for smuggling the proportionality test into Estonian case 
law.97 However, he maintains that the wording of the article may also be 
understood in a way that the prohibition on distorting the nature of rights entirely 
bans the restriction of some constitutional rights,98 such as in §§8, 17, 18, 22, 23, 
24 PS.99 
Kalmo continues that the removal of the legal validity of the constitutional 
rights is more difficult than the removal of the legal validity of an act of 
parliament. Constitutional rights are also criteria for judgements on the validity 
of an act of parliament. But these are purely formal characteristics. According to 
him, there is no reason to believe that there are substantial characteristics 
common to all constitutional rights, but that do not exist on the basis of rights 
derived from simple laws. Therefore, just as there is no ‘theory of blue items’ 
there is also no theory of constitutional norms.100 Kalmo argues that in different 
constitutional systems very different norms exist at a constitutional level. But the 
question of whether a provision should be a rule or a principle is, according to 
Kalmo, quite a substantial one. However, it would be difficult to criticise the more 
reserved position that applies principles theory to those constitutional rights that 
can be treated as principles.101 
Kalmo does not invalidate the arguments presented by Alexy in his analysis 
of 1997 referred to in the introduction to this chapter.102 Furthermore, other 
authors have presented arguments for the universality of Alexy’s theory. For 
example, according to Rivers, who translated Alexy’s Theory of Constitutional 
Rights into English, there are ample grounds why the theory should be applicable 
more widely; he argues that its transferability between systems is at  
 
 
  
                                                 
95  Ibid., p. 92. 
96  Ibid., p. 90 ff. 
97  Ibid., p. 90. 
98  Ibid., p. 94 fn. 53. 
99  Ibid., p. 92. 
100  Ibid., p. 91. 
101  Ibid. 
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least plausible.103 The main reasons for that are the formal abstraction and 
substantive openness of the principles theory. The feature that principles are 
optimisation requirements “explains the logical necessity of the principle of 
proportionality and exposes constitutional reasoning as the process of identifying 
the conditions under which one of two or more competing principles takes 
precedence on the facts of specific cases.”104 
“Constitutional rights need not be limited to the classic liberties, or defensive 
rights against public authorities: equality rights, rights to protection and procedure, 
and social rights are all conceivable as constitutionally protected rights. Nor need 
constitutional rights to be limited to relationships between the individual and the 
state; the precise degree of third party, or horizontal, effect is also a matter of 
substance. Finally, the theory manages a (partial) reconciliation between 
democracy and human rights, once again, not in substantive sense, but in showing 
how the structure of constitutional rights reasoning can be sensitive to both 
concerns.”105 
Furthermore, concerning the German doctrine, historical and genetic arguments 
can be brought forward: German Grundgesetz was one of the main examples for 
the Estonian Constitution during its travaux preparatoires.106 It is, therefore, a 
logical next step to look towards the prevailing doctrine of its application. And, 
finally, the case law of the SC cited above is a good proof of the inter-systematic 
transferability of the principles theory.  
 
 
VII. Closing remarks 
To conclude, the substantial core of constitutionality is, in most cases, the 
principle of proportionality and the central method for solving constitutional 
cases is balancing. The SC appears to be right and its method, developed since 
1997, is a success.107 The Estonian critics have not been able to raise an issue that 
                                                 
103  J. Rivers. A Theory of Constitutional Rights and the British Constitution. – R. Alexy. 
A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. XVIII. Cf. 
J. Rivers. Fundamental Rights in the UK Human Rights Act. – A. J. Menéndez, E. O. Eriksen 
(eds.). Arguing Fundamental Rights. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006, p. 141 ff. 
104  J. Rivers. A Theory of Constitutional Rights and the British Constitution. – R. Alexy. 
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105  Ibid. 
106  M. Ernits. 20 Jahre Menschenwürde, Demokratie, Rechtsstaat, Sozialstaat. – S. Hüls-
hörster, D. Mirow (eds.). Deutsche Beratung bei Rechts- und Justizreformen im Ausland. 
Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2012, p. 124; P. K. Tupay. Verfassung und Verfas-
sungsänderung in Estland. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2015, p. 35 ff. 
107  In a recent judgement the CRCSC stated: “§11 of the Constitution according to which 
circumscriptions of constitutional rights must be necessary in a democratic society does not 
contain any constitutional right to balancing. It requires only that from point of view of the 
constitutional right the balancing delivers ultimately a proportionate result. According to the 
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would cause us to be sceptical regarding the correctness of this practice in 
general. Although originally developed explicitly for the German context,108 
Alexy’s principles theory has proven to be a useful tool for constitutional review 
in Estonia as well. In the case of principles, the principles theory even in hard 
cases provides the constitutional court with a structure that makes the reasoning 
more rational. 
However, not all constitutional norms are principles. The deontological 
structure of a constitutional norm has to be found with the help of interpretation 
on a case-by-case basis, taking into account that there are logically two different 
kinds of norms – principles and rules. Instead of questioning proportionality and 
balancing as such, we could rather concentrate on the problem of structural 
interpretation; that is, on the clarification of which constitutional norms are not 
principles but rules. There are rules among constitutional rights as well as among 
the norms relating to the organisation of the state. Their identification seems to 
be one of the constitutional interpretation challenges that will need more effort in 
the future. 
 
 
                                                 
view of the Chamber, no other constitutional provision requires such constitutional right to 
balancing. An infringement of constitutional right to family life may be proportionate also 
when democratically legitimated lawgiver has weighed it by enacting the law.” (CRCSCj 
16.11.2016, 3-4-1-2-16, para. 119). This statement is at least ambiguous. There is no doubt 
that when the law in question is proportionate (and meets all formal and other requirements of 
the constitution) it is also constitutional. However, it does not mean that the SC may omit its 
independent substantial scrutiny whether the particular law is proportionate because the 
assessment whether the law is proportionate or not can only be carried out after the 
proportionality test by the SC itself. Therefore, the claim that there is no constitutional right 
to balancing is misleading. As far as a constitutional right with the nature of a principle is 
infringed there must be an individual right to an answer as to whether this infringement is 
proportionate. And this answer can only be given using the method of balancing. In this sense 
there is an individual right to balancing. 
108  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 1 ff. 
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The Use of Foreign Law by Estonian Supreme Court 
 
I. Introduction  
Estonian Constitution consists of three acts. Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus [The 
Constitution of the Republic of Estonia] (Constitution),1 as the main act was 
adopted via a referendum on 28 June 1992 and came into force on the following 
day, as prescribed by §1(1) of the Eesti Vabariigi põhiseaduse rakendamise sea-
dus [The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia Implementation Act] (CIA).2 
CIA was adopted together with the Constitution by a referendum on the same 
day. On 1 May 2004 Estonia, together with nine other European countries, joined 
the European Union (EU). Before the accession the Constitution of the Republic 
of Estonia was amended via a referendum on 14 September 2003. The Eesti 
Vabariigi põhiseaduse täiendamise seadus [The Constitution of the Republic of 
Estonia Amendment Act] (CAA)3 was added to the Constitution. This act 
provides for that Estonia may belong to the European Union, provided the 
fundamental principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia are 
respected and that when Estonia has acceded to the European Union, the Con-
stitution of the Republic of Estonia is applied without prejudice to the rights and 
obligations arising from the Accession Treaty.  
The Estonian constitutional order is determined by five fundamental con-
stitutional principles: human dignity,4 democracy,5 rule of law,6 social state7 and 
                                                 
1  Riigi Teataja [State Gazette] (RT) 1992, 26, 349; 15.05.2015, 1. For the English translation 
of the Constitution, see:  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/521052015001/consolide/current. All electronic resources 
accessed on 27.05.2019. The links are to the English translations unless indicated otherwise. 
2  RT I 1992, 26, 350:  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/530102013012/consolide/current. 
3  RT I 2003, 64, 429; RT I 2007, 43, 313:  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/530102013005/consolide/current. 
4  Judgment of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court (CRCSCj) 
21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 14; 05.05.2014, 3-4-1-67-13, para. 49; ruling of the Adminis-
trative Law Chamber of the Supreme Court (ALCSCr) 04.05.2011, 3-3-1-11-11, para. 10. 
Selected Constitutional Review judgments and selected judgments of the Administrative Law 
Chamber are available in English under:  
https://www.riigikohus.ee/en/judgements/constitutional-judgments and  
https://www.riigikohus.ee/en/judgements/judgments-administrative-law-chamber.  
5  Supreme Court en banc judgment (SCebj) 01.07.2010, 3-4-1-33-09, paras. 52, 67; ALCSCr 
16.01.2003, 3-3-1-2-03, para. 11; 27.01.2003, 3-3-1-6-03, para. 11. 
6  CRCSCr 07.11.2014, 3-4-1-32-14, para. 28. Cf. CRCSCj 19.03.2009, 3-4-1-17-08, para. 26; 
06.01.2015, 3-4-1-34-14, para. 33; ALCSCr 16.01.2003, 3-3-1-2-03, para. 11; 27.01.2003,  
3-3-1-6-03, para. 11. 
7  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 14; 05.05.2014, 3-4-1-67-13, para. 49. 
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Estonian identity.8,9 The Estonian legal order is a part of continental legal culture 
with a strict hierarchy of norms, with the principle of reservation of law provided 
for by §3(1)110 of the Constitution, according to which the Constitution requires 
a specific enactment of a statute for every specific exercise of the state power, 
and with the fundamental division of the legal order in public and private law. 
According to the Constitution, Estonia is a parliamentary republic, with 
governments being subject to the confidence of the directly and proportionally 
elected Parliament. The 2nd Chapter of the Constitution provides for a rather 
detailed catalogue of 48 provisions of enforceable constitutional rights. Five 
general rights can be identified: general liberty right in §19(1),11 general equality 
right in §12(1),12 general right to state protection in §13(1),13 general right to 
organisation and procedure in §1414 and general social right in §28(2)1.15,16 The 
chapter on constitutional rights is otherwise also rather comprehensive and 
                                                 
8  CRCSCj 04.11.1998, 3-4-1-7-98, para. III. 
9  To the debate about fundamental principles of the Constitution see: W. Drechsler, T. Annus. 
Die Verfassungsentwicklung in Estland von 1992 bis 2001. – Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts 
der Gegenwart 50 (2002), p. 473 ff.; M. Ernits. 20 Jahre Menschenwürde, Demokratie, 
Rechtsstaat, Sozialstaat. – S. Hülshörster, D. Mirow (eds.). Deutsche Beratung bei Rechts- 
und Justizreformen im Ausland. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2012, p. 126 ff.; R. 
Maruste. The Role of the Constitutional Court in Democratic Society. – Juridica International 
13 (2007), p. 8 ff.; R. Maruste. Democracy and the Rule of Law in Estonia. – Review of 
Central and East European Law 26 (2000), p. 311 ff.; J. Laffranque. A Glance at the Estonian 
Legal Landscape in View of the Constitution Amendment Act. – Juridica International 12 
(2007), p. 55 ff.; R. Narits. About the Principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia 
from the Perspective of Independent Statehood in Estonia. – Juridica International 16 (2009), 
p. 56 ff. See compilation of the sources in Estonian and presentation of the debate: M. Ernits. 
Põhiõigused, demokraatia, õigusriik. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2011, p. 5 fn. 9, p. 6 ff., 
23 f. 
10  “Governmental authority is exercised solely pursuant to the Constitution and laws which 
are in conformity therewith.” 
11  “Everyone has the right to free self-realisation.” 
12  “Everyone is equal before the law. No one shall be discriminated against on the basis of 
nationality, race, colour, sex, language, origin, religion, political or other opinion, property or 
social status, or on other grounds.” 
13  “Everyone has the right to the protection of the state and of the law. The Estonian state shall 
also protect its citizens abroad.” 
14  “The guarantee of rights and freedoms is the duty of the legislative, executive and judicial 
powers, and of local governments.” 
15  “An Estonian citizen has the right to state assistance in the case of old age, incapacity for 
work, loss of a provider, or need.” 
16  This division was first introduced by Robert Alexy in the first systematic monograph 
concerning fundamental rights in the Estonian Constitution: R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti 
põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 51 ff., 56 ff., 68 ff., 73 f., 76 f. 
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detailed.17 In addition, §1018 opens the constitutional rights catalogue towards 
human rights and constitutes a constitutional rights development clause.19 All 
constitutional rights are procedurally guaranteed by the general right to address a 
court in case of an alleged violation of a right in §15(1).20 Therefore, the Estonian 
Constitution is a typical example of a constitution adopted after the fall of an 
authoritarian regime – it is fully binding and enforceable in courts.  
The highest appeal court is the Estonian Supreme Court (SC), which unifies 
the functions of the final appellate instance of civil, criminal, and administrative 
jurisdictions, alongside constitutional review.21 The power of constitutional 
review can be exercised either by the Constitutional Review Chamber or, 
alternatively, by the SC en banc. The first public hearing of the SC took place on 
27 May 1993 and the Constitutional Review Chamber of the SC rendered its first 
judgment on 22 June 1993. The constitutional procedural law is regulated by the 
Constitutional Review Court Procedure Act (CRCPA)22 which provides for 14 
different types of proceedings. The most important type of proceedings is the 
concrete norm control which may be initiated by any court that concludes that a 
law, on whose validity its decision depends, is unconstitutional. However, the 
CRCPA does not provide for explicitly an individual constitutional complaint. In 
spite of that, there has been one successful precedent23 and the SC has in several 
decisions stressed the possibility of the individual constitutional complaint 
                                                 
17  It contains classic rights and liberties like the right to privacy in §26, freedom to choose 
an occupation in §29(1), property right in §32, inviolability of the home in §33, right to free 
movement in §34, freedom of religion in §40, secrecy of correspondence in §43, freedom of 
expression in §45, freedom of assembly in §47 etc. as well as special social rights like e.g. the 
right to education in §37. 
18  “The rights, freedoms and duties set out in this chapter do not preclude other rights, 
freedoms and duties which arise from the spirit of the Constitution or are in accordance 
therewith, and which are in conformity with the principles of human dignity, social justice and 
democratic government founded on the rule of law.” 
19  P. Häberle. Dokumentation von Verfassungsentwürfen und Verfassungen ehemals sozi-
alistischer Staaten. – Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 43 (1995), p. 177; 
R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 87 f.; M. Ernits. 
Põhiõigused, demokraatia, õigusriik. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2011, p. 140. 
20  “Everyone whose rights and freedoms have been violated has the right of recourse to the 
courts. Everyone is entitled to petition the court that hears his or her case to declare un-
constitutional any law, other legislative instrument or measure which is relevant in the case.” 
21  §149(3): “The Supreme Court is the highest court in the state and shall review court judg-
ments by way of cassation proceedings. The Supreme Court is also the court of constitutional 
review.” 
22  Põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalve kohtumenetluse seadus. – RT I 2002, 29, 174; RT I, 
23.12.2013, 57: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/508042019015/consolide/current. 
23  SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02 (Brusilov), especially para. 17. Cf. ALCSCr 22.12.2003 
and SCebj 30.04.2004, 3-3-1-77-03. 
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deriving directly from §15(1) of the Constitution.24 Nevertheless, it remains dis-
putable in Estonian constitutional law theory whether the Constitution establishes 
a right to individual constitutional complaint to the SC or do all courts have the 
obligation to enforce constitutional rights and there remains no room for a direct 
complaint to the SC.25  
The following analysis will not include numerous references of the SC on 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Already in travaux pre-
paratoirs of the Constitution the prominent role of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) was underlined26 and the ECHR was one of the main 
models for the constitutional rights chapter of the Constitution. Later on the SC 
pointed out “that proceeding from the aforesaid the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms constitutes an 
inseparable part of Estonian legal order and the guarantee of the rights and 
freedoms of the Convention is, under §14 of the Constitution, also the duty the 
judicial power.”27 The SC used the ECHR as an interpretation argument even 
                                                 
24  CRCSCj 09.06.2009, 3-4-1-2-09, para. 36; CRCSCr 23.03.2005, 3-4-1-6-05, para. 4; 
09.05.2006, 3-4-1-4-06, paras. 8 f.; 20.05.2009, 3-4-1-11-09, paras. 5 ff.; 07.12.2009, 
3-4-1-22-09, para. 7; 10.06.2010, 3-4-1-3-10, paras. 13 f.; 23.01.2014, 3-4-1-43-13, para. 9; 
27.01.2017, 3-4-1-14-16, para. 22. 
25  See e.g. the materials of the 2013 conference on the Brusilov case (SCebj 01.01.2009,  
3-1-3-10-02), (available in Estonian) http://www.oigus-selts.ee/konverentsid/kumme-aastat-
brusiloviga-kuidas-edasi. In 2017 the controversy sparked again, cf. I. Pilving. Kas Eestis on 
vaja individuaalkaebust? – Kohtute aastaraamat 2016, p. 81 ff.; E. Kerganberg. Individuaal-
kaebus kui riigisaladus. – Kohtute aastaraamat 2016, p. 91 ff. There was also a passionate 
debate in the press: L. Velsker. Reinsalu plaanitav seaduseelnõu on õiguskantsleri hinnangul 
arusaamatu ja ohustab demokraatiat. – Postimees Online (10.03.2017); R. Maruste. Õigus-
kantsler püüab eksitada seadusandjat ja avalikkust. – Postimees Online (14.03.2017); K. Kangro. 
Rask näeb otsekaebuste lubamise plaanis katset õiguskantsler tasalülitada. – Postimees Online 
(15.03.2017); Ü. Madise. Otsekaebuse petukaup ehk kuidas rohkem on tegelikult vähem. – 
Postimees Online (16.03.2017); H. Mihelson. Riigikohus ei toeta otsekaebuste lubamise 
plaani, kuid soovib arutelu jätkata. – Postimees Online (29.03.2017); I. Pilving. Põhiõiguste 
kaitset tuleb alustada õigest otsast. – Postimees Online (02.04.2017) (all available in Estonian 
at: http://www.postimees.ee/); U. Lõhmus. Võimalus pöörduda otse riigikohtusse väärib 
arutelu. – ERR (16.03.2017) (available in Estonian at:  https://www.err.ee/584528/uno-
lohmus-voimalus-poorduda-otse-riigikohtusse-vaarib-arutelu). The starting point of the debate 
was a plan of the Minister of Justice to introduce the individual constitutional complaint to the 
CRCPA that triggered exceptionally harsh critique especially from the Chancellor of Justice 
Ülle Madise. The strong reaction is somewhat surprising and regrettable because the central 
task of the Chancellor of Justice is to protect constitutional rights and the individual 
constitutional complaint is their procedural guarantee of the last resort. 
26  V. Rumessen. – V. Peep (ed.). Põhiseadus ja Põhiseaduse Assamblee. Tallinn: Juura, 1997, 
p. 172. 
27  SCebj 06.01.2004, 3-1-3-13-03, para. 31; cf. CRCSCj 04.04.2011, 3-4-1-9-10, para. 54. 
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before Estonian accession to the ECHR28 and has repeatedly done this after the 
accession.29  
Except some early references to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, the following analysis will not deal with links to the EU Law.30  
The following analysis concentrates on the use of comparative national and 
international law beyond the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR in judgments 
of constitutional review and judgments of the SC en banc. References to the 
judgments of the Administrative Law Chamber are also used where appropriate. 
Some of the judgments of the SC en banc are also formally constitutional review 
cases but often they are formally criminal, civil or administrative law cases which 
despite that essentially deal with the constitutional matters.  
 
 
                                                 
28  CRCSCj 12.01.1994, III-4/1-1/94; cf. judgment of the Criminal Law Chamber of the SC 
(CLCSCj) 12.12.1995, III-1/3-47/95. 
29  Some of the most important cases: SCebj 06.01.2004, 3-1-3-13-03; 06.01.2004, 3-3-2-1-04; 
18.03.2005, 3-2-1-59-04; 14.04.2009, 3-3-1-59-07, para. 32; 12.04.2011, 3-2-1-62-10, paras. 
48.4, 57.3, 62.2; CRCSCj 04.04.2011, 3-4-1-9-10. 
30 2005 the SC formulated its first version of the relationship between EU Law and domestic 
law: “The European Union law has indeed supremacy over Estonian law, but taking into 
account the case law of the European Court of Justice, this means the supremacy upon 
application. The supremacy of application means that the national act which is in conflict with 
the European Union law should be set aside in a concrete dispute […]” (SCebj 19.04.2005, 
3-4-1-1-05, para. 49. To this judgment: U. Lõhmus. Euroopa Liidu õigussüsteem ja 
põhiseaduslikkuse kontroll pärast 1. maid 2004. – Juridica 2006/1, p. 4 f.) 2006 the SC went 
significantly further and suspended large parts of the Constitution: “[…] the Constitution of 
the Republic of Estonia must be read together with the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia 
Amendment Act, applying only the part of the Constitution that is not amended by the CAA. 
[…] In the substantive sense this amounted to a material amendment of the entirety of the 
Constitution to the extent that it is not compatible with the European Union law. To find out, 
which part of the Constitution is applicable, it has to be interpreted in conjunction with the 
European Union law, which became binding for Estonia through the Accession Treaty. At 
that, only that part of the Constitution is applicable, which is in conformity with the European 
Union law or which regulates the relationships that are not regulated by the European Union 
law. The effect of those provisions of the Constitution that are not compatible with the 
European Union law and thus inapplicable is suspended.” (Opinion of the CRCSC 11.05.2006, 
3-4-1-3-06, paras. 14, 16.) This statement of the SC has been heavily criticized in the literature 
as too far going. (L. Mälksoo. Eesti suveräänsus 1988–2008. – H. Kalmo, M. Luts-Sootak 
(eds.). Iganenud või igavene? Tekste kaasaegsest suveräänsusest. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli 
Kirjastus, 2010, p. 147 f.; U. Lõhmus. Põhiseaduse muutmine ja muutused põhiseaduses. – 
Juridica 2011/1, p. 24 f.; M. Ernits. Põhiõigused, demokraatia, õigusriik. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli 
Kirjastus, 2011, p. 37 ff., 63 ff.; cf. B. Aaviksoo. Konstitutsiooniline identiteet: kild moodsa 
konstitutsionalismi kaleidoskoobis. – Juridica 2010/5, p. 335 ff.). 
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II. Comparative National and International Law  
in the Case Law of the Supreme Court  
Historically bound to the German legal culture, after regaining the independence 
in 1991 Estonia took again mainly an example of the German legal doctrine. The 
most influential model for reconstruction of vast parts of the Estonian legal order 
was modern German law. In first order this applies to the central parts of private 
law but also for criminal law and general administrative law. However, often the 
introduced rules were radically simplified. In this way Estonia gained a young 
and dynamic legal order where some of the principles and tenets that have become 
natural in more settled legal systems must still develop.  
In Estonian public law literature comparative law arguments are widespread.31 
However, probably due to limited academic capacity there has been no serious 
academic controversy about the use of foreign law arguments in constitutional 
law or specifically in the case law of the SC.32 The possibility to use comparative 
law arguments in constitutional review judgments can therefore be regarded as 
the dominant opinion.  
 
 
1. General Principles of Law  
Already in 1994, the Supreme Court declared that general principles of law 
developed by European institutions are incorporated into the Estonian legal 
system. The facts of the case were, in short, that the Farm Act introduced a five-
year income tax exemption for interest on loans granted to farmers, which was 
subsequently repealed when the coalition changed. In this connection, the 
question arose as to whether the tax advantage can be repealed before the end of 
the five-year period granted. The SC held such drawback for a violation of the 
                                                 
31  E.g. K. Merusk, I. Koolmeister. Haldusõigus. Tallinn: Juura, 1995; K. Merusk. Administ-
ratsiooni diskretsioon ja selle kohtulik kontroll. Tallinn: Juura, 1997: R. Alexy. Põhiõigused 
Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljanne 2001; A. Aedmaa, E. Lopman, N. Parrest, 
I. Pilving, E. Vene. Haldusmenetluse käsiraamat. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2004; 
R. Maruste. Konstitutsionalism ning põhiõiguste ja -vabaduste kaitse. Tallinn: Juura, 2004; 
P. K. Tupay. Verfassung und Verfassungsänderung in Estland. Berlin: Berliner Wissen-
schafts-Verlag, 2015. Cf. Dissenting opinion of the justice Uno Lõhmus to the CRCSCj 
05.10.2000, 3-4-1-8-00, para. II; Dissenting Opinion of Justice Eerik Kergandberg, joined by 
Justices Jaak Luik and Hele-Kai Remmel, to the SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, paras. 9 f.; 
Dissenting opinion of Justice Julia Laffranque, joined by Justices Tõnu Anton, Peeter Jero-
fejev, Hannes Kiris, Indrek Koolmeister and Harri Salmann, to the SCebj 19.04.2005, 
3-4-1-1-05, para. 10; Dissenting opinion of the Justices Villu Kõve, Peeter Jerofejev and Henn 
Jõks to the SCebj 21.06.2011, 3-4-1-16-10, para. 5; Dissenting opinion of the justices Henn 
Jõks, Ott Järvesaar, Eerik Kergandberg, Lea Kivi, Ants Kull and Lea Laarmaa to the SCebj 
12.07.2012, 3-4-1-6-12, para. 3. 
32  Cf. M. Ernits. Põhiõigused, demokraatia, õigusriik. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2011, 
p. 119 ff. 
85 
principle of legitimate expectations. However, the Constitutional Review 
Chamber of the SC spiced the reasons of the judgment with one of its best known 
obiter dictums in Estonia:  
“In democratic states the laws and general principles of law developed in the 
course of history are observed in law-making as well as in implementation of law, 
including in the administration of justice. When creating the general principles of 
Estonian law the general principles of law developed by the institutions of the 
Council of Europe and the European Union should be taken into consideration 
alongside the Constitution. These principles have their origin in the general 
principles of law of the highly developed legal cultures of the member states. […] 
The validity of the principles of a state based on democracy, social justice and the 
rule of law means that in Estonia the general principles of law recognised within 
the European legal space are in force. Pursuant to the Preamble of the Constitution, 
the Estonian state is founded on liberty, justice and law. In a state founded on 
liberty, justice and law the general principles of law are in force. Consequently, an 
Act which is in conflict with these principles is also in conflict with the 
Constitution.”33  
The general principles of law referred by the SC have the following character-
istics cumulatively – they:  
 
–  are developed in the course of history;  
–  are developed by the institutions of the Council of Europe and the European 
Union (recognised within the European legal space);  
–  have their origin in the general principles of law of the highly developed legal 
cultures of the member states;  
–  are based on democracy, social justice and the rule of law;  
–  are founded on liberty, justice and law.  
 
The SC stresses that a law which is in conflict with the general principles is also 
in conflict with the Constitution.  
From these observations arises the question why did the SC need the general 
principles in its reasoning if the Constitution already introduces constitutional 
rights, democracy and the rule of law? If the Constitution includes all important 
principles there is no logical need to invent external principles and to declare 
afterwards that a breach of the latter would lead to a breach of the Constitution. 
Later the SC has declared repeatedly that the case deciding principle, i.e. the 
principle of legitimate expectations derives from the Constitution itself, more 
precisely from §10.34 Consequently, the general principles of law were strictly 
speaking superfluous.  
However, the SC did not commit a mistake by declaring the general principles 
of law to be an important part of Estonian legal system. In the early phase of the 
                                                 
33  CRCSCj 30.09.1994, III-4/A-5/94. Cf. CRCSCj 17.02.2003, 3-4-1-1-03. 
34  CRCSCj 17.03.1999, 3-4-1-2-99, para. II; 02.12.2004, 3-4-1-20-04, para. 11. 
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constitutional review the interpretative skills such as understanding of the 
fundamental principles of a constitutional democracy were half-baked. With the 
introduction of the general principles of law the SC paved the way for faster 
integration of those doctrines and structures into Estonian legal system that have 
been developed by states with advanced legal culture. Essentially it was a 
comparative argument. With the help of the catalyst of the general principles of 
law the Constitutional Review Chamber of the SC stimulated the development of 
particularly the following principles in Estonian constitutional review: legality,35 
prohibition on retroactivity,36 legitimate expectations37 and the even broader 
legal certainty.38 The Administrative Law Chamber of the SC also elaborated in 
its early judgments on general principles of administrative law, especially on 
proportionality,39 legitimate expectations40 and the principle of equal treatment.41 
According to the model from 1994, the Administrative Law Chamber derived 
those principles also directly from the Constitution.  
Although not explicitly connected to the general principles of law by the 
Constitutional Review Chamber of the SC, the principle of proportionality may 
also be considered to be a general principle of law deriving from legal systems of 
constitutional democracies with highly developed legal culture. The Constitutional 
Review Chamber of the SC introduced it in 1997, without connecting it with any 
constitutional provision, holding a restriction of freedom of movement for 
justifiable “if it is proportional with the desired goal and it is impossible to 
achieve the desired goal by other means”.42 It therefore was first introduced 
essentially as a general principle of law. In 1998 the SC reformulated the core of 
the principle of proportionality deducing it from the rule of law: “Pursuant to the 
principle of proportionality, valid in a state based on the rule of law, the measures 
taken must be proportional to the objectives to be achieved”43 and delivered the 
following justification: “It is a principle of constitutional jurisdiction that when 
assessing the conflicting rights or competencies a solution has to be found that 
does not damage constitutional stability, that would restrict rights as little as 
possible, and would maintain the constitutional nature of law, and guarantee a 
                                                 
35  CRCSCj 12.01.1994, III-4/1-1/94: „According to the principle of legality, which is a 
generally recognised principle of (international) law and is established in §3 of the Con-
stitution of the Republic of Estonia, fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted solely 
on the basis of law.“ 
36  CRCSCj 30.09.1994, III-4/A-5/94. 
37  CRCSCj 30.09.1994, III-4/A-5/94; 30.09.1998, 3-4-1-6-98, para. II. 
38  CRCSCj 30.09.1998, 3-4-1-6-98, para. II. 
39  ALCSCr 13.04.1998, 3-3-1-14-98, para. 3; ALCSCj 17.06.2002, 3-3-1-32-02, para. 21; 
26.11.2002, 3-3- 1-64-02, para. 10. 
40  ALCSCj 27.03.2002, 3-3-1-17-02, para. 18. 
41  ALCSCr 24.03.1997, 3-3-1-5-97, para. 4. 
42  CRCSCj 06.10.1997, 3-4-1-3-97, para. I. 
43  CRCSCj 30.09.1998, 3-4-1-6-98, para. III. 
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justified and constitutional exercise of rights.”44 The next milestone was 
judgment of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the SC from 2000, where the 
SC for the first time clearly applied the scheme of infringement and limits as well 
as all three levels of the principle of proportionality and stated: “Restrictions must 
not prejudice legally protected interests or rights more than is justifiable by the 
legitimate aim of the provision. The means must be proportional to the desired 
aim […]. The legislators, as well as those who apply law, must take the 
proportionality principle into consideration.”45 In this judgment the SC also 
connected for the first time the principle of proportionality with §11 of the 
Constitution.46 From 2002 on the SC has applied the fully developed three level 
principle of proportionality: 
“The principle of proportionality arises from the second sentence of §11 of the 
Constitution, pursuant to which the restrictions on rights and freedoms must be 
necessary in a democratic society. The compliance with the principle of proportio-
nality is reviewed by the courts on three consecutive levels – first the suitability 
of a measure, then the necessity of the measure and, if necessary, also the 
proportionality of the measure in the narrower sense, i.e. the reasonableness 
thereof. If a measure is manifestly unsuitable, it is needless to review the necessity 
and reasonableness of the measure. A measure that fosters the achievement of a 
goal is suitable. For the purposes of suitability a measure, which in no way fosters 
the achievement of a goal, is undisputedly disproportional. The requirement of 
suitability is meant to protect a person against unnecessary interference of public 
power. A measure is necessary if it is not possible to achieve the goal by some 
other measure which is less burdening on a person but is at least as effective as the 
former measure. In order to determine the reasonableness of a measure the extent 
and intensity of the interference with a fundamental right on the one hand and the 
importance of the aim on the other hand have to be weighed. The more intensive 
the infringement of a fundamental right the weightier the reasons justifying it have 
to be.”47 
The use of general principles of law in reasons of early SC judgments represents 
a willingness to integrate the Estonian legal system that was for long time locked 
behind the iron curtain to the (continental) European legal culture and to open it 
up to human rights based values and to speed up the transformation of the legal 
system. The SC has essentially succeeded in reaching this aim.  
                                                 
44  CRCSCj 14.04.1998, 3-4-1-3-98, para. IV. 
45  CRCSCj 28.04.2000, 3-4-1-6-00, para. 13. 
46  “Rights and freedoms may only be circumscribed in accordance with the Constitution. 
Such circumscription must be necessary in a democratic society and may not distort the nature 
of the rights and freedoms circumscribed.” 
47  Formulation from CRCSCj 17.07.2009, 3-4-1-6-09, para. 21, and 15.12.2009, 3-4-1-25-09, 
para. 24. Beginning with CRCSCj 06.03.2002, 3-4-1-1-02, para. 15; cf. CRCSCj 12.06.2002, 
3-4-1-6-02, para. 12; 30.04.2004, 3-4-1-3-04, para. 31; SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 
30; 17.06.2004, 3-2-1-143- 03, paras. 20 ff.; 03.01.2008, 3-3-1-101-06, para. 27; 07.12.2009, 
3-3-1-5-09, para. 37; 21.01.2014, 3-4-1-17-13, paras. 32 ff. 
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Furthermore, the SC has deduced from “general principles of law of a demo-
cratic rule of law state” the right to self-regulation, i.e. “that the branches of state 
power and constitutional institutions must have autonomy in the exercise of the 
competencies given to them by the Constitution”.48 This is essentially a 
concretisation of the checks and balances principle. Later on the SC added the 
autonomy of local governments as “a general constitutional principle”.49 The 
autonomy is set out as the principle of local self-government in XIV. Chapter of 
the Constitution and it is structurally similar to the autonomy of universities and 
research institutions (§38(2)) and the partial autonomy of the Bank of Estonia 
(§111 and §112) – all three are guarantees of lower level public law legal persons 
to decide some issues on its own responsibility. These two principles differ from 
the principles above because they belong rather to the law relating to the 
organisation of the state and they do not concern the relationship between the 
state and individuals. However, they have become important principles of 
Estonian constitutional law as well.  
 
 
2. International Law  
§123 of the Constitution provides for: “The Republic of Estonia may not enter 
into international treaties which are in conflict with the Constitution. When laws 
or other legislation of Estonia are in conflict with an international treaty ratified 
by the Riigikogu,50 provisions of the international treaty apply.” This means that 
any international treaty has to be in conformity with the Constitution. If the SC 
discovers a contradiction between the Constitution and a treaty after the treaty 
has entered into force and the SC cannot eliminate the contradiction by inter-
pretation, the state organ which entered into the treaty is obliged to withdraw 
from it or initiate its denunciation or amendment. The §123(2) introduces a 
primacy of applicability of treaties in relation to acts of the parliament which is 
similar to the primacy of the EU Law. However, §158(4) of the Code of Adminis-
trative Court Procedure51 does not provide for any competence of administrative 
courts to set aside a valid act of parliament if it contravenes any international 
treaty as it does for contradictions with the Constitution or the EU Law. Thus, 
although §123(2) of the Constitution introduces by wording a primacy of 
application of any international treaty, a contradiction of an act of parliament and 
                                                 
48  CRCSCj 14.04.1998, 3-4-1-3-98, para. IV. 
49 SCebj 19.04.2005, 3-4-1-1-05, para. 24. 
50  The Estonian Parliament, see: https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/. 
51  “When deciding a matter, the court sets aside any Act of Parliament or other legislative 
act if that Act of Parliament or legislative act contravenes the Constitution of the Republic of 
Estonia or the law of the European Union.”  
(https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/512122017007/consolide/current). 
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an international treaty is considered by the SC as an argument for un-
constitutionality of the corresponding act of parliament.52 
Thus, the application of the international law in the case law of the SC is 
twofold. In some cases the SC confirms the interpretation indicated above and 
refers to the possibility of disapplication of the contradicting national norm.53 In 
other cases the SC does not use the international law in the sense of §123 of the 
Constitution but uses it instead as a comparative argument in order to interpret a 
constitutional provision. In this way the international law gains a double 
function – first, as a binding norm below the Constitution and above parlia-
mentary law and second, as a guideline in the framework of interpretation. 
Hereby the SC uses references to hard54 as well as to soft law.55 
In 1996 the President of the Republic initiated an abstract norm control of the 
Non-profit Associations Act passed by the Riigikogu but not yet promulgated and 
contested inter alia the conformity with the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. The Act provided for that only persons with active legal capacity may set 
up and belong to the leadership of non-profit associations. As according to the 
General Part of the Civil Code Act a person with active legal capacity is, as a rule, 
a person who has attained 18 years of age, the Act excluded children’s right to 
found associations and participate in the leadership thereof. First, the SC estab-
lished that the Convention has become binding for Estonia and then subsumed: 
“Article 15(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides for that States 
Parties recognise the rights of the child to freedom of association, which embraces 
the freedom to form associations, and freedom of peaceful assembly. According 
to Article 1 of the Convention a child means every human being below the age of 
18 years. According to Article 3 of the Convention in all actions concerning 
children, whether undertaken by courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
With the accession to the Convention Estonia has recognised the rights of the child 
to freedom of association, and the obligation of the state authority to establish 
pertinent legal mechanisms in national legislation. On the basis of the aforesaid, 
§5 of the Non-profit Associations Act is in conflict with Article 15(1) of the 
Convention.”56 
                                                 
52  CRCSCj 10.05.1996, 3-4-1-1-96, para. II; 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 20; SCebj 
14.04.2009, 3-3-1-59-07, paras. 33 f. 
53  ALCSCj 02.10.2014, 3-3-1-47-14, para. 17: “The Chamber notes that direct application of 
provisions of an international treaty on the basis of §123 of the Constitution does not provide 
for the initiation of constitutional review proceedings in relation to the domestic norm. The 
court dealing with the matter has in case of identification of a contradiction pursuant to 
§123(2) the right to disapply the domestic norm and to rely on the provision of the international 
treaty.” 
54  E.g. CRCSCj 10.05.1996, 3-4-1-1-96, para. II; 26.03.1998, 3-4-1-4-98, paras. III, IV; 
21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 20. 
55 E.g. CRCSCj 01.09.2005, 3-4-1-13-05, para. 17; SCebj 14.04.2009, 3-3-1-59-07, para. 33. 
56  CRCSCj 10.05.1996, 3-4-1-1-96, para. II. 
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In the resolution the SC declared the whole Non-profit Associations Act un-
constitutional. It was legally possible because the Act was not valid law yet and 
the §123 of the Constitution was not applicable. In this way the international law 
argument became supportive constitutional argument in a comparative role.  
Another case from 1998 concerned a professional foreign seafarer who was 
refused to leave Estonia because he was not entered into the crew list of a ship 
flying Estonian flag although he had the seafarer’s discharge book provided for 
by the Convention No. 108 of the International Labour Organisation57 that en-
abled him to leave Estonia. According to the Convention No. 108 the seafarer’s 
discharge book was an employment document proving the identity of a profes-
sional seafarer and enabled the holder thereof to leave the country on a ship and 
arrive from a ship which was located abroad; also to leave and arrive on a ship to 
the crew list of which he or she had been entered. The Administrative Court 
satisfied the complaint of the seafarer and initiated a concrete norm control of the 
corresponding government regulation that imposed the additional requirement of 
the entry into the crew list of a ship flying Estonian flag. Before the SC managed 
to render the judgment, the government abolished the regulation because it lacked 
a legal basis. However, the SC held it for necessary to examine the merits of the 
application. Thereby the SC found: 
“The unequal treatment of aliens and Estonian citizens is not in conformity […] 
with Article 5 of Convention No. 108, pursuant to which any seafarer who holds 
a valid seafarer’s identity document issued by the competent authority of a 
territory for which this Convention is in force, shall be readmitted to that territory, 
irrespective of whether he or she has been or has not been entered in the crew list 
of a ship flying Estonian flag. Pursuant to Article 6 of the Convention each 
member state shall permit the entry into a territory for which this Convention is in 
force of a seafarer holding a valid seafarer’s identity document, when entry is 
requested for temporary shore leave while ship is in port. The Convention does 
not regulate the issues of leaving the territory of a state. This right, especially if 
related to going on board of one’s ship, is self-evident and proceeds from the 
purpose of the Convention, namely to simplify the formalities related to seafarer’s 
travel to or from ships. As the referred Regulation of the Government of the 
Republic is in conflict with Convention No. 108, the implementation of the 
Regulation is in conflict with §123 of the Constitution. If Estonian laws or other 
legislation are in conflict with international agreements ratified by the Riigikogu, 
then, pursuant to second indent of §123 of the Constitution, the provisions of the 
international agreement shall apply. […] Pursuant to Article 1 of Convention No. 
108 it was decided to unify seafarers’ national identity documents, so that every 
seafarer could freely and without any restrictions work on a ship of a country, 
member to the convention, other than a ship of war, if the ship is registered in a 
territory for which the convention is in force. Under this principle it is unjustified 
and contrary to the spirit of the Convention to issue to seafarers identity documents 
on nationality grounds, pursuant to which an Estonian citizen can, on the basis of 
                                                 
57  Available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:: 
P12100_ILO_CODE:C108.  
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a seafarer’s service record book, enjoy wider rights upon arrival in Estonia and 
leave from Estonia than an alien who has been issued a certificate of record of 
service on Estonian ships.”58 
The whole judgment of the SC should be considered as an obiter dictum because 
since the government had abolished its restricting regulation there was no 
constitutional need to render any review judgment anymore. Therefore, the actual 
message of the judgment is that international obligations should be taken 
seriously by the legislator and that international law may be used as a supportive 
tool for constitutional interpretation. The extensive quotes of the Convention No. 
108 witness the eagerness of the SC to demonstrate its international and 
comparative law friendliness.  
A further example derives from one of the few landmark judgments of the 
Constitutional Review Chamber of the SC. The judgment that was rendered 2004 
was based on joined cases of a concrete norm control and abstract norm control 
initiated by the Chancellor of Justice59 and concerned a provision in the Social 
Welfare Act which deprived persons who were using dwellings on the bases 
different from those established in that provision of the possibility to get 
subsistence benefits. According the SC: 
                                                 
58  CRCSCj 26.03.1998, 3-4-1-4-98, paras. III, IV. 
59  The monocratic institution of the Chancellor of Justice is an exceptional one (see: 
http://www.oiguskantsler.ee/en). Heiki Loot, the current justice at the SC, was the first to 
propose a tripartite division of the functions of the Chancellor of Justice (protocol of the 
meeting of the Commission for the Legal Expertise of the Constitution from 14–15 November 
1997, not yet published). The first function of the Chancellor of Justice is to exercise 
supervision over the constitutionality and legality of the proceedings of the legislative and 
executive power. To perform this function the Chancellor of Justice has four wide-reaching 
competences. The Chancellor of Justice has the right to speak before the Riigikogu and during 
the sessions of the Government (§141(2) of the Constitution), to lodge a complaint against any 
state organ, to submit a direction to the Riigikogu to bring forward an Act within 20 days in 
accordance with the Constitution (§142(1)) and also to appeal to the SC, if his request was not 
fulfilled (§142(2)). The second function is the ombudsman function (§139(1) and (2)). This 
function includes the right to receive individual complaints, and to analyse and make 
suggestions to improve administrative governance. His third function is that of State 
Prosecutor (§139(3)). The Chancellor of Justice has the right to decide whether to bring a 
question of removal of immunity before the Parliament. According to the Constitution, this 
immunity is granted to members of the Parliament (§76), the President (§85), the Ministers 
(§101), the Auditor General (§138), and to all the judges (§153). In addition, the Chancellor 
of Justice has an immunity, which can be waived in cases where the right to decide over his 
immunity belongs to the Riigikogu and the President has the right to propose removal. A fourth 
important function of the Chancellor of Justice derives not from the Constitution but from the 
crcpa and consists in acting as amicus curiae in most of the constitutional proceedings. This 
function reminds to the function of Advocate General at the Court of Justice. Finally, the 
Chancellor of Justice Act adds to Chancellor of Justice several further functions like e.g. the 
Children’s Ombudsman or the national preventive mechanism provided for in Article 3 of the 
Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. 
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“The Constitution does not specify when a person is needy, that is when the 
satisfaction of his or her primary needs is not guaranteed, and that is why, to 
interpret the Constitution, it is necessary to examine international agreements to 
which the Republic of Estonia has acceded. Article 11 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights […] recognises “the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family”. According 
to Article 13(1) of the European Social Charter (revised) […] a state must “ensure 
that any person who is without adequate resources and who is unable to secure 
such resources whether by his own efforts or from other sources, in particular by 
benefits under a social security scheme, be granted adequate assistance […]”. The 
Social Charter requires that the states establish systems of social security (Article 
12(1)) that guarantee benefits in certain situations (sickness, incapacity for work, 
maternity, unemployment, family, old age, death, widowhood, industrial accidents, 
occupational diseases). Social insurance systems require the contribution of people 
themselves into the accumulation of funds out of which the payments shall be 
made. The Constitution does not expressly speak of the state’s duty to create social 
insurance systems. The application practice of the Social Charter, in assessing the 
need, proceeds from the minimum means of subsistence, established by state, 
which means that those persons are needy whose resources do not guarantee the 
minimum means of subsistence. That is why the amount of assistance given to 
such a person must not be in manifest inconformity with the minimum means of 
subsistence of the state.”60 
Furthermore, the SC made a reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union.61 Finally the SC declared the provision of the Social Welfare 
Act for unconstitutional to the extent that expenses connected with dwelling of 
needy people and families who were using dwellings not referred to in the 
corresponding provision were not taken into account and were not compensated 
for upon the grant of subsistence benefits.  
This judgment demonstrates once again the use of international law as com-
parative arguments by the SC. The outstanding importance of this judgment arises 
mainly from the facts that the SC declared the right to receive state assistance in 
the case of need to a subjective constitutional right and the principles of a state 
based on social justice and human dignity to fundamental constitutional 
principles.62 Ten years later, in a judgment of 2014 the SC referred in an obiter 
dictum to the European Committee of Social Rights Conclusions 2013 according 
to which Estonian practice of granting social assistance to a single needy person 
is inadequate and not in conformity with article 13(1) of the European Social 
Charter.63  
                                                 
60  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 20. 
61  See next section. 
62  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, paras. 16, 14. 
63  CRCSCj 05.05.2014, 3-4-1-67-13, para. 50. The European Committee of Social Rights 
concluded (European Committee of Social Rights. Activity Report 2013. Council of Europe, 
2014, p. 84. Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-social-charter/activity-
reports): “The Committee concludes that the situation in Estonia is not in conformity with 
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The further judgment from 2005 dealt with e-voting issues. In 2002 the 
Riigikogu passed the Local Government Council Election Act that enabled the 
voters holding a certificate for giving a digital signature to vote from 2005 on in 
local government council elections electronically on the webpage of the National 
Electoral Committee. In 2005, before the election, the Riigikogu amended the 
aforementioned election law. The President of the Republic held the amendment 
for unconstitutional and appealed the amendment act to the SC. In its 
argumentation the SC referred inter alia to a recommendation of the Council of 
Europe Committee of Ministers: 
“Pursuant to Recommendation Rec(2004)11 of the Council of Europe Committee of 
Ministers to member states on legal, operational and technical standards of  
e-voting […] the principle of uniform suffrage in the context of e-voting means 
four requirements. Firstly, it should be guaranteed that a voter shall be prevented 
from inserting more than one ballot into the electronic ballot box, and that a voter 
shall be authorised to vote only if it has been established that his/her ballot has not 
yet been inserted into the ballot box (§5). Secondly, the e-voting system shall 
prevent any voter from casting a final vote by more than one voting channel (§6). 
Thirdly, every vote deposited in an electronic ballot box shall be counted, and each 
vote cast in the election or referendum shall be counted only once (§7). Fourthly, 
where electronic and non-electronic voting channels are used in the same election 
or referendum, there shall be a secure and reliable method to aggregate all votes 
and to calculate the correct result (§8). All the requirements are aimed at 
guaranteeing that only one vote per voter is taken into account upon electronic 
voting. Although the Recommendation of the Council of Europe is not a legally 
binding document, it summarises the understanding of the democratic states of 
Europe of the conformity of electronic voting with the election principles inherent 
to democratic states, and it is thus an appropriate tool for interpreting the 
Constitution.”64 
Finally the SC dismissed the claim of the President. However, the introduction of 
these comparative arguments to the reasoning conveys the notion of elegance.  
A further landmark judgment of the SC en banc from 2009 addressed the 
constitutionally necessary extent of legislative safeguards for the independence 
of judges. A judge under criminal investigation was suspended from the office 
and the Minister of Justice suspended by his decision also his salary payments. 
However, despite the suspension of the public service relationship the judge’s 
status was retained and pursuant to law he could not be employed other than in 
the office of judge, except for teaching or research. The judge filed an action 
before the administrative court against the decision of the Minister of Justice. As 
the case reached the SC, the Administrative Law Chamber referred the matter to 
the SC en banc for adjudication. The SC en banc referred inter alia to the 
European Charter on the Statute for Judges: 
                                                 
Article 13§1 of the Charter on the ground that the amount of social assistance granted to a 
single person without resources is inadequate.” 
64  CRCSCj 01.09.2005, 3-4-1-13-05, para. 17. 
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“Nevertheless, in Article 6.1 of the European Charter on the Statute for Judges, 
adopted at a multilateral meeting organised by the Council of Europe […] it is 
considered to be universally recognised that remuneration is one of the guarantees 
for the independence of judges. The referred Article establishes the following: 
“Judges exercising judicial functions in a professional capacity are entitled to 
remuneration, the level of which is fixed so as to shield them from pressures aimed 
at influencing their decisions and more generally their behaviour within their 
jurisdiction, thereby impairing their independence and impartiality.” In regard to 
the referred provision the following is pointed out in the Explanatory Memo-
randum to the Charter: “The Charter provides that the level of the remuneration to 
which judges are entitled for performing their professional judicial duties must be 
set so as to shield them from pressures intended to influence their decisions or 
judicial conduct in general, impairing their independence and impartiality.” […] 
On the basis of the aforesaid the Supreme Court en banc holds that salary as a 
guarantee for the independence of judges is within the sphere of protection of 
§§15, 146 and 147(4) of the Constitution. Sufficient income guaranteed by the 
state to the judges while they hold the office of judge allows them to perform the 
role of judge as expected and, at the same time, constitutes a guarantee to 
participants in proceedings that their cases are heard by an independent and 
impartial tribunal. The Constitution does not allow for the conclusion that the 
guarantees for the independence of judges are not applicable to a judge during 
certain periods of time while he or she holds the office of judge, e.g. during the 
suspension of a service relationship. Also, for the duration of suspension of a 
service relationship […] an income must be guaranteed to a judge in order to 
guarantee his or her independence as a judge after his or her authority is 
restored.”65 
As we have seen, the SC used the European Charter on the Statute for Judges as 
the crucial argument to interpret constitutional provisions. As a result, the SC 
declared the failure to pass such legislation that would allow paying a salary or 
other equivalent compensation to a judge whose service relationship is suspended 
for the duration of a criminal proceeding for unconstitutional.  
The SC has also made references to other treaties,66 especially numerous 
references the European Charter of Local Self-Government67 but the afore-
mentioned examples shall suffice here. 
 
 
                                                 
65  SCebj 14.04.2009, 3-3-1-59-07, paras. 33 f. 
66  E.g. SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 21: “The Constitution was worded on the model 
of Article 15(1) of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the wording 
of which coincides with that of §23 of the Constitution.” 
67  CRCSCj 05.02.1998, 3-4-1-1-98, para. IV; 09.02.2000, 3-4-1-2-00, para. 17; 15.07.2002, 
3-4-1-7-02, para. 20; 16.01.2007, 3-4-1-9-06, para. 29; 19.03.2009, 3-4-1-17-08, paras. 38, 
50 f.; 09.06.2009, 3-4-1- 2-09, paras. 41 f.; 26.06.2009, 3-4-1-4-09, para. 16; 30.09.2009,  
3-4-1-9-09, para. 27; 15.10.2013, 3-4-1-47-13, para. 21; 20.12.2016, 3-4-1-3-16, paras. 89, 
136; SCebj 19.04.2005, 3-4-1-1-05, para. 17; 16.03.2010, 3-4-1-8-09, paras. 50 f., 55, 57 f., 
65, 68, 71, 83. 
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3. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union  
It is common knowledge that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (Charter) was solemnly proclaimed on 7 December 2000 by the European 
Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission but it became 
legally binding on the EU institutions and on national governments with the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, which amended Article 
6 of the Treaty on European Union.68 However, the SC referred to the Charter 
even before Estonia’s accession to the EU on 1 May 2004. 
Already in February 2003 the SC consulted first time the Charter.69 The case 
concerned the constitutionality of a government regulation that provided for in 
case of a satisfaction of any protest by a public tender the obligation to organise 
a new auction. The plaintiff of the underlying administrative proceedings was a 
company that gave the highest bid but had thereby breached some minor 
formalities. The plaintiff was therefore first excluded from the tender but after 
the satisfaction of his protest his bid was approved again. However, the plaintiff 
did not win the auction in spite of the highest bid because the government 
regulation did not allow simply awarding the highest bidder but prescribed the 
announcement of a new auction. The SC made in the reasons first a reference to 
the general principles of law and repeated essentially what it had said in 1994.70 
Then the SC introduced general principles of administrative law: 
“Principles of administrative law constitute a generalisation of rules valid in 
different branches of administrative law, which are expressed in different sources 
of law in different countries (e.g. in codified codes of administrative procedure, 
specific laws, judicial practice). In the European legal space the following 
principles are recognised as principles of administrative law: legal certainty, 
legitimate expectation, proportionality, non-discrimination, right to be heard in 
administrative procedure, right to procedure within a reasonable time, effective-
ness and efficiency.”71 
After that the SC referred to Article 41 of the Charter: 
“Article 41 of one of the most recent international documents on fundamental 
rights – the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights – directly refers to the 
right to good administration. The Charter puts an obligation on the European 
Union institutions and bodies to handle the affairs of persons impartially, fairly 
and within reasonable time. Pursuant to the Charter the right to good administration 
includes, inter alia, the right to have access to a person’s file, right to be heard, the 
                                                 
68  2016/C 202/02, OJ C 202, 07.06.2016, p. 389–405. Earlier versions of the Charter: 2000/C 
364/01, OJ C 364, 18.12.2000, p. 1–22; 2007/C 303/01, OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, p. 1–16; 
2010/C 83/02, OJ C 83, 30.03.2010, p. 389–403; 2012/C 326/02, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, 
p. 391–407. 
69  CRCSCj 17.02.2003, 3-4-1-1-03. 
70  CRCSCj 30.09.1994, III-4/A-5/94. 
71  CRCSCj 17.02.2003, 3-4-1-1-03, para. 14. 
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obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions and the right to 
compensation for damage caused by an administrative agency.”72 
The SC justified the reliance on the Charter essentially in two steps. First, the SC 
argued that constitutions of some European countries include some of the relevant 
principles. In step two the SC jumped to the Charter, presuming that the Charter 
is a certain concentrate of these principles. The Charter was not yet legally 
binding and Estonia was not yet a member state of the EU, but the SC decided to 
integrate the Charter as a comparative law argument into its argumentation. This 
witnesses obviously the EU friendliness of the SC. Furthermore, the actual trick 
of this argumentation was to make use of the constitutional rights development 
clause of §10 of the Constitution in order to introduce a new constitutional right 
– the right to good administration: 
“Pursuant to §10 of the Constitution the principles of a state based on democracy 
and rule of law are valid in Estonia. […] The analysis of the principles recognised 
in the European legal space leads to the conclusion that §14 of the Constitution 
gives rise to a person’s right to good administration, which is one of the 
fundamental rights.”73 
It was a simple case because the government had obviously misused its discretion 
allowed by law. But, instead of simply examining the use of discretion, the SC 
chose to bring in many different principles. Thus, this judgment witnesses above 
the EU friendliness of the SC also the open mindedness and creativity of the SC. 
The SC referred before the accession to the EU in two further judgments to 
the Charter. In the landmark judgment from March 2003 that was initiated by the 
individual constitutional complaint the SC en banc referred to the Charter 
deducing that it “establishes a principle that if, subsequent to the commission of 
a criminal offence, the law provides for a lighter penalty, that penalty shall be 
applicable”.74 In the above mentioned subsistence minimum case from January 
2004 the SC referred inter alia to clauses in Charter that recognise the right to 
social and housing assistance and that ensure a decent existence for all those who 
lack sufficient resources as additional arguments to the European Social Charter 
(revised).75  
After Estonia’s accession to the EU in Mai 2004 the Charter continued to be 
a source for supportive arguments until it became fully binding. For instance in 
2005 the SC referred, as an example, to Article 17 of the Charter to support the 
existence of the constitutional right to bequeath one’s property.76 In 2006 the 
Administrative Law Chamber of the SC made a reference to Article 1 of the 
                                                 
72  CRCSCj 17.02.2003, 3-4-1-1-03, para. 15. Cf. ALCSCj 19.12.2007, 3-3-1-80-06, para. 20. 
73  CRCSCj 17.02.2003, 3-4-1-1-03, paras.14, 16. 
74  SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 21 (see a more detailed presentation of the case 
below). 
75  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 20. 
76  SCebj 22.02.2005, 3-2-1-73-04, para. 17. 
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Charter to support its argument that human dignity is inviolable, a basis for all 
constitutional rights of a person and the goal of protection of constitutional rights 
and freedoms.77 After the Charter became binding, the SC used it a couple of 
times clearly outside of its field of application.78 
All in this section mentioned references to the Charter can be considered as 
comparative law references. 
 
 
4. Constitutions of Other Countries  
In the context of its general principles case law the SC en banc pointed 2003 to 
different Constitutions of EU member states as sources of general principles of 
law:  
“The principles of good administration have been inserted in black and white into 
several constitutions. For example, pursuant to §21(2) of the Constitution of 
Finland provisions concerning the publicity of proceedings, the right to be heard, 
the right to receive a reasoned decision and the right of appeal, as well as other 
guarantees of a fair trial and good governance shall be laid down by an Act. §31(2) 
of the Spanish Constitution requires efficient and economical use of public 
resources.”79  
Later in this judgment the SC added that “the Basic Law of the Federal Republic 
of Germany does not establish a principle that a law providing for a lesser 
punishment shall have retroactive force.”80  
These have remained the clearest comparative references to constitutional 
provisions of other countries.  
In 2009 the SC held it for necessary to significantly restrict the possibility to 
use comparative argumentation in the reasoning of the judgments:  
“As regards the statement of the Tallinn City Council that the request should be 
admissible also arising from the source of §7 of the crcpa in the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the practice of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court which has been developed on the basis of the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Chamber notes that the Supreme Court of 
the Republic of Estonia can only make its judgments on the basis of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. The comparative law arguments may have 
weight upon determining the content of the provisions of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia but they cannot be used to constitute binding instructions for 
Estonian courts.”81 
                                                 
77  ALCSCj 28.03.2006, 3-3-1-14-06, para. 11. 
78  ALCSCj 10.12.2010, 3-3-1-72-10, para. 14; ALCSCr 21.06.2010, 3-3-1-85-09, para. 19. 
79  CRCSCj 17.02.2003, 3-4-1-1-03, para. 14. 
80  SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 24 (see next section of this article). 
81  CRCSCr 22.12.2009, 3-4-1-16-09, para. 42. 
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However, the statement of the SC is at least misleading. The case was initiated 
by Tallinn City Council as a municipal constitutional complaint against some 
provisions of Local Government Council Election Act. The main issue of the case 
was the admissibility of the complaint. In the statement of claim the Tallinn City 
Council supported his interpretation of admissibility with some comparative 
arguments from German system.82 The Chancellor of Justice acting as amicus 
curiae expressed his scepticism towards this interpretation.83 The statement of the 
SC went even beyond the scepticism of the Chancellor of Justice and could be 
misinterpreted as a rejection of comparative law arguments. This is detrimental.  
 
 
5. Other Comparative Law Arguments  
The comparative law arguments below the constitutional level are relatively rare. 
However, there are a few good examples. They occur in judgments of the SC en 
banc which require in vast majority of cases also an interpretation of statutory law.  
The best known example is the already mentioned landmark judgment from 
2003. In this case the complainant whose name was Brusilov was convicted in 
1997 for theft of other person’s property on a large scale and punished for that by 
six years’ imprisonment. On September 1 2002 a new Penal Code entered into 
force and replaced the old Criminal Code that had been a modification of the 
Soviet Criminal Code. The new Penal Code was prepared taking into account 
constitutional rights and fundamental principles of the Constitution and it – 
generally speaking – raised the sanctions for crimes against the person and 
reduced the sanctions for crimes against property. According to the new Penal 
Code, the maximum rate of punishment for the complainant’s crime would have 
been five years’ imprisonment. After entering into force of the new Penal Code 
the complainant wished to get released from further serving the sentence but the 
Penal Code Implementation Act did not provide for any legal basis for his release. 
The main substantial constitutional issue of the case was whether §23(2)2 of the 
Constitution84 had to be extended to persons who were serving their sentences 
pursuant to judgments which had entered into force or not. In this judgment the 
SC made also long references to penal codes of other countries:  
“Some countries have further specified or established the principle of retroactive 
force of a lesser punishment in their Penal Codes. For example, the 1997 Criminal 
Code of Poland establishes that if for an offence, for which a new law establishes 
a maximum punishment which is lower than the sentence already passed, a 
judgment has already been rendered, then length of the sentence shall be decreased 
up to the maximum punishment established by the new law (§4(2)). The 1995 
Penal Code of Spain stipulates that a law which alleviates the situation of a person 
                                                 
82  CRCSCr 22.12.2009, 3-4-1-16-09, para. 11. 
83  CRCSCr 22.12.2009, 3-4-1-16-09, para. 23. 
84  “If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, the law makes provision for a lighter 
penalty, the lighter penalty applies.” 
99 
shall have retroactive force, even if a sentence has been pronounced and enforced 
(§282)). The same principle has been adopted in the 1999 Criminal Code of Latvia 
(§5(2)) and 1996 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (§10(5)). These 
examples allow to draw a conclusion that the Penal Codes of several European 
countries extend the effect of criminal laws alleviating the situation of a person 
also to the time of serving the sentence. […] The discussions during the legislative 
proceeding of the Penal Code Implementation Act in the Riigikogu shed light on 
the formation of the will of the legislator. […] At the second reading of the draft 
the chairman of the Legal Affairs Committee gave the following explanation to 
the Riigikogu: “[…] We also studied how these issues have been solved abroad. 
We found that in many respects the penal law of Germany has served as a model 
for drafting our Penal Code. The commentary of the German Penal Code 
concerning penal law states clearly that the principle of retroactive force of a law 
applying lesser punishment shall not mean the obligation to render a new judgment 
retroactively. […] Thus, we can assert that neither international law nor our 
Constitution give rise to a general obligation to review punishments imposed by 
court judgments that have entered into force.” […] The Supreme Court en banc is 
of the opinion that although German penal law has essentially influenced the 
wording of our Penal Code, it cannot be used to interpret the second sentence of 
§23(2) of the Constitution. Firstly, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many does not establish a principle that a law providing for a lesser punishment 
shall have retroactive force. Secondly, the German Penal Code establishes clearly 
that if the statute as it appeared at the completion of the crime is amended prior to 
the judgment in the case, the most lenient statute shall be applied (§2(3)).”85 
As a result, the SC declared the Penal Code Implementation Act to be in conflict 
with the §23(2)2 of the Constitution in conjunction with the principle of equality 
to the extent that the Act did not provide for a possibility to mitigate the 
punishment of a person serving imprisonment, imposed under the Criminal Code, 
up to the maximum rate of imprisonment established by a corresponding section 
of the Special Part of Penal Code. In this case the SC combined genuine 
comparative arguments with the will of the legislator who had also used 
comparative arguments. The comparative arguments played a crucial role to 
substantiate the wide scope of protection of the §23(2)2 of the Constitution which 
influenced the result of weighing the competing constitutional principles.  
The second example concerns too high court fees. Due to the outbreak of the 
economic crisis the legislator raised significantly and in several steps all court 
fees. From 2008 on the minimum court fee for general courts was rapidly raised 
from 15.98 to 75 Euro and the maximum court fee from 47 933.74 to 131 955.82 
Euro for every level of jurisdiction. The SC en banc argued in 2011: 
“Concerning the Estonian state fee rates it is important to note that at least in case 
of financial claims, legal costs, including fees, in Estonia are proportionally the 
highest compared to other European Union Member States, forming ca. 12.3% of 
the claim compared to, for example, France’s 2.7%, Finland’s 3.06%, Lithuania’s 
6% or Latvia’s 6.4% of the claim (The World Bank’s report Doing Business 2011, 
                                                 
85  SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, paras. 22 ff. 
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based on countries’ reports; http://www.doingbusiness.org/). The legislator has 
also not pointed out a reasonable and significant justification for establishing 
extraordinary state fees on the scale of Europe.”86 
In the underlying case the plaintiff was originally obliged to pay 60 396.51 Euro 
court fee but the SC found that this was too high. Since the SC dealt with every 
single table entry of the court fee table separately, there are more than 50 
judgments of the SC dealing with the constitutionality of the court fees. The main 
result of this painful process was the reduction of higher court fees, e.g. the 
maximum court fee is since July 2012 fixed to 10 500 Euro. By reaching this 
result some role was played by the cited comparative argument.  
The third example concerns the question of constitutionality of a prohibition 
for persons in custody to receive long-term visits from wife or husband in contrast 
to convicted prisoners who were allowed to receive long-term visits. The 
Constitutional Review Chamber of the SC used comparative law arguments while 
assessing the proportionality of the prohibition: 
“To the knowledge of the Chamber, similarly to Estonia, Croatia, Lithuania and 
the Czech Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, several cantons in the 
Swiss Confederation and Georgia permit persons in custody to receive only short-
term visits, duration of which is almost the same as in Estonia (about one hour in 
a week on the average). The Constitutional Court of Latvia also found, based 
mostly on the opinion of the European Court of Human Rights and, among other, 
also directly on the regulatory framework in Estonia and Lithuania, that the 
Constitution of Latvia does not require enabling persons in custody to receive long-
term visits (judgment of 23 April 2009 no. 2008-42-01). Unlike the aforementioned, 
for example, Canada, the Kingdom of Norway and the Federal Republic of Germany 
have provided persons in custody with the right to longterm visits.”87 
The SC weighed the aims of preventing evasion from criminal proceedings and 
continuous commission of criminal offences, including destruction, alteration 
and falsification of evidence and influencing of witnesses, against the interests of 
family life and found no violation of the latter. The comparative argument was in 
this case not decisive but rather illustrative.  
 
 
  
                                                 
86  SCebj 12.04.2011, 3-2-1-62-10, para. 48.3; cf. SCebj 22.11.2011, 3-3-1-33-11, para. 29.3. 
87  CRCSCj 04.04.2011, 3-4-1-9-10, para. 56. 
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III. Concluding Remarks  
Estonian legal system has since beginning of the nineties performed a turn from 
a post-communist country to a modern Western European type of constitutional 
democracy. I have called this development elsewhere a constitutional tiger leap.88 
Comparative national and international law arguments have played a significant 
role in this development, mainly as a catalyst to help to boost the Estonian 
constitutional law doctrine to a contemporary one. The general principles of law 
doctrine, especially the principle of proportionality have similarities with many 
other developed European legal systems, e.g. to Germany. The links to other legal 
systems, especially links to the Constitutions of other European states, witness 
the openness of the system. However, the sceptical statement of the SC from 2009 
towards the German Constitution89 remains a rather disputable step into other 
direction. Hopefully the SC finds a way to clarify it.  
Gábor Halmai has divided constitutional jurisdictions into three categories: 
those who do not use foreign law, those who do use foreign law implicitly, i.e. 
without any references to foreign constitutional review judgments, and those who 
do so explicitly.90 As we have seen, the SC uses foreign case law but mostly does 
not do so explicitly. Only very few references to constitutional review judgments 
of foreign constitutional courts exist.91 It belongs therefore somewhere in 
between the second and the third category. The use of references to foreign 
constitutional review judgments of the SC stands still in sharp contrast e.g. to the 
South African Constitutional Court.92 There is some room for improvement in 
this area.  
Michael Rosenfeld and András Sajó have drawn the link of the comparative 
constitutional law to the enlightenment and the early developments in the United 
                                                 
88  M. Ernits. 20 Jahre Menschenwürde, Demokratie, Rechtsstaat, Sozialstaat. – S. Hülshörs-
ter, D. Mirow (eds.). Deutsche Beratung bei Rechts- und Justizreformen im Ausland. Berlin: 
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2012, p. 123. 
89  CRCSCr 22.12.2009, 3-4-1-16-09, para. 42 (see above). 
90  G. Halmai. The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation. – M. Rosenfeld, 
A. Sajó (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012, p. 1329. 
91  Reference to the judgment of 23 April 2009 (2008-42-01) of the Constitutional Court of 
Latvia in CRCSCj 04.04.2011, 3-4-1-9-10, para. 56. Furthermore, there have been some refe-
rences to judgments of the German Constitutional Court in dissenting opinions: reference to 
the judgment of 4 May 2011 (2 BvR 2365/09) in the Dissenting opinion of the judges Villu 
Kõve, Peeter Jerofejev and Henn Jõks to the SCebj 21.06.2011, 3-4-1-16-10, para. 5; reference 
to the judgment of 19 June 2012 (2 BvE 4/11) in the Dissenting opinion of the justices Henn 
Jõks, Ott Järvesaar, Eerik Kergandberg, Lea Kivi, Ants Kull and Lea Laarmaa to the SCebj 
12.07.2012, 3-4-1-6-12, para. 3. 
92  Cf. J. Fedtke. Die Rezeption von Verfassungsrecht. Südafrika 1993-1996. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2000 to the beginnings and N. Petersen. Proportionality and Judicial Activism. 
Fundamental Rights Adjudication in Canada, Germany and South Africa. Cambridge et al.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017 to some more recent developments. 
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States and France.93 In these times not only the confirmation of the new ideas was 
a reason for comparative arguments but also the immanent universality and open-
mindedness of the great doctrines of human rights, democracy and rule of law. 
The fall of the iron curtain in the end of the 20th century reminds a little to 
upheaval of enlightenment and could perhaps be called the small enlightenment – 
the great ideas were not invented but (re)implemented in a large area of Central 
and Eastern Europe. The Estonian Constitution is a child of these times. And 
therefore the comparison is immanent to Estonian constitutional doctrine.  
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An Early Decision with Far-reaching Consequences 
 
How the Parliamentary Prerogative, the Right to Good Administration  
and Judicial Activism Entered into the Estonian Legal Order1 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Adoption of the Constitution at referendum on 28 June 1992 and its entry into 
force on the following day started the process of the formation of constitutional 
institutions in the country. In autumn 1992, the Riigikogu and the President of the 
Republic were elected and the Government of the Republic assumed office. 
Constitutional review in the Supreme Court began in 1993. This is the first time 
in the history of the Republic of Estonia that the substantive constitutional review 
was implemented. In 2008, fifteen years shall pass thereof, which is a good 
impetus for a short mid-term review. 
The object of this article is to analyse critically the relevance of one early 
decision of the Supreme Court on its subsequent practice and on the constitutional 
debate in Estonia. The selected decision is that of 12 January 1994, which could 
be called Operative Technical Measures I2 and which is one of the most important 
and influential decisions in the practice of the Supreme Court. The case arose 
from typical tense relations in the beginning of the 1990s. On the one hand, the 
legislator and the government were obliged to solve quickly a number of different 
issues after the restoration of independence of the Republic of Estonia, which 
were the result of a new societal structure and economic relations. On the other 
hand, one of the most important messages of the new Constitution is that every 
individual has (fundamental) rights arising from the Constitution that are directed 
against the state and the state has corresponding obligations to every individual 
pursuant to the Constitution. The implementation of the Constitution was 
necessary in order for it not to become a stillborn baby as was the case with the 
Constitution of the Estonian SSR. Thus, the sacrifice that had to be made in this 
case was the young state’s practical and urgent need to more effectively fight 
against organised crime in order to follow something more abstract and distant, 
the rightfulness or wrongfulness of which will only be revealed in the long term. 
 
                                                 
1  The paper expresses the author’s personal opinions. 
2  CRCSCj 12.01.1994, III-4/1-1/94. The decision Operative Technical Measures II also 
originates from the same date. Cf. CRCSCj 12.01.1994, III-4/1-2/94. All decisions of the 
Supreme Court referred to in the article are available at https://www.riigikohus.ee/. 
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II. The decision of the Supreme Court and its relevance 
On 21 April 1993, the Riigikogu adopted the Republic of Estonia Police Act 
Amendment Act.3 Part 2 subsection 4 thereof laid down: 
To establish that until the adoption of an act laying down operative surveillance 
activity, the security police officers may temporarily use operative technical 
measures to perform their duties only at the written consent of a member of the 
Supreme Court appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
The Chancellor of Justice, who has the sole right to initiate reactive abstract 
constitutional review of an act of parliament in Estonian legal order, disputed this 
act in the Supreme Court. On 12 January 2004, the Constitutional Review 
Chamber of the Supreme Court passed a decision by which the given rule was 
repealed as of the entry into force of the decision. 
In the reasons to the decision, the Chamber first defines the term ‘operative 
technical measure’: “In forensic science, the term ‘operative technical measures’, 
or ‘operative surveillance measures’ in the meaning of technical measures and 
operations, which enable to covertly interfere in the use of an individual’s rights 
and freedoms, i.e., without the individual’s knowledge, for the purposes of 
information collection.” 
The Chamber further admits that surveillance measures restrict several funda-
mental rights: “By allowing the security police officers to implement operative 
technical measures, the act provides the possibility to limit the rights and 
freedoms listed in the Constitution, including the rights laid down in §§26, 33 and 
43 regarding the inviolability of private and family life, the inviolability of the 
home and confidentiality of messages sent or received by other commonly used 
means.” The Chamber thereafter declares the fundamental rights subject to 
restrictions as a point of principle, thereby paving the way to its later practice 
where the principle of proportionality is decisive: “The possibility to limit the 
aforementioned rights and freedoms is prescribed both by the Constitution and 
international instruments of law.” This is followed by the reasons, the most 
important part of which follows: 
“According to lawfulness as the generally accepted principle of (international) law 
and the principle laid down in §3 of the Republic of Estonia Constitution, 
fundamental rights and freedoms may only be restricted pursuant to law. The 
procedure for restricting the rights and freedoms determined and published by law 
and publicity enable discretion and ensure the possibility to avoid abuse of power. 
However, lack and obscurity of a thorough legislative regulation leaves a person 
without a right to informative self-determination to choose a line of conduct and 
protect oneself. […] [T]he valid standards for implementing operative technical 
measures are insufficient and deficient from the point of view of the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms which in such an important field encompasses a 
                                                 
3  Eesti Vabariigi politseiseaduse muutmise ja täiendamise seadus. – RT I 1993, 20, 355 (in 
Estonian). 
107 
danger of arbitrariness and distortion of use of fundamental rights and freedoms 
and restrictions contrary to the Constitution. It has not been specified what operative 
technical measures specifically mean. […] The circle of subjects entitled to 
implement operative technical measures, cases, conditions, procedure, guarantees, 
control and supervision and liability remains unspecified. […] Therefore, in 
adopting subsection 4 in part II of the Police Act Amendment Act, the Riigikogu 
has disregarded §3 of the Constitution according to which state power shall be 
exercised solely pursuant to the Constitution and laws which are in conformity 
therewith and violated §14, which obliges the legislative power to ensure 
everyone’s rights and freedoms. […] The Riigikogu should have established the 
specific cases and detailed procedure for the implementation of operative technical 
measures and the related possible restrictions of rights itself instead of delegating 
the latter to security police officers and the justice of the Supreme Court. What the 
legislator is entitled or obliged to do according to the Constitution cannot be 
delegated to the executive power, not even temporarily or on the condition of a 
possible judicial review. Thus, subsection 4 of part II of the Police Act 
Amendment Act is also contrary to §13(2) of the Constitution as insufficient 
regulation in establishing restrictions to fundamental rights and freedoms shall not 
protect everyone against arbitrary action by state power.” 
This decision is important for three reasons. Firstly, the Supreme Court hereby 
formulates the principle of parliamentary prerogative. Secondly, in this decision 
the Supreme Court implements the general right to organisation and procedure 
for the first time (§14 of the Constitution), although not yet explicitly stating this. 
Thirdly, the decision by the Supreme Court entails that in addition to a limitation 
too intense, the legislator can also violate the Constitution by omission, whereby 
the constitutionality of both can be reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
 
 
1. The principle of parliamentary prerogative 
The principle of parliamentary prerogative is vested in the first sentence of §3(1) 
of the Constitution, according to which state power shall be exercised solely 
pursuant to the Constitution and laws which are in conformity therewith. The 
principle of parliamentary prerogative is also expressed by §104(2) of the 
Constitution, which lays down a list of laws that can be passed only by a majority 
of the membership of the Riigikogu. If a law can be passed only by a majority of 
the membership of the Riigikogu, it can therefore be only passed by the Riigikogu 
and thus the decision is reserved to the parliament. 
In its decision of 12 January 1994, the Supreme Court formulates the principle 
of parliamentary prerogative: “What the legislator is […] obliged to do according 
to the Constitution cannot be delegated to the executive power, not even 
temporarily or on the condition of a possible judicial review.” In 1998, the same 
idea is repeated: “The Riigikogu may not delegate solving a matter, which must 
be solved by law pursuant to the Constitution to the Government of the Republic.”4 
                                                 
4  CRCSCj 23.03.1998, 3-4-1-2-98, para. VIII. 
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In its later decision, the Supreme Court first explains the principle of parlia-
mentary prerogative by the principle of separation and balance of powers and 
thereafter by the principle of legal certainty. 
In the practice of the Supreme Court in the field of fundamental rights, the 
principle of parliamentary prerogative has been expressed in three ways: 
declaring unconstitutional a law that delegates power to the executive but lacks 
the essential substance of a delegating norm5, a government regulation that 
restricts fundamental rights passed without legal basis6 as well as a government 
regulation that restricts fundamental rights exceeding the parliamentary dele-
gation of power7. It is true that the separation of the latter two cases may prove to 
be difficult in case of a generally formulated parliamentary delegation of power. 
In order to analyse how the principle of parliamentary prerogative operates, 
an answer must first be sought to the question what should be reserved to the 
parliament. The simple answer is that the most important questions shall be 
reserved to the parliament. But what is important? The Supreme Court primarily 
places relevance on matters important from the point of view of fundamental 
rights, which include cases and grounds for restricting fundamental rights: “The 
legislator must itself decide on all matters important from the point of view of 
fundamental rights and may not delegate the regulation thereof to the executive 
power. The executive power may only specify restrictions established on funda-
mental rights and freedoms, and not establish further restrictions compared to 
what has been provided by the law.”8 
A detailed procedure for restricting rights9 or the designation of a competent 
administrative body10 may be important from the viewpoint of fundamental rights 
and thus the object of an act of parliament. The law must establish disciplinary 
action against officials: it is unlawful to establish disciplinary offences, 
disciplinary punishments and disciplinary proceedings by a government 
                                                 
5  CRCSCj 12.01.1994, III-4/1-1/94; 05.02.1998, 3-4-1-1-98, paras. III and IV; 23.03.1998, 
3-4-1-2-98; 04.11.1998, 3-4-1-7-98, para. II; 05.11.2002, 3-4-1-8-02; 24.12.2002, 3-4-1-10-02, 
para. 25; 19.12.2003, 3-4-1-22-03. 
6  CRCSCj 02.11.1994, III-4/1-8/94; 11.01.1995, III-4/A-12/94; 06.10.1997, 3-4-1-3-97; 
17.06.1998, 3-4-1-5-98; 23.11.1998, 3-4-1-8-98; 09.02.2000, 3-4-1-2-00; 10.04.2002, 
3-4-1-4-02. 
7  SCebj 22.12.2000, 3-4-1-10-00; CRCSCj 20.12.1996, 3-4-1-3-96; 22.12.1998, 3-4-1-11-98; 
17.03.1999, 3-4-1-1-99; 12.05.2000, 3-4-1-5-00, para. 42; 08.02.2001, 3-4-1-1-01; 22.03.2001, 
3-4-1-5-01; 17.02.2003, 3-4-1-1-03; 18.11.2004, 3-4-1-14-04; 13.06.2005, 3-4-1-5-05; 
13.02.2007, 3-4-1-16-06; 02.05.2007, 3-4-1-2-07. 
8  CRCSCj 24.12.2002, 3-4-1-10-02, para. 24. 
9  CRCSCj 12.01.1994, III-4/1-1/94. In case of an intensive limitation, which wire tapping 
and covert surveillance included under operative technical measures undoubtedly are, the 
Supreme Court considers the order or procedure so important that it must be established by 
law and not by an act subordinate to a law. 
10  ALCSCr 22.12.2003, 3-3-1-77-03, para. 24. 
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regulation.11 A regulation cannot establish customs duty or customs tariff12, tax 
interest or fine for delay13, a participation fee in the privatisation of land by 
auction14 or the rate of a bailiff15. The law itself must prescribe the purpose, 
content and scope of the regulation: “[T]he government may issue regulations 
pursuant to law and subject to enforcement, i.e., based on the delegation standard 
included in the law. The delegation standard indicates the purpose, content and 
scope of a regulative authorisation, in the framework of which the government has 
the right to issue regulations. A regulation which exceeds the purpose, content and 
scope of an authorisation issued by a delegation norm is unconstitutional.”16 
The relationship between a law and a regulation is also specified by the so-
called framework theory: “[T]he law need not […] describe all restrictions in 
detail. The law must, however, establish the framework within which the executive 
power specifies the relevant provisions of the law.”17 In this context, the Supreme 
Court further discusses the transfer of technical specification to the government.18 
In defining borders between the powers of the legislator and the issuer of 
regulations it is unclear, where the line between sufficient and therefore consti-
tutional delegation norm and unconstitutional delegation norm is. Namely, in 
1998 the Supreme Court established that a generally formulated delegation is not 
unconstitutional due to its general formulation: “If the legislator’s authorisation 
is general but not directly unconstitutional, the assumption or possibility that the 
government’s activity may be unconstitutional following this authorisation does 
not in itself necessarily cause the unconstitutionality of the authorisation. In the 
course of delegated norm establishment the Government of the Republic must 
follow the Constitution and interpret the law as well as the delegation norm in 
compliance with the Constitution. Therefore, the fact that an indefinite delegation 
would for instance enable the government to establish requirements that are 
unnecessary in a democratic society does not render the delegation itself 
unconstitutional.”19 
On the face of it, this seems to be contrary to the rest of the practice of the 
Supreme Court. For example, in its decision of 12 January 1994, the Supreme 
Court declared the authorisation norm unconstitutional, blaming the legislator, 
among other things, in the following: “The circle of subjects entitled to implement 
                                                 
11  CRCSCj 11.06.1997, 3-4-1-1-97. 
12  CRCSCj 23.03.98, 3-4-1-2-98. 
13  CRCSCj 05.11.2002, 3-4-1-8-02. 
14  SCebj 22.12.2000, 3-4-1-10-00. 
15  CRCSCj 19.12.2003, 3-4-1-22-03. 
16  CRCSCj 08.02.2001, 3-4-1-1-01, para. 13. Cf. also CRCSCj 20.12.1996, 3-4-1-3-96, para. 
III; 05.02.1998, 3-4-1-1-98, para. V; 13.02.2007, 3-4-1-16-06, para. 21; 02.05.2007,  
3-4-1-2-07, para. 20. 
17  CRCSCj 17.03.1999, 3-4-1-1-99, para. 14. 
18  CRCSCj 20.12.1996, 3-4-1-3-96, para. II. 
19  CRCSCj 05.02.1998, 3-4-1-1-98, para. V. 
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operative technical measures, cases, conditions, procedure, guarantees, control 
and supervision and liability remain unspecified.”20 
It is also difficult to imagine how the purpose, content and scope of a regu-
lation can simultaneously be laid down in a delegation norm when it is formulated 
ambiguously. The cited decision of 1998 must probably be interpreted as 
mitigating the requirements presented to the legislator that were caused by the 
necessity of the transitional period to quickly modernise the majority of the legal 
system. The Supreme Court might have feared that the consistent implementation 
of the principle of parliamentary prerogative in the transformation period may 
prove to be overly difficult.21 Indeed, a number of delegation norms contradict 
the standards set in 1994 even today and the current legal order includes numerous 
government regulations issued pursuant to such delegation norms. These 
regulations regulate matters important from the viewpoint of fundamental rights, 
which should be in the exclusive competence of the legislator, for example: The 
traffic regulation22 or the border regime rules23 approved by the Government of 
the Republic or the internal rules of prisons24 or regulation of an armed  
                                                 
20  The Supreme Court has declared in a later decision a delegation norm in a law in the sense 
of §104(2) of the Constitution unconstitutional for formal reasons (CRCSCj 04.11.1998, 
3-4-1-7-98, para. II). Among other things, the object of this decision was the delegation given 
to the Government of the Republic by the legislator to establish the procedure for the level of 
Estonian language skills necessary for working in a local government council. The Supreme 
Court proceeded from §104(2) No. 4 of the Constitution, according to which the Local 
Government Council Election Act may only be adopted and amended by a majority of the 
membership of the Riigikogu (i.e., 51 votes of 101) although the delegation not declared 
unconstitutional and invalid was included in the Language Act. 
21  In the same decision, the Supreme Court declared the unconstitutionality of two delegation 
norms violating the principle of parliamentary prerogative. See CRCSCj 05.02.1998, 
3-4-1-1-98, paras. III and IV. 
22  The regulation is called Traffic Code (Liikluseeskiri. – RT I 2001, 15, 66; 2003, 22, 131; 
2005, 41, 336 (in Estonian)). English translation is no longer available. The Traffic Code 
established important traffic and movement restrictions, the violations of which were subject 
to a punishment. However, the authorisation norm that the Traffic Code is based on, was rather 
brief. Subsection 3 (Determination of road traffic rules) (2) of the Traffic Act (RT I 2001, 3, 
6; 2007, 4, 19; in Estonian) layd down: The Government of the Republic shall determine the 
road traffic rules with the Traffic Code. 
23  Piirirežiimi eeskiri. – RT I 1997, 69, 1126; 2004, 77, 529 (in Estonian). Subsection 8 
(Border regime) (3) is a problematic authorisation norm: The rights, obligations and 
restrictions arising from the border regime, unless provided by law or international agreements, 
shall be established by the Government of the Republic or an agency authorised thereby, unless 
otherwise provided by law. 
24  Vangla sisekorraeeskiri. – RTL 2000, 134, 2139; 2007, 13, 192 (in Estonian). Among other 
things, the internal rules of prisons establish restrictions on the use of personal items, meetings 
and correspondence by imprisoned persons. Subsection 105 (Prison) (2) of the Imprisonment 
Act forms a problematic authorisation norm: “[…] the Minister of Justice shall establish 
internal rules of prisons.” (It is true that numerous other provisions of the Imprisonment Act 
also refer to internal rules in prisons, but this kind of ‘spreading’ of authorisations across the 
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unit25 approved by regulations of the Minister of Justice. Precisely the decision 
of 1994, in which the Supreme Court declared a delegation norm unconstitutional 
and invalid, which does not include a circle of subjects, cases, conditions, 
procedural rules, guarantees, control, supervision or liability, must be considered 
an important motivator of the legislator in increasing the quality of the laws of 
the transitional period. Today, as the end of the transitional period is jointly 
recognised, the Supreme Court could even more clearly turn to the goal set in 
1994 stating that the obligation of the legislator pursuant to the Constitution to 
regulate important matters by itself cannot be delegated to the executive. This 
back-to-the-roots tendency is confirmed by several decisions from 2002 and 
2003.26 
 
 
2. General fundamental right to organisation and procedure 
The second development, to which the basis was laid by Operative Technical 
Measures I, is the procedural dimension of fundamental rights. The Supreme 
Court discusses the elements of the implementation procedure of special measures 
and the procedural order in the explanation of the decision and establishes that 
the law which does not regulate the mentioned elements violates §14 of the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court adds: “The Riigikogu should have established 
the specific cases and detailed procedure for the implementation of operative 
technical measures and the related possible restrictions of rights.”27 The Supreme 
Court shall later name §14 of the Constitution the general fundamental right to 
organisation and procedure.28 
In this context, there are two important developments. Firstly, the right to 
organisation and procedure has expanded into a comprehensive right to effective 
procedure in the practice of the Supreme Court. Secondly, the Supreme Court has 
also developed the specific direction of an administrative procedure by developing 
the general right to organisation and procedure into a right to good administration. 
                                                 
law renders the regulation difficult to survey and in turn raises issues in connection with legal 
clarity.) 
25  Relvastatud üksuse tegevuse kord. – RTL 2002, 144, 2107 (in Estonian). An armed unit, 
i.e., the so-called prison commando organises searches in prisons among other things; its 
members have the right to carry weapons and use these against people. The legal regulation is 
limited by an authorisation norm in §109 (Prison escort guards) (3) of the Imprisonment Act: 
If necessary, an armed unit may be formed for the performance of special duties at a prison. 
The duties and operating procedure of prison escort guards shall be provided for pursuant to 
the procedure established by the Minister of Justice. 
26  CRCSCj 05.11.2002, 3-4-1-8-02; 24.12.2002, 3-4-1-10-02, para. 25; 19.12.2003, 
3-4-1-22-03. 
27  Author’s emphasis. 
28  SCebj 28.10.2002, 3-4-1-5-02, paras. 30, 35; 12.04.2006, 3-1-63-05, para. 24; CRCSCj 
17.02.2003, 3-4-1-1-03, para. 12; 31.01.2007, 3-4-1-14-06, paras. 22, 34. 
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The first development is marked by an interpretation of §14 of the Consti-
tution: “According to §14 of the Constitution, the state is obliged to guarantee the 
rights and freedoms of individuals. Guarantee of rights and freedoms does not 
mean that the state avoids interference with fundamental rights. According to §14 
of the Constitution, the state is obliged to establish appropriate procedures for 
protecting fundamental rights. Both judicial and administrative proceedings must 
be fair. This means, among other things, that the state must enforce a procedure 
that ensures effective protection of the rights of an individual.”29 The sequence 
of thoughts continues: “[I]f the legislator has not established an effective 
mechanism without gaps for the protection of fundamental rights, the judicial 
power must ensure protection of fundamental rights pursuant to §14 of the 
Constitution.”30 
Since 2000, the Supreme Court has repeatedly derived the right to effective 
procedure from §§13, 14 and 15 of the Constitution and article 13 of the ECHR.31 
In order for the right to effective procedure to be implemented, it must be 
considered sufficient if a person complains that his rights have been violated. A 
person shall have a remedy before a national administrative authority as well as 
before a national court in order both to have his claim decided and, if appropriate, 
to obtain redress.32 An effective remedy means a remedy that is as effective as 
can be.33 
The second development appears in the good administration precedents. The 
Supreme Court names §14 of the Constitution a fundamental right to good 
administration34, thereby emphasising that §14 of the Constitution applies 
primarily to administrative proceedings regardless of its general character. §14 of 
the Constitution, which among other things obliges the executive power and local 
                                                 
29  CRCSCj 14.04.2003, 3-4-1-4-03, para. 16. The obligation to guarantee rights also expands 
to the rights arising from European Convention on Human Rights. See SCebj 06.01.2004,  
3-1-3-13-03, para. 31: “The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms is […] an inseparable part of the Estonian legal order and the 
guarantee of the rights and freedoms provided therein is also the obligation of the judicial 
power pursuant to §14 of the Constitution.” 
30  SCebj 06.01.2004, 3-3-2-1-04, para. 27. 
31 SCebr 22.12.2000, 3-3-1-38-00, para. 19; 28.04.2004, 3-3-1-69-03, para. 24; SCebj 
17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 17. Cf. CRCSCj 22.02.2001, 3-4-1-4-01, paras. 9–11; 
U. Lõhmus. Õigus õiglasele kohtulikule arutamisele. – U. Lõhmus (ed.). Inimõigused ja nende 
kaitse Euroopas. Tartu: Iuridicum, 2003, p. 152 ff. (in Estonian). 
32  European Court of Human Rights uses the concept ‘redress’ in ECtHR 06.09.1978, Case 
5029/71, Klass etc. v. Germany, para. 64. In later cases it uses instead of redress the broader 
concept ‘relief’ (ECtHR 26.10.2000, Case 30210/96, Kudla v. Poland, para. 157; 26.10.2000, 
Case 30985/96, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, para. 96): “a remedy must allow the competent 
domestic authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and 
to grant appropriate relief.” 
33  SCebr 22.12.2000, 3-3-1-38-00, para. 19 with a reference to ECtHR 06.09.1978, Case 
5029/71, Klass etc. v. Germany, paras. 64, 69. 
34  CRCSCj 17.02.2003, 3-4-1-1-03, para. 23. 
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governments to ensure fundamental rights, is a fundamental right to an effective 
administrative procedure.35 A fundamental right to good administration or the 
principle of good administration as the Administrative Law Chamber of the 
Supreme Court calls it, subjects the administrative procedure to heightened 
requirements: “The principles of good administration among other things also 
presume that a person must be provided information regarding the course of 
procedure of the case that concerns him within a reasonable amount of time and 
the administrative acts that influence solving the case and other relevant 
information. For this purpose, a person must first be included in a procedure to 
hear his viewpoint, he must have the opportunity to present objections, provide 
relevant explanations, circumstances must be examined, evidence must be 
collected, different options weighed etc.”36 Shortly, the principle of good 
administration means that “an administrative procedure must also be fair”.37 
 
 
2.1. So-called Traffic Act saga 
If the practice of the Supreme Court in general complies with the requirements 
established by the committees and panels of the Supreme Court, four recent 
decisions regarding the assessment of the constitutionality of the suspension of 
the right to drive proceeding laid down in the Traffic Act deviate therefrom.38 
Namely, the administrative authority issuing the right to drive, which is the 
Estonian Motor Vehicle Registration Centre (MVRC), has the legal obligation to 
suspend the right to drive for a period of one to 24 months pursuant to §413(1)–
(8) of the Traffic Act. The proceeding that led to the suspension of the right to 
drive is the following. A person driving a vehicle without a state registration plate, 
who caused a traffic accident causing damage to another person who was driving 
a motor vehicle while drunk or avoided the state of intoxication to be ascertained 
or used alcohol after the traffic accident, who exceeded the permitted speed limit, 
who ignored the stop signal for vehicle and failed to give notification of the traffic 
accident, was punished for the misdemeanour committed pursuant to the Traffic 
                                                 
35  Naturally, §14 of the Constitution as the general fundamental right to organisation and 
procedure also has other aspects, which are unrelated to administrative proceedings, e.g., the 
right to private law powers. Cf. R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 324 ff. 
36  ALCSCj 05.03.2007, 3-3-1-102-06, para. 21. Cf. also ALCSCj 27.03.2002, 3-3-1-17-02, 
para. 18; 20.06.2003, 3-3-1-49-03, para. 16; 25.10.2004, 3-3-1-47-04, para. 18; 18.11.2004, 
3-3-1-33-04, para. 16; 23.02.2004, 3-3-1-1-04, para. 20; 09.05.2006, 3-3-1-6-06, para. 29; 
11.12.2006, 3-3-1-61-06, para. 20; 19.12.2006, 3-3-1-80-06, paras. 18–22; 10.01.2007, 
3-3-1-85-06, para. 12; 10.05.2007, 3-3-1-100-06, 15; ALCSCr 08.10.2002, 3-3-1-56-02, para. 
9; 20.05.2003, 3-3-1-37-03, para. 13; 03.03.2005, 3-3-1-1-05, paras. 18–22; 27.09.2005, 
3-3-1-47-05, para. 13; 22.12.2005, 3-3-1-73-05, para. 14. 
37  ALCSCj 11.12.2006, 3-3-1-61-06, para. 20. 
38  SCebj 25.10.2004, 3-4-1-10-04; 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05; 27.06.2005, 3-3-1-1-05; CRCSCj 
10.12.2004, 3-4-1-24-04. 
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Act. If the decision on punishment entered into force, the body conducting 
misdemeanour proceedings who was not MVRC, sent it to MVRC. Since the 
acquisition of the enforced decision on punishment, the latter was obliged to 
make a decision pursuant to §413(10), i.e., to suspend the right to drive of the 
persons punished within three days. The only condition of suspension in various 
subsections was the enforced decision on punishment made in the misdemeanour 
procedure. In the selection of legal consequences, there was no right of discretion. 
Several administrative courts39 and the Administrative Law Chamber of the 
Supreme Court40 expressed doubt about the constitutionality of §413(1)–(8) and 
(10) of the Traffic Act and initiated a concrete norm control in the Supreme Court 
for the review of constitutionality thereof. One of the main arguments was the non-
existent procedure in making the decision to suspend the right to drive. However, 
the Supreme Court en banc41 declared on three and the Constitutional Review 
Chamber42 on one occasion the compliance of the Traffic Act with the 
Constitution. Nevertheless, the Estonian parliament Riigikogu declared §413 of 
the Traffic Act invalid on 16 June 2005, i.e., eleven days before the announce-
ment of two latest decisions by the Supreme Court en banc.43 We are thus dealing 
with cases that conceal a certain element of drama as the divide between the two 
opposing viewpoints did not only permeate legal publicity, but also the judiciary 
and even the Supreme Court itself. It remains unclear why the legislator amended 
the law, the constitutionality of which the Supreme Court declared on several 
occasions. This justifies the more detailed critical analysis of the prevailing point 
of view in the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court en banc admits that the regulation in the Traffic Act is a 
limitation of the scope of the right to organisation and procedure.44 However, in 
the opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court judges the limitation is consti-
tutional. The reasons of the court may be reconstructed as follows. First, the prior 
misdemeanour procedure outside MVRC and the procedure for suspension of a 
driving licence in MVRC constitute a single procedure in the opinion of the 
Court: “[A]lthough the misdemeanour procedure and suspension of the right to 
drive as an administrative procedure in MVRC constitute separate procedures, 
                                                 
39  Tallinn Administrative Court judgments 05.03.2004, 3-799/2004; 19.05.2004, 
3-1298/2004; 25.06.2004, 3-1473/2004; 01.09.2004, 3-1763/2004; 08.02.2005, 3-1368/2004; 
Tartu Administrative Court judgments 22.12.2004, 3-480/04 and 3-509/04; 28.12.2004, 
3-461/04; Jõhvi Administrative Court judgments 28.12.2004, 3-249/2004; 30.12.2004, 
3-254/2004 and 3-255/2004; 10.02.2005, 3-309/2004. 
40  ALCSCr 03.03.2005, 3-3-1-1-05, paras. 18–22; cf. also ALCSCj 23.02.2004, 3-3-1-1-04, 
para. 20. 
41 SCebj 25.10.2004, 3-4-1-10-04; 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05; 27.06.2005, 3-3-1-1-05. 
42  CRCSCj 10.12.2004, 3-4-1-24-04. 
43  RT I 2005, 40, 311 (in Estonian). 
44  SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, para. 36: “[T]he right to a fair and effective procedure 
stemmed from §14 of the Constitution has been restricted”. Cf. also SCebj 27.06.2005,  
3-3-1-1-05, para. 20. 
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they can be regarded as a single whole. Thus, whether a person is ensured a right 
to a procedure arising from § 14 of the Constitution must also be assessed in the 
light of the set of procedures.”45 
Secondly, the Supreme Court en banc states that in this single procedure, the 
right to a hearing of the person whose right to drive is suspended is ensured in the 
misdemeanour procedure. In this procedure the law provides a basis for 
immediate withdrawal of a driving licence. In immediate withdrawal of a driving 
licence, the administrative body conducting extra-judicial proceedings is obliged 
to explain the reason for the withdrawal.46 Based on this, the Supreme Court en 
banc concludes that a person knows what awaits him and can thus also protect 
himself.47 In addition, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that the misdemeanour 
procedure includes a hearing in the matter whether a violation occurred and if the 
person is guilty of the violation.48 
Thirdly, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that a hearing is ensured in 
MVRC in the following matters: whether a person holds a valid right to drive; 
whether the person has been subjected to an enforced decision on punishment in 
a misdemeanour matter that may form the basis for suspension of the right to 
drive pursuant to §413 of the Traffic Act; whether there is a legal basis for the 
suspension of the right to drive; whether prior decisions on punishment that the 
person has been subjected to are applicable according to the punishment register; 
whether the person uses a vehicle in connection with disability; whether a prior 
decision on suspension of the right to drive that the person has been subjected to 
has been fulfilled.49 The Supreme Court also states: “After the enforcement of the 
decision on punishment made in the misdemeanour procedure, a person has […] 
the right to turn to the MVRC for presentation of circumstances which preclude 
suspension of the right to drive pursuant to the law.”50 
Fourthly, according to the Supreme Court “pursuant to subsection 10 of §413 
of the Traffic Act, a person has the possibility to lodge a complaint against the 
suspension of the right to drive to a higher official or dispute it in the court, which 
also ensures his right to a hearing and at the same time enables to explain his 
views and submit applications and objections.”51 
  
                                                 
45  SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-3-1-1-05, para. 19. Cf. also SCebj 25.10.2004, 3-4-1-10-04, para. 23; 
27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, paras. 28–29. 
46  SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, para. 32. 
47  SCebj 25.10.2004, 3-4-1-10-04, para. 24: “It is easy for a driver of a power-driven vehicle 
to foresee the consequences accompanied by his unlawful activity and protect himself 
therefrom in the course of the misdemeanour procedure.” 
48  SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, para. 34. 
49  Ibid., para. 35. 
50  Ibid., para. 36. 
51  Ibid., para. 37. 
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Fifthly, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that the limitation is not intensive52, 
and the result of the consideration thereof is that the general effectiveness of the 
proceedings weighs up the unfairness that may arise in single cases: “The 
Supreme Court en banc is of the opinion that this restriction is the result of a 
legitimate goal to economise on resources spent on the proceedings and ensure 
effective procedure of a large amount of similar cases […]. The statistics show 
that the number of more serious traffic violations on which the prescribed 
punishment is the suspension of the right to drive is high. According to the 
Estonian Motor Vehicle Registration Centre (MVRC), the right to drive was 
suspended in 13,295 cases in total in 2004. It is obvious that hearing of persons 
in MVRC in all these cases would be resource-consuming. At the same time, the 
circumstances needed for the formalisation of suspension of the right to drive are 
generally correctly identifiable also without hearing the person (e.g., 
determination of applicable punishments must be based on the data in the 
punishment register) and failure to hear a person results in incorrect decisions in 
rare cases. There is no measure for the achievement of the goal that would interfere 
with the rights of the persons concerned less intensively. A limitation is 
proportional as the failure to hear does not necessarily bring about an incorrect 
decision.”53  
In the end, the Supreme Court also refers to the fact that the European Court 
of Human Rights has also given its blessing to the suspension of the right to drive 
as an automatic consequence of conviction in a case Malige v. France.54 
In this light, it seems paradoxical that the Supreme Court, on the other hand, 
does not deny the absence of the procedure: “In the suspension of the right to 
drive, no substantive proceedings are carried out in the MVRC upon suspension 
of the right to drive, but the role of the agency is only to formalise suspension of 
the right to drive.”55 
 
 
2.2. Criticism 
On a closer look it becomes clear that most of the prerequisites that the decisions 
of the Supreme Court are based on do not really match and the concluding value 
judgment is also questionable. 
Firstly, it is impossible to agree with the statement that misdemeanour 
procedure followed by the procedure of suspension of the right to drive would 
constitute a single whole. The purpose of the misdemeanour procedure is to prove 
the guilt of the offender and to penalise the person who committed the offence. 
The presumption of innocence is in force here according to §22(1) of the 
Constitution. A misdemeanour procedure may either be conducted in court or by 
                                                 
52  SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-3-1-1-05, para. 20; 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, para. 37. 
53  SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, para. 37. Cf. also SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-3-1-1-05, para. 20. 
54  SCebj 25.10.2004, 3-4-1-10-04, para. 19. 
55  Ibid. 
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the administrative body conducting extra-judicial proceedings (MVRC is neither 
of them by law) and ends with the enforcement of a ruling on penalty or a ruling 
on the termination of a procedure. Once the procedure has ended, it cannot be 
continued any longer. An administrative procedure is conducted by the 
administrative authority and it ends with the delivery of an administrative act, 
administrative conduct or the conclusion of an administrative contract. Both the 
duty to cooperate and the right to a hearing remain in force. The proceedings of 
the suspension of right to drive taken in MVRC are administrative proceedings 
because the MVRC is an administrative body and the Traffic Act includes 
substantive administrative law, a reference to the Administrative Procedure Act56 
as well as special regulations of the administrative procedure (e.g., §413(10) of the 
Traffic Act). Two procedures, misdemeanour procedure and (administrative) 
procedure of the suspension of the right to drive follow to one another and in 
temporal order but they can and should nevertheless be differentiated. Two 
procedures existed instead of a single whole.57 
In case of properly conducted proceedings, the administrative authority should 
indeed have notified the person that the committed offence may be accompanied 
with the suspension of the right to drive. However, even in case of a notification 
there were no remedies against the possible suspension. The allegation that beside 
the matter of fact and guilt of the misdemeanour, the person in the misdemeanour 
procedure was ensured with the right to be heard in the impending suspension of 
the right to drive, is misguided. The Traffic Act required the police to withdraw 
the driving licence and issue a temporary driving licence.58 However, during the 
misdemeanour procedure conducted by the police or by the court, the suspension 
of the right to drive was not deliberated and was not allowed to be discussed. 
Suspension of the right to drive was neither a penalty for the misdemeanour nor a 
supplementary punishment. According to the first sentence of §56(1) of the Penal 
Code59, punishment shall be based on the guilt of the person. According to the 
second sentence of §56(1) of the Penal Code, in imposition of a punishment, a 
court or an extra-judicial body shall take into consideration the mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances, the possibility to influence the offender not to commit 
offences in the future, and the interests of the protection of public order. Other 
                                                 
56  Traffic Act §1 (Scope of application of Act) (2): “The provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act […] apply to administrative proceedings prescribed in this Act, taking account 
of the specifications provided for in this Act.” 
57  Cf. ALCSCr 03.03.2005, 3-3-1-1-05, paras. 18 ff.; Dissenting opinion of Justice Indrek 
Koolmeister, SCebj 25.10.2004, 3-4-1-10-04, paras. 1 and 3; Dissenting opinion of Justice 
Indrek Koolmeister, joined by Justices Tõnu Anton, Julia Laffranque, Jüri Põld and Harri 
Salmann, to the SCebj 25.10.2004, 3-3-1-29-04, para. 1. 
58  Traffic Act §411 (Issue of temporary driving licences) (1): “Upon the commission of a 
misdemeanour for which suspension of the right to drive is prescribed pursuant to §413 of this 
Act, the driving licence of the person shall be immediately withdrawn and a temporary driving 
licence shall be issued in place of the confiscated driving licence.” 
59  RT I 2001, 61, 364; 2004, 88, 600 (in Estonian). English translation available at  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/529052014006/consolide/current. 
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considerations, including the suspension of the right to drive following the 
penalty could and ought not to have been taken into consideration.60 
It remains unclear what the Supreme Court en banc means with the questions 
regarding which the person can be heard in proceedings before the MVRC.61 The 
person in this situation was mainly interested in whether and for how long his 
right to drive would be suspended. The questions like whether a person holds a 
valid right to drive or whether there is a legal basis for the suspension of the right 
to drive can be interesting too but only if and as much they concern the main 
question which remains unanswered by the Supreme Court en banc. The opinion 
of the Supreme Court that after the enforcement of the penalty of the 
misdemeanour procedure the person has the opportunity to address the MVRC to 
present statements concerning the circumstances that by law prevent the sus-
pension of the right to drive, is inappropriate. Disability excluded62, the Traffic 
Act prescribed no single basis that would prevent the suspension of the right to 
drive. Moreover, the right to be heard during the administrative procedure 
following the decision in the misdemeanour proceedings could not be exercised 
solely for the lack of information the person received. “The person has no 
knowledge when and where his documents are being sent, who and when the 
hearing regarding his matter on suspension of the right to drive takes place. The 
procedure pursuant to Traffic Act (incl. §413(10)) precludes the notification of a 
person even on the initiative of MVRC.”63 In addition, practical incompatibility 
of the legally set three days term for the suspension with the minimum standards 
of the administrative procedure excluded a hearing before the MVRC.64 “Even as 
                                                 
60  Cf. ALCSCr 03.03.2005, 3-3-1-1-05, para. 20; Dissenting opinion of Justices Tõnu 
Anton, Indrek Koolmeister, Julia Laffranque, Jüri Põld and Harri Salmann to the SCebj 
27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, para. 1. 
61  SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, para. 35 (see above). 
62  Traffic Act § 41 (Bases of and procedure for suspension of right to drive) (3) sentence 2: 
“Suspension of the right to drive shall not be applied in respect of a person who uses a power-
driven vehicle due to disability, unless he or she drives the power-driven vehicle in a state of 
intoxication.” 
63  Dissenting opinion of Justices Tõnu Anton, Indrek Koolmeister, Julia Laffranque, Jüri 
Põld and Harri Salmann to the SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, para. 1 subitem 3. Cf. ALCSCj 
23.02.2004, 3-3-1-1-04, para. 20: “[P]roceeding from the priciples of good administration, the 
minimum requirement (is) notification of a person concerning the procedure he is subjected 
to and providing a person with the possibility present objections.” 
64  Administrative Procedure Act §40 (Hearing of opinions and objections of participants in 
proceedings) (1): “An administrative authority shall, before issue of an administrative act, 
grant a participant in a proceeding a possibility to provide his or her opinion and objections in 
a written, oral or any other suitable form.” (2): “Before taking any measures which may 
damage the rights of a participant in a proceeding, he or she shall be granted a possibility to 
provide his or her opinion and objections.” The derogations regarding when the administrative 
procedure may be conducted without hearing the opinion and objections of the parties to a 
proceeding, are laid down in §40(3) of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Administrative 
Law Chamber of the Supreme Court adopted the position that no prerogative laid down in 
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a formality, it must be considered that this kind of hearing would take place by 
violating either the term provided in §413(10) of the Traffic Act or the principles 
provided by the Administrative Procedure Act.”65 The argument that the person 
could contest the suspension of the right to drive in court is unconvincing too. 
Taking into account the repeated confirmation of the Supreme Court, this case in 
court could only have resulted in a loss for the person. 
It is hard to agree that the limitation of the scope of the right to organisation 
and procedure was not intensive. The total lack of the opportunity to be heard 
annuls the right to be heard in this instance. “By providing such a short term to 
make the ruling about the suspension of the right to drive, the legislator has 
substantively precluded the possibility to involve the person in the procedure and 
exercise his rights in procedural law, including the right to be heard.”66 The right 
to be heard is an important part of the right to organisation and procedure (§14 of 
the Constitution) and therefore a fundamental right.67 Total lack of the 
opportunity to be heard is therefore an intensive limitation of an important 
fundamental right. 
Also, the value judgment that saving the resources justifies the failure in 
hearing is disputable. The Supreme Court en banc itself admits that its position 
may, in an individual case, result in a false ruling: “[C]ircumstances necessary to 
formalise the suspension of the right to drive can be in general correctly established 
also without hearing the person […] and failure to undertake a hearing leads in 
rare occasions to false rulings. […] A limitation is proportional, since failure to 
hear a person does not in general bring about an erroneous decision.”68 In addition 
the Supreme Court en banc concedes that: “In suspending the right to drive no 
substantive proceedings take place but the sole role of the administrative body 
lies in formalising the suspension of the right to drive.”69 Apart from that, the 
Supreme Court en banc disregards the opportunity to analyze alternative 
procedures that ensure better the rights in individual cases.70 A suspicion arises 
                                                 
§40(3) of the Administrative Procedure Act is applicable in case of a suspension of the right 
to drive. See ALCSCr 03.03.2005, 3-3-1-1-05m, para. 21. 
65  Dissenting opinion of Justices Tõnu Anton, Indrek Koolmeister, Julia Laffranque, Jüri 
Põld and Harri Salmann to the SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, para. 1 subitem 3. 
66  ALCSCr 03.03.2005, 3-3-1-1-05, para. 19. 
67  Ibid. 
68  SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, para. 37 (author’s emphasis). 
69  SCebj 25.10.2004, 3-4-1-10-04, para. 19 (author’s emphasis). 
70  Dissenting opinion of Justices Tõnu Anton, Indrek Koolmeister, Julia Laffranque, Jüri 
Põld and Harri Salmann to the SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, para. 1 subitem 4: “One of the 
possibilities is informing the person of the procedure commenced regarding the suspension of 
the right to drive and the possibility to present written objections. It is also possible to prepare a 
conditional suspension notice, which acquires the force of a decision if the person does not 
present objections or apply for the case to be discussed. The use of all such possibilities 
ensures sufficient right to be heard in a relatively sustainable way. Making the decision on the 
suspension of the right to drive immediately after the entry into force of the misdemeanour 
decision is not necessary as the period of time between the commission of the latest offence 
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whether the decision of the Supreme Court en banc is in accordance with the 
principle of human dignity. “[H]uman dignity is the basis of all fundamental 
rights and the aim of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms.”71 According 
to the prevalent negative definition, human dignity means that a person ought not 
to be turned into an object of the state power, he shall always remain the subject 
thereof.72 When the state knowingly waives from procedure, thereby withdrawing 
from the person the opportunity to be heard and at the same time concedes that 
saving money outweighs violations of rights of some people, this state denies the 
elementary requirements of the state based on the rule of law and fundamental 
rights and turns a person into a mere object of state authority. In essence, this 
means sacrificing an individual for the greater good. The theoretical basis for this 
appears to be the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham73 and John Stuart Mill.74 The 
task of the Supreme Court is nevertheless to protect the fundamental rights, not 
to sacrifice them. The court admits itself recently: “The procedure must be aimed 
at the protection of rights of a person, otherwise it might be impossible for the 
person to exercise his rights.”75 It is precisely the procedural dimension that 
serves human dignity76 in the first order and a procedure that fails to consider this 
cannot be compatible with the constitution. 
Finally, it is doubtful whether the Supreme Court accurately proceeded from 
the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case Malige v. 
France.77 The object thereof was the French point system in which several 
recorded misdemeanours may have finally brought about the suspension of the 
right to drive. The account of a driving licence had twelve points on it and each 
violation provided burdened the account with a certain number of points that were 
once again added to the account after the expiry of the punishment. When the 
account reached zero points the competent authority suspended the right to 
                                                 
and the suspension of the right to drive is usually long, during which a person practices the 
right to drive.” 
71  ALCSCj 22.03.2006, 3-3-1-2-06, para. 10. 
72  In Estonian literature R. Maruste. Põhiseadus ja selle järelevalve. Tallinn: Juura, 1997, 
p. 113 (in Estonian). This object formula originates from a German state lawyer Günter Dürig: 
G. Dürig. – T. Maunz, G. Dürig (eds.). Grundgesetz, Kommentar. Vol. 1. München: C. H. 
Beck, 1958, Art. 1 Abs. 1 recital 28: “Die Menschenwürde ist getroffen, wenn der konkrete 
Mensch zum Objekt, zu einem bloßen Mittel, zur vertretbaren Größe herabgewürdigt wird.” 
73  J. Bentham. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. J. H. Burns, 
H. L. A. Hart (eds.). London: The Athlone Press, 1970. 
74  J. S. Mill. Utilitarianism. 7. ed. London: Longmans, Green, 1879. 
75  CRCSCj 31.01.07, 3-4-1-14-06, para. 28. 
76  The famous German state lawyer and the author of the object formula Günter Dürig even 
considers making a person an object of a national procedure an example of a violation of 
human dignity. G. Dürig. – T. Maunz, G. Dürig (eds.). Grundgesetz, Kommentar. Vol. 1. 
München: C. H. Beck, 1958, Art. 1 Abs. 1 recital 34: “Es verstößt gegen die Menschenwürde, 
wenn der Mensch zum Objekt eines staatlichen Verfahrens gemacht wird.” 
77  Cf. SCebj 25.10.2004, 3-4-1-10-04, para. 19. 
121 
drive.78 Without scrutiny of the details of the French point system, it is important 
to mention its differences with the Estonian system pointed out by the European 
Court of Human Rights: “At the time when the details of an offence are recorded, 
the driver is informed by the administrative authority that he is liable to lose 
points on account of the offence he has committed and that there is an automatic 
system for the deduction and restoration of points […]. He is thus given the 
opportunity to contest the constituent elements of the offence which might be 
used as the basis for a deduction of points.”79 It was this type of obligation to 
notify and opportunity to contest that the Estonian system lacked. 
 
 
2.3. Conclusions of the Traffic Act saga 
Previous analysis only concerned one out of many complicated matters dealt 
within the Traffic Act cases. The answer to the question raised whether the 
addressee of the suspension of the right to drive was ensured with an effective 
and just procedure is, contrary to the majority of the Supreme Court Supreme 
Court en banc and like the Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme Court, 
negative: “The Supreme Court en banc has found that the suspension of the right 
to drive pursuant to §413 of the Traffic Act is constitutional, the right to a 
procedure arising from §14 of the Constitution is ensured, and the principle of 
proportionality is not violated. We find that the abovementioned statements are 
misleading. In the opinion of the signatories, the procedure of the suspension of 
the right to drive provided by the Traffic Act does not conform with the right to 
a procedure arising from §14 of the Constitution. In addition, the regulation in 
force fails to ensure the consideration of the principle of proportionality in 
applying the suspension of the right to drive.”80 
It must be hoped that the result of the Traffic Act saga and the majority 
arguments of the Supreme Court en banc will not turn into the future case law 
and that the Supreme Court will find its way back to the developments started on 
12 January in 1994. The fundamental right to organisation and procedure is of 
central importance for the principle of human dignity and for the rule of law. It is 
the procedural dimension that makes a state based on the rule of law what it is. 
 
  
                                                 
78  ECtHR 23.09.1998, Case 68/1997/852/1059, Malige v. France, paras. 17–20. 
79  Ibid., para. 47. 
80  Dissenting opinion of Justices Tõnu Anton, Indrek Koolmeister, Julia Laffranque, Jüri 
Põld and Harri Salmann to the SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-3-1-1-05, para. 1. 
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3. Judicial activism81 
The third development based on the decision of Operative Technical Measures I, 
is supervision of the legislator’s omission by the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court conceded in this ruling: “[T]he valid standards for implementing operative 
technical measures are insufficient and deficient from the point of view of the 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. […] It has not been specified what 
operative technical measures specifically mean […] The circle of subjects entitled 
to implement operative technical measures, cases, conditions, procedure, 
guarantees, control and supervision and liability remains unspecified. […] The 
Riigikogu should have established the specific cases and detailed procedure for 
the implementation of operative technical measures and the related possible 
restrictions of rights itself instead of delegating the latter to security police 
officers and the justice of the Supreme Court. Thus, subsection 4 of part II of the 
Police Act Amendment Act is also contrary to §13(2) of the Constitution as 
insufficient regulation in establishing restrictions to fundamental rights and 
freedoms shall not protect everyone against arbitrary action by the state power.”82 
The Supreme Court talks about insufficient and deficient standards or about 
things that the Riigikogu has left unspecified or which itself should have 
established. All this refers to the omission on the part of the legislator. In 
conclusion, in 1994 the Supreme Court declared the insufficient Act of 
Parliament invalid, thereby founding yet another important development in the 
constitutional review. There is a connection with the principle of parliamentary 
prerogative here. What the legislator is obliged to do by the Constitution may not 
be delegated to the executive power, but ought to be decided by the legislator 
itself. By not deciding on its own, the legislator fails to fulfil its constitutional 
obligations. Therefore, the delivery of an insufficient delegation norm is the 
legislator’s unconstitutional omission. The Supreme Court has later summarised 
the idea as follows: “The legislator’s failure to act or insufficient activity may be 
unconstitutional and the Supreme Court shall have the opportunity to also 
determine the unconstitutionality of the legislator’s omission in the constitutional 
review proceedings.”83 
The cases regarding the constitutional review of legislator’s omission may be 
classified in several ways. Classification according to various procedural types is 
possible as well as material principles of the Constitution, from which the 
legislator’s positive obligations arise. The author hereby proceeds from the latter. 
                                                 
81  The meaning of the term ‘judicial activism’ is anything but clear. Cf. K. Kmiec. The origin 
and current meanings of ‘judicial activism’. – California Law Review 92 (2004), p. 1442 ff., 
1463 ff. See also an excellent analytical approach in Estonian: B. Aaviksoo. Kohtulik aktivism 
põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalve funktsioonina. – Juridica 2005/5, p. 295 ff. There seems to be 
consensus only regarding the fact that the term is related to the concept of constitutional review 
and its opposite is the term ‘judicial restraint’. In this article, the nature of the constitutional 
review is activistic, which may declare the legislator’s omission unconstitutional. 
82  CRCSCj 12.01.1994, III-4/1-1/94. 
83  CRCSCj 02.12.2004, 3-4-1-20-04, para. 42. 
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In this context, it is still important to refer to the fact that to the unconstitutionality 
of the legislator’s omission corresponds the positive obligation to eliminate the 
unconstitutional situation. 
 
 
3.1. Positive obligations proceeding from  
the underlying principle of the rule of law 
In its decision Operative Technical Measures I, the Supreme Court declared the 
delegation norm invalid due to the violation of the principle of parliamentary 
prerogative.84 The positive obligation that derives from the parliamentary 
prerogative is included under the obligations based on the underlying principle of 
the separation and balance of powers and thus, more broadly, the underlying 
principle of the rule of law. The Supreme Court has since declared insufficient 
delegation norms invalid on several occasions.85 
The legislator’s positive obligation to establish effective procedure in order to 
ensure fundamental rights is also based on the underlying principle of the rule of 
law.86 The Supreme Court specifies this obligation, for instance, in connection with 
the obligation to guarantee the rights of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: “The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms is […] an inseparable part of the Estonian legal order and 
the guarantee of the rights and freedoms provided therein is also the obligation of 
the judicial power pursuant to §14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court en 
banc is of the opinion that the performance of this obligation in the best possible 
way would assume supplementation of the Court Procedure Act so that this would 
unambiguously indicate whether, in which cases and how the review of a criminal 
matter should take place after the decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights.”87 
The Supreme Court has also declared the unconstitutionality of the provision 
of the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure that did not guarantee sufficient 
remedies: “The wording of the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure […] did not 
guarantee judicial protection of rights, because it did not allow appeals against 
refusals to hear an appeal.”88 
Also, due to the violation of the principle of proportionality proceeding from 
the underlying principle of the rule of law, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
complained to the legislator about the establishment of administrative laws that 
                                                 
84  CRCSCj 12.01.1994, III-4/1-1/94. 
85  CRCSCj 05.02.1998, 3-4-1-1-98, paras. III and IV; 23.03.1998, 3-4-1-2-98; 04.11.1998, 
3-4-1-7-98, para. II; 05.11.2002, 3-4-1-8-02; 24.12.2002, 3-4-1-10-02, para. 25; 19.12.2003, 
3-4-1-22-03. 
86  See above CRCSCj 14.04.2003, 3-4-1-4-03, para. 16. 
87  SCebj 06.01.2004, 3-1-3-13-03, para. 31. To date, the indicated procedure for the review 
of a criminal matter has been adopted and enforced (RT I 2006, 48, 360). 
88  CRCSCj 25.03.2004, 3-4-1-1-04, para. 22, cf. also para. 17. 
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have not provided the administrative body with the right of discretion.89 The 
object of a decision from 2004 was a provision of the Aliens Act that did not 
enable to issue a residence permit to a person who submitted false data.90 In a 
concrete norm control case discussed in the Supreme Court a complaint had been 
lodged to an administrative court by a person who had served in the armed forces 
of the USSR as a professional member in 1973–1988, but hidden this from the 
Citizenship and Migration Board. At the same time, the person was linked to 
Estonia by personal connections. The law did not enable to issue him a residence 
permit. The Supreme Court considered its traditional practice and specific 
circumstances and declared those provisions of the Aliens Act “unconstitutional 
with regard to the part that does not provide a competent state authority with a 
right of discretion in case of a refusal to issue a residence permit due to 
presentation of false data”. The unconstitutionality arose from the disproportion 
of the regulation as the court admitted in a similar case: “The Aliens Act is 
disproportionate with regard to not allowing the provider or extender of a 
residence permit to choose legal consequences against a person who has been or 
regarding whom there are legitimate grounds to speculate that he has been a 
member of an intelligence or security service of a foreign state. The provider or 
extender of a residence permit lacks the opportunity to consider whether the 
restriction of rights and freedoms in a specific case is necessary in a democratic 
society.”91 
In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the positive obligation from the 
underlying principle of the rule of law was also violated by the legislator in the 
course of the reform of the penal law. Namely, the legislator did not sufficiently 
account for what is provided in the second sentence of §23(2) of the Constitution: 
if the law prescribes a lesser punishment after the commission of an offence, the 
lesser penalty has to be applied. For instance, the Penal Code significantly 
lessened the length of imprisonment for criminal offences against property. Thus, 
a person imprisoned for six years complained that according to the term of 
punishment laid down in the new Penal Code92 he could only be imposed a 
punishment of up to five years. His complaint received the following reply from 
the Supreme Court: “The law is unconstitutional as it does not prescribe a 
decrease in the punishment of a person in imprisonment to the upper limit of 
                                                 
89  SCebj 11.10.2001, 3-4-1-7-01; CRCSCj 28.04.2000, 3-4-1-6-00; 05.03.2001, 3-4-1-2-01; 
03.05.2001, 3-4-1-6-01; 21.06.2004, 3-4-1-9-04. 
90  CRCSCj 21.06.2004, 3-4-1-9-04. 
91  CRCSCj 05.03.2001, 3-4-1-2-01, para. 20. Cf. also CRCSCj 28.04.2000, 3-4-1-6-00, para. 
17: “§19(1) No. 2 of the Alcohol Act is disproportional regarding the inability of the issuer of 
the activity licence to choose legal consequences.” 
92  Karistusseadustik. Adopted 6.06.2001, entry into force 1.09.2002. – RT I 2001, 61, 364 
(in Estonian). English translation available at  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/529052014006/consolide/current. 
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imprisonment laid down in the relevant provision of the special part of the Penal 
Code.”93 
Finally, the underlying principle of the rule of law may be associated with the 
principle of legal clarity, a violation for which occurred when, for instance, if the 
legislator did not determine the rights of persons in the implementation of the 
ownership reform clearly enough: “[T]he disputed provision is in conflict with 
the Constitution because the legislator failed to fulfil its duty to sufficiently 
comprehensibly establish the rights of persons who resettled and of the users of 
the property which had belonged to them.”94 
 
 
3.2. Positive obligations proceeding from  
the underlying principle of democracy 
In two cases, the Supreme Court had to review the conformity of the legislator’s 
omission with the underlying principle of democracy. The object of both 
decisions was the exclusion of election coalitions from the local government 
council elections. The legislator did not allow the election coalitions that had so 
far participated in local elections to register for the next elections. Here, the 
legislator did not explicitly forbid the participation of election coalitions but 
simply abolished the law that enabled this. The Supreme Court declared the 
legislator’s omission unconstitutional: “However, the Chamber deems the 
prohibition of citizens’ election coalitions unconstitutional […].”95 If the prohi-
bition of election coalitions is unconstitutional, the underlying principle of 
democracy thus obliges the legislator to enact a law that also allows election 
coalitions to participate in local elections. 
The Supreme Court deemed it necessary to add a specification: “The 
execution of the Supreme Court’s decision requires the amendment of a valid law 
in order to constitutionally hold local elections. Hereby, the legislator shall have 
the freedom to weigh different solutions.”96 
 
 
3.3. Positive obligations proceeding from  
the underlying principle of the social state 
The Supreme Court has given meaning to the underlying principle of the social 
state in its pioneering decision of 2004: “A social state and the protection of social 
rights incorporate the idea of aid and care for those who are unable to ensure 
themselves independently and sufficiently. The human dignity of these people 
                                                 
93  SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 40. 
94  SCebj 28.10.2002, 3-4-1-5-02, para. 37. Cf. also SCebj 12.04.2006, 3-3-1-63-05; CRCSCj 
31.01.2007, 3-4-1-14-06. 
95  CRCSCj 15.07.2002, 3-4-1-7-02, para. 15. Cf. also SCebj 19.04.2005, 3-4-1-1-05. 
96  CRCSCj 15.07.2002, 3-4-1-7-02, para. 34. 
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would be degraded if they were left without aid that they need to satisfy their 
primary needs.”97 
The object of this decision was the new wording of the Social Welfare Act, 
which did not enable students living in dormitories to receive housing allowance 
while students privately renting apartments were left with the opportunity to 
receive housing allowance. The Supreme Court established that the “Social 
Welfare Act […] was unconstitutional to the extent that expenses connected with 
dwelling of needy people and families who were using dwellings not referred to 
in […] Social Welfare Act were not taken into account […].”  
There was another case in which the criticism of the Supreme Court was based 
on the underlying principle of the social state, although this was not explicitly 
mentioned by the Supreme Court. This case started from a refund claim of 
overpaid pension filed by the state, which was contested by the person. Namely, 
it was laid down in the State Pension Insurance Act that an early-retirement 
pension shall not be paid if the person continues working, but failed to lay down 
that when a person reaches pensionable age, the person receiving early-retirement 
pension must be paid equally to the persons receiving “common” retirement 
pension, the reception of which is not directly related to working. The Supreme 
Court established that the “State Pension Insurance Act […] was in confl ict with 
§ 12 of the Constitution98 to the extent that the provisions did not allow to pay 
early-retirement pension to those employed persons who had attained 
pensionable age.”99 
 
 
3.4. Matters of procedural law 
Contestation of the legislator’s omission by the Supreme Court is permitted in the 
form of a concrete norm control initiated by a court100, in the form of a proactive 
abstract norm control initiated by the President of the Republic101, in the form of 
a retrospective abstract norm control initiated by the Chancellor of Justice102 as 
well as in the form of an individual constitutional complaint, which so far remains 
the only successful precedent.103 The Supreme Court itself has discussed the 
                                                 
97  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 33. 
98  The Supreme Court hereby indicates to the first sentence in §12(1) of the Constitution: 
Everyone is equal before the law. 
99  CRCSCj 21.06.2005, 3-4-1-9-05, resolution, cf. also para. 24. 
100  SCebj 11.10.2001, 3-4-1-7-01; 28.10.2002, 3-4-1-5-02; 12.04.2006, 3-3-1-63-05; CRCSCj 
04.11.1998, 3-4-1-7-98, para. II; 28.04.2000, 3-4-1-6-00; 05.03.2001, 3-4-1-2-01; 03.05.2001, 
3-4-1-6-01; 05.11.2002, 3-4-1-8-02; 24.12.2002, 3-4-1-10-02, para. 25; 19.12.2003, 
3-4-1-22-03; 25.03.2004, 3-4-1-1-04; 21.06.2004, 3-4-1-9-04; 21.06.2005, 3-4-1-9-05. 
101  CRCSCj 05.02.1998, 3-4-1-1-98, paras. III and IV; 31.01.2007, 3-4-1-14-06. Cf. CRCSCj 
02.12.2004, 3-4-1-20-04, paras. 41–46. 
102  SCebj 19.04.2005, 3-4-1-1-05; CRCSCj 12.01.1994, III-4/1-1/94; 23.03.1998, 3-4-1-2-98; 
15.07.2002, 3-4-1-7-02; 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03. 
103  SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02. 
127 
different initiators at length in an obiter dictum.104 Therein the Supreme Court 
recognises the competence of every court, the President of the Republic as well 
as the Chancellor of Justice to contest the legislator’s omission in the Supreme 
Court.105 
Whenever the legislator’s omission is declared unconstitutional, also its 
consequences ought to be taken into account. The legal order should stay clear of 
unconstitutional, yet formally valid “ghost” norms.106 In order to avoid such a 
situation, it might be reasonable, depending on the specific case, to formulate in 
the resolution of the court’s decision an explicit positive obligation of the 
legislator and/or set to the legislator a term for elimination of deficiencies.107 
In view of the underlying principle of the social state, an activist court must 
also take into account the parliament’s financial prerogative: “The court of 
constitutional review must […] avoid a situation in which the development of the 
budgetary policy is mostly the liability of the court.”108 
 
 
III. Conclusions 
This brief analysis has thus come to an end. The constitutional review in the 
Supreme Court has undergone an impressive development without however 
completely avoiding some peregrinations. It remains to be recognised that the 
choice made by the Supreme Court on 12 January 1994 to follow something more 
abstract and distant than the unambiguous pragmatic desire of those in the 
position of power to prosecute criminals was justified. Let us hope that the 
Supreme Court will continue to possess enough courage to pass forwardlooking 
decisions in the future. 
                                                 
104  Cf. CRCSCj 02.12.2004, 3-4-1-20-04, paras. 41–46. 
105  The Supreme Court sets a supplementary procedural condition to the President of the 
Republic and the Chancellor of Justice and deems the contestation of the legislator’s failure 
to act by them permitted if “the unprovided norm would be included in the contested 
legislation or it is by nature related to the contested legislation.” (CRCSCj 02.12.2004, 
3-4-1-20-04, para. 45, cf. also para. 46; 31.01.2007, 3-4-1-14-06, para. 18.) Such norms 
include, for instance, procedural rules or transitional provisions. Cf. CRCSCj 31.01.2007, 
3-4-1-14-06, para. 21. One can hope that in the future, the Supreme Court shall explain this 
relatively new criterion in more detail. 
106  This happened as a consequence of a decision of the Supreme Court en banc from autumn 
2002 (SCebj 28.10.2002, 3-4-1-5-02), in the resolution of which the Supreme Court declared 
the unclear norm unconstitutional, yet not invalid. The result of this decision was in essence 
the continuance of lack of legal clarity. The Supreme Court en banc received the opportunity 
to correct the mistake only in spring 2006. Cf. SCebj 12.04.2006, 3-3-1-63-05. 
107  The Supreme Court has also formulated this idea: “The Supreme Court en banc cannot 
assume the legislator’s role or make the parliament’s decision between possible solutions and 
develop relevant legal regulations. It is reasonable to give the legislator time to solve these 
matters.” (SCebj 12.04.2006, 3-3-1-63-05, para. 31.) 
108  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 16. 
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The Principle of Equality in the Estonian Constitution 
A Systematic Perspective 
 
I. Introduction 
The powers within a state, of both the executive and the judiciary, must be 
exercised subject to the principle of equality or equal treatment. This is almost 
trivial. The problem is that, whilst the principle may be stated simply, imposing 
such an equality obligation on the legislative body is far from trivial, and must 
rank as a major achievement of democratic constitutionalism: only a fully 
functioning mechanism for constitutional review genuinely provides equality, in 
relation to any given constitution. The principle of constitutional equality is 
embodied, in this sense, by the general fundamental right to equal implementation 
of the (constitutional) law. The aim here is to demonstrate how the principle of 
equality has emerged and evolved in relation to Estonian constitutional law, by 
conducting a structural analysis of the doctrine, together with an analysis of the 
main questions posed during its implementation. This is achieved through 
systematic analysis and criticism of relevant case law. 
The Põhiseadus [Estonian Constitution] (henceforth: the Constitution),1 was 
adopted via a referendum on 28 June 1992 and came into force on the following 
day, as prescribed by §1(1), Eesti Vabariigi põhiseaduse rakendamise seadus 
[The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia Implementation Act]. According to 
the Constitution, Estonia is a parliamentary republic, with governments being 
subject to the confidence of the directly and proportionally elected Parliament. 
The highest court is the Estonian Supreme Court (henceforth: the SC), which 
unifies the functions of the final appellate instance of civil, criminal, and 
administrative jurisdictions, alongside constitutional review. The power of 
constitutional review can be exercised either by the Constitutional Review 
Chamber or, alternatively, by the SC en banc. The Constitution stresses the 
general principles of democracy and independence of the state2 and then, in the 
2nd Chapter, provides a rather detailed catalogue of 48 provisions of enforceable 
constitutional rights. One of them, §12(1), states the principle of equality: 
“Everyone is equal before the law. No one may be discriminated against on the 
basis of nationality, race, colour, sex, language, origin, religion, political or other 
views, property or social status, or on other grounds.” 
  
                                                 
1  For the English translation of the Põhiseadus [Estonian Constitution], see:  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/521052015001/consolide/current, all internet links visi-
ted on 30 September 2019 and link to the English translations unless indicated otherwise. 
2  See §1 of the Põhiseadus [Estonian Constitution]. 
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The first sentence of §12(1) corresponds exactly to Article 20 of the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (henceforth: the Charter). This short provision is 
not, however, as straightforward as one might expect. The wording itself raises a 
question as to the enforceability of the equality principle, both in terms of 
providing a constitutional right for a rights-holder, and indeed of binding the 
legislature. However, §12(1) of the Constitution additionally includes a second 
sentence, which distinguishes it from the Charter, providing a prohibition on 
discrimination on the basis of nationality; race; colour; sex; language; origin; 
religion; political or other views; property or social status; or on other grounds. 
This second sentence is problematic, as previously examined by Robert Alexy, in 
the first systematic monograph concerning fundamental rights in the Estonian 
Constitution.3 In addition to the points made by Alexy, in the Estonian doctrine 
the equality principle also raises questions about the relevant standard for 
justifying unequal treatment, the exact meaning of the constitutional requirement 
of statutory reservation, and the relationship between general and special equality 
rights. Although Alexy’s theory was explicitly designed for the constitutional 
rights of the German Grundgesetz,4 its main elements were adopted by the SC 
and it has proved to be a powerful practical weapon in resolving constitutional 
rights cases. Alexy’s theory is thereby the binding link that allows us to address 
the arguments made in German jurisprudence.  
This article is divided into two main parts. In the first part a summary is made 
of the development of the equality principle related case law of the SC since the 
1990s, while in the second part a critical analysis of the case law is presented in 
order to build a system of equality rights, which could serve as the basis for future 
case law. 
 
 
II. Development of the Case Law of  
the Estonian Supreme Court 
The SC has made a moderate number of decisions concerning the right to equal 
treatment. They can be divided into three stages: first, an initial period of early 
development at the end of the 1990s; secondly, the foundation of the first doctrine 
of the equality principle; and, finally, the new doctrine. 
 
 
                                                 
3  R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 63. 
4  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 5 f. 
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1. The first stage: early development – the property reform 
Three property reform5 cases from the last decade of the 20th century characterise 
the early equality-related case law of the SC in Estonia.6 The first occurred in 
1998, and concerned compensation for property unlawfully expropriated during 
the Soviet occupation and later demolished. A Parliamentary amendment to the 
relevant Act had previously abolished the compensatory scheme in relation to 
property destruction. The issue was the supervision procedure between the State 
and the local government who granted compensation in a particular case, despite 
the abolition of the scheme. As the case reached the SC, the Court stated that the 
unequal treatment of the relevant individuals, whose applications for compensation 
were at different stages of the compensation procedure, was unreasonable and 
unjust.7 The SC added: “If a social-economic analysis indicates that compen-
sating for unlawfully expropriated property in the present amount would be 
essentially detrimental to Estonia’s economy, then compensation should be 
restricted at least according to the principle of equal treatment.”8 
In the second case, heard in 1999, the applicant was a widow of a man whose 
parents were former landowners: she was therefore entitled to compensation 
under the original scheme. However, Parliament restricted the circle of those so 
entitled, removing from it the spouses of children of former owners. The Consti-
tutional Review Chamber observed, in accordance with its aforementioned 
decision, that “contrary to the principle of equal treatment, the legislator has 
failed to apply the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectation to some 
of the persons who have started to exercise their right to claim the return of or 
compensation for unlawfully expropriated property”.9 
                                                 
5  Eesti Vabariigi omandireformi aluste seadus [Republic of Estonia Principles of 
Ownership Reform Act] was passed 13 June 1991 and came into force a week later, 20 June 
1991 (RT 1991, 21, 257 [in Estonian; ‘RT’ stands for ‘Riigi Teataja’, the Estonian State 
Gazette, available only in electronic version: https://www.riigiteataja.ee). An English trans-
lation of a later version of the law is available here:  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/520122018006/consolide/current. The four major areas 
of regulation of this pre-constitutional law were return, compensation, municipalisation, and 
privatisation of property. It was an Act of major importance for Estonian economic and 
societal transition. Up to April 2014, it has been amended 41 times. 
6  Prior to these developments the Administrative Law Chamber of the SC stated, in respect 
of the principle of equality, that it is a general principle of European Union Law, and declared it 
to be a general principle of Estonian Law (ALCSr [hereinafter: ruling of the Administrative 
Law Chamber of the SC] 24.03.1997, 3-3-1-5-97, para. 4). In the ruling the Administrative 
Law Chamber also states: “According to the principle of equality, equal situations have to be 
treated equally.” This can be considered as the very first doctrinal description of the principle 
of equality. 
7  CRCSCj [hereinafter: judgment of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the SC] 
30.09.1998, 3-4-1-6-98, para. II. 
8  CRCSCj 30.09.1998, 3-4-1-6-98, para. III. 
9  CRCSCj 17.03.1999, 3-4-1-2-99, para. II. 
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A third case dealt with the delayed return procedure for land unlawfully 
expropriated during the Soviet era. The dispute originated from the question of 
whether legal title to land continued to exist, despite subsequent redevelopment 
of the property, given that non-redevelopment was an essential pre-supposition 
for the return of the land. The local government, as the relevant competent 
authority, insisted on awarding compensation rather than returning the land to the 
original landowner. Four years after the submission of the original application, 
the Parliament amended the relevant statutory regime and changed the criteria for 
assessing the continuance of the original legal title. The disputed land did not 
fulfil the new criteria and the local government again rejected the application, this 
time on the basis of the new law. The fifth attempt at litigating the case reached 
finally the SC; according to the SC there was a violation of the equality principle 
due to the application of the procedure. Furthermore, the SC formulated a 
standard interpretation of the procedure, which was to be in favour of the 
applicant. The main reasoning of the SC was that the application of the new 
statutory wording to the applicant was unfounded, unreasonable, and unfair.10 
 
 
2. The second stage: the doctrinal foundation 
To refer to an unconstitutional unequal treatment as unfounded, unreasonable and 
unfair is not erroneous, but it lacks the necessary doctrinal structure and criteria 
for rational control of the principle of equality. The SC addressed this deficit from 
2002 onwards.11 The initial foundation of the first doctrine of the principle of 
equality was laid in the decision of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the SC 
in March 2002. The Court stated:  
“The first sentence of §12(1) of the Constitution, ‘Everyone is equal before the 
law’, establishes the general fundamental right to equality, the sphere of protection 
of which embraces all spheres of life, including enterprise. The fundamental right 
to equality, just like freedom of enterprise, is extended also to legal persons under 
§9(2) of the Constitution. This fundamental right is infringed in the case of unequal 
treatment.”12 
The case concerned value added tax for businesses. According to the statute, the 
business was obliged to pay the tax, even when it purchased an item worth more 
than 50,000 Estonian kroon (approx. 3,200 EUR) for its business, but paid for it 
                                                 
10  ALCSCj [hereinafter: judgment of the Administrative Law Chamber of the SC] 
20.06.2000, 3-3-1-30-00, para. 3. 
11  Previously the Administrative Law Chamber declared: “According to the principle of 
equal treatment, all persons under the same circumstances and the same conditions shall be 
treated equally” (ALCSCj 20.12.2001, 3-3-1-61-01, para. 5). 
12  CRCSCj 06.03.2002, 3-4-1-1-02, para. 13, identical wording in CRCSCj 12.06.2002,  
3-4-1-6-02, para. 10. 
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in cash. The Court declared the statute unconstitutional.13 Furthermore, the Court 
created a principle according to which the supervision of equality rights is sub-
ordinate to the control of freedom rights, hence giving the principle of equality a 
subsidiary nature. Thus, the Court indicated that it will not apply the equality 
principle if the contested measure violates a freedom right, because the application 
of the relevant freedom right will prevail.14 Therefore, the first pieces of the 
equality principle doctrine in Estonian constitutional law were created by way of 
obiter dictum.  
A little less than a month later, in April 2002, the Constitutional Review 
Chamber considered the constitutionality of combined criminal penalties. 
According to the Criminal Code, which was part of the Soviet legacy (although 
extensively modified), different rules were to be applied by the courts depending 
on whether the combined penalty resulted from multiple counts in a single 
criminal case, or whether it was formed subsequently as a result of further counts 
at a second trial. The Constitutional Review Chamber declared this provision 
unconstitutional, because of a violation of the principle of equality, establishing 
another cornerstone of the equality doctrine: 
“The Constitutional Review Chamber observes first of all that the first sentence of 
§12(1) of the Constitution does not expressly refer to a subjective right. It only 
states that everyone is equal before the law. Nevertheless, these words embrace 
the right of a person not to be treated unequally. The wording of the first sentence 
expresses, above all, equality as to the application of law and means a requirement 
to implement valid laws in regard of every person impartially and uniformly. […] 
The Chamber shares the opinion that the first sentence of §12(1) of the 
Constitution is to be interpreted as also meaning equality in legislation. Equality 
in legislation requires, as a rule, that persons who are in similar situations must be 
treated equally by law. This principle expresses the idea of essential equality: those 
who are equal, have to be treated equally and those who are unequal must be 
treated unequally. But not any unequal treatment of equals amounts to the 
violation of the right to equality. The prohibition to treat equal persons unequally 
has been violated if two persons, groups of persons or situations are arbitrarily 
treated unequally. An unequal treatment can be regarded as arbitrary if there is no 
reasonable cause therefor. The Chamber admits that, although the review of 
arbitrariness is extended to the legislator, the latter must be awarded a wide margin 
of appreciation. If there is a reasonable and appropriate cause, unequal treatment 
in legislation is justified.”15 
                                                 
13  The decision of the Constitutional Review Chamber of 06.03.2002 plays a significant role 
in Estonian fundamental rights doctrine, because the SC first established the principle of 
proportionality with three stages: the suitability, the necessity and the proportionality in the 
narrow sense (paras. 14 f.). 
14  CRCSCj 06.03.2002, 3-4-1-1-02, para. 18; repeated in CRCSCj 12.06.2002, 3-4-1-6-02, 
para. 15. 
15  CRCSCj 03.04.2002, 3-4-1-2-02, paras. 16 f. 
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Following the decision above, the SC en banc confirmed the statements of the 
decision of 3 April 200216 and then subsequently condensed and combined its 
earlier statements.17 In the autumn of 2003, the Constitutional Review Chamber 
specified the criteria for establishing unequal treatment. It found that: “It is first 
necessary to find the closest common generic concept of the persons to be 
compared, and after that to describe the alleged unequal treatment.”18 In other 
words, the SC invented the classic criteria for examining unequal treatment – the 
genus proximum and the differentia specifica. This methodological precision is 
also a necessary further piece of the first equality doctrine.  
The second set of developments began in 2004. In the decision of 21 January 
2004, the Constitutional Review Chamber pointed out the connection between 
the equality principle and social rights. According to the SC, the right of the 
complainant, who was a student, to housing benefit derived from the fundamental 
social right (§28(2) of the Constitution), in combination with the general principle 
of equality. Sotsiaalhoolekande seadus [the Social Welfare Act]19 made the 
payment of housing benefit dependent on the type of accommodation, so that the 
majority of students were now excluded. The justification of the Constitutional 
Review Chamber can be summarised as follows:  
“The legislator is granted an extended power of decision because of the fact that 
economic and social policies and the formation of the budget are within the 
competence of the legislator. Still, an increase of tax burden and redistribution of 
resources may result in a collision of social rights with other fundamental rights. 
[…] In making social policy choices the legislator is bound by the constitutional 
principles and the nature of fundamental rights. The right to receive state 
assistance in the case of need is a subjective right, in the case of violation of which 
a person is entitled to go to court, and the courts have an obligation to review the 
constitutionality of an Act granting a social right. But a court of constitutional 
review must avoid a situation where the development of budgetary policies goes, 
to a large extent, into the hands of court. That is why in implementing social 
policies the court cannot replace the legislative or executive powers. […] The 
connection of social fundamental rights with the general right to equality is closer 
than that with other fundamental rights. […] Recognising the wide margin of 
                                                 
16  SCebj [hereinafter: judgment of the SC en banc] 14.11.2002, 3-1-1-77-02, para. 22. 
17  SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 36. This decision is one of the most important 
decisions of the SC, because so far it is the only successful individual constitutional complaint 
in Estonian constitutional case law. 
18  CRCSCj 16.09.2003, 3-4-1-6-03, para. 18. The Court stated: “In order to ascertain a 
violation of the fundamental right to equality, it is first necessary to find the closest common 
generic concept of the persons to be compared, and after that to describe the alleged unequal 
treatment.” However, it must be considered as a mistake. The Court did not find any violation of 
the principle of equality in the end in this case. Therefore, the sentence must be interpreted in 
this way, since only these first two conditions are presented and, apparently, satisfied. 
19  RT I 1995, 21, 323 (in Estonian; a revised single text e.g. in RT I 2001, 98, 617). An 
English translation of a later version of the law is available here:  
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/522032019017/consolide/current. 
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appreciation of the legislator, an unequal treatment is arbitrary when it is 
manifestly inappropriate. […] Unequal treatment cannot be justified by difficulties 
of mere administrative and technical nature. Excessive burden on the state budget 
is an argument that can be considered when deciding on the scope of social 
assistance, but the argument cannot be used to justify unequal treatment of needy 
persons and families.”20 
Furthermore, in 2005, the SC clarified that an infringement of the principle of 
equality does not automatically amount to a violation of the principle,21 and, in 
2007, declared that the substantial scope of protection of the general equality right 
covers all areas of life and extends personal protection to every individual.22 
The first doctrine experienced a third and final development in 2008. The 
Constitutional Review Chamber summarised and developed the existing doctrine 
further, in an outstandingly detailed judgement.23 The complainant was a pensioner 
who wanted time spent in the Soviet Army recognised as a period of employment 
relevant for the calculation of his pension, as the pension benefit varied according 
to length of service. He was an Estonian, born in Estonia, who was studying in 
Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) when he was recruited to the Soviet Army. After 
his release from the army, he successfully completed his studies in Leningrad and 
returned to Estonia. Riikliku pensionikindlustuse seadus [the State Pension 
Insurance Act] (hereinafter: the Pension Act)24 recognised time spent in the 
Soviet Army as a pension-relevant period of employment, only if the applicant 
had been recruited in Estonian territory. The Constitutional Review Chamber 
rightly considered this as a violation of the principle of equality and declared the 
relevant clause of the Pension Act void. The doctrinal essence of the equality 
principle is extended by this decision in two ways: first, in achieving the necessary 
precision for determining unequal treatment; and, secondly, in the criteria for 
determining when unequal treatment is reasonable: 
“Whereas the smallest common denominator should be found on the basis of the 
fact that it shall depend on who is compared to whom. This means that in principle 
everybody is comparable to everybody else […] A cause is reasonable and 
appropriate if it is proportional in the narrow sense. To ascertain whether unequal 
treatment is proportional in the narrow sense it is necessary to weigh the objective 
of unequal treatment and the gravity of the unequal situation that has been 
created.”25 
                                                 
20  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, paras. 15–17, 37, 39. 
21  CRCSCj 02.05.2005, 3-4-1-3-05, para. 20. 
22  CRCSCj 01.10.2007, 3-4-1-14-07, para. 13. To the substantial scope of protection cf. 
already CRCSCj 06.03.2002, 3-4-1-1-02, para. 13; SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 36. 
To the personal scope of protection cf. ALCSCj 20.12.2001, 3-3-1-61-01, para. 5. 
23  CRCSCj 30.09.2008, 3-4-1-8-08, paras. 20 f., 24, 27, 32. 
24  RT I 2001, 100, 648 (in Estonian). English translations of later versions of the law are 
available here: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/504022019001/consolide/current. 
25  CRCSCj 30.09.2008, 3-4-1-8-08, paras. 24, 32. 
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3. The third stage: the new doctrine 
On 7 March 2011, the Constitutional Review Chamber forwarded a case to the 
SC en banc, because the judges of the Constitutional Review Chamber had funda-
mental disagreements regarding the interpretation of §12(1) of the Constitution 
and considered it necessary to harmonise the case law regarding the application 
of the equality principle.26 The initial case concerned the question of whether 
those over 65 years of age could be treated in the same way as receivers of 
disability benefit when calculating the maximum period of statutory sickness 
benefit. The regular statutory maximum period of sickness benefit is 250 days per 
calendar year. After the expiry of that period it is possible to apply for the 
disability benefit scheme, provided that the capacity to work is reduced by 
between 40% and 100%. Furthermore, there are special rules in ravikindlustuse 
seadus [the Health Insurance Act]27 for those who receive disability benefit. In 
this case, the maximum period of statutory sickness benefit is no more than sixty 
consecutive days, and a total of ninety days, per calendar year. This means that 
those who have lost about 50% of their capacity to work may receive the 
disability benefit, but still work part-time. But if such a person becomes sick, the 
Health Insurance Agency will pay sickness benefit for a much shorter duration 
than to those who do not receive disability benefit. The legislature purported to 
place identical restrictions on statutory sickness benefit for the over 65s: ninety 
days maximum, with no more than sixty consecutive days. In the immediate case, 
a 67 year old working pensioner became sick for an extended period and requested 
sickness benefit, but the Health Insurance Agency declined to continue making 
payments after reaching the maximum of ninety days. The pensioner brought an 
action before the Administrative Court.  
The SC en banc declared the unequal treatment of the over 65s, compared to 
the younger workers, to be unconstitutional. The Court also considered the previous 
fundamental judicial disagreement regarding the interpretation of §12(1) of the 
Constitution and thus the new doctrine of equality was born. The decision 
contained four key points regarding the new doctrine: first, the SC interpreted 
§12(1) of the Constitution, so that its first and second sentence combined to 
generate a comprehensive, uniform, equality right. Previously, the SC had 
assumed that the first sentence constituted the general equality right and that the 
specific discrimination prohibition, contained in the second sentence, constituted 
special equality rights.28 But now the SC found: 
 
                                                 
26  CRCSCr [hereafter: ruling of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the SC] 07.03.2011, 
3-4-1-12-10, para. 58. 
27  RT I 2002, 62, 377 (in Estonian). 
28  Cf. SCebj 20.11.2009, 3-3-1-41-09, paras. 21, 42, 51; ALCSCj 20.10.2008, 3-3-1-42-08, 
para. 28. 
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“After analysing the case law, the Supreme Court en banc is of the opinion that 
distinguishing between the grounds of discrimination in the first and second 
sentence of §12(1) of the Constitution and the legitimate objectives of the 
infringement is not justified. §12(1) of the Constitution includes a fundamental 
right to equality which is uniform with respect to all grounds of unequal treatment 
[…]. It guarantees a uniform approach to the fundamental right to equality.”29 
Secondly, the SC clarified the question of statutory reservation of the general 
equality right, finding that it is a right with a simple statutory reservation.30 This 
ended the earlier contradictory practice, whereby the statutory reservation applied 
only to the general equality right, extending the simple statutory reservation to 
include the special discrimination prohibitions contained in §12(1) (2nd sentence) 
of the Constitution. Thirdly, the SC prescribed that justifications of unequal 
treatment should be reviewed with the help of the principle of proportionality, 
rather than of the reasonable cause criteria.31 The future application and extent of 
the tests of suitability and necessity remain to be seen. However, it does appear 
to be an important part of the doctrinal specification, at least in some cases, as 
will be demonstrated below. Lastly, the SC added a balancing rule, drawing a 
distinction between personal attributes acquired by act of will, such as language 
skills and, to a certain extent, religion or beliefs, which are changeable, and 
attributes that exist independently of the will of the person, which include: race, 
age, disability, genetic characteristics, or mother tongue. According to the SC, even 
stronger reasons must be brought forth to justify unequal treatment in the latter 
case.32 Since the particular case concerned the attribute ‘age’, which exists 
regardless of the will of the person, the SC turned to the stricter criteria and 
declared the unequal treatment on grounds of age to be disproportionate. 
 
 
  
                                                 
29  SCebj 07.06.2011, 3-4-1-12-10, para. 31. 
30  SCebj 07.06.2011, 3-4-1-12-10, para. 31. 
31  SCebj 07.06.2011, 3-4-1-12-10, paras. 35, 43 ff. Cf. the three level principle of 
proportionality: CRCSCj 06.03.2002, 3-4-1-1-02, paras. 14 ff.; and especially the wording in: 
CRCSCj 17.07.2009, 3-4-1-6-09, para. 21. 
32  SCebj 07.06.2011, 3-4-1-12-10, para. 32. 
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III. Systematic Analysis and Review of the Case Law 
The SC control of the equality right has a two-level-structure: an unequal treat-
ment level and a justification of the unequal treatment level.33 From this 
standpoint of the SC it can be concluded that the general structure of the right to 
equality corresponds to the principle theory, and therefore the equality right is 
correctly treated as a principle, given that it applies the scheme of infringement 
and limitation of constitutional rights.34 So, the starting point of the following 
analysis, is the principle theory of constitutional rights,35 with slight modifica-
tions by the author.  
The analysis and review of relevant case law, considers whether the principle 
of equality constitutes a constitutional right that also binds the legislature, 
whether it protects factual equality as well as legal equality, whether it contains 
a requirement of unequal treatment for those who are not equal, whether the 
principle of equality has any statutory reservation, whether the applicability of 
the principle of equality can legitimately be excluded when the persons to be 
compared are allegedly incomparable, how the comparison groups should be 
formed, whether any special equality rights exist and, if so , what kind of structure 
they have, how the principle of equality functions in interaction with other 
constitutional rights, whether there are different levels of scrutiny in the test of 
the principle of equality, and whether there is any principle of ‘coherence’. 
 
 
1. The equality principle as a fully developed constitutional right 
The questions of whether the principle of equality is enforceable and could be 
used as a constitutional right by a rights-holder and, if so, whether it is also 
binding for the legislature, were clearly answered by the SC in a judgement on 
                                                 
33  Constitutively CRCSCj 03.04.2002, 3-4-1-2-02, para. 17; cf. esp. CRCSCj 02.05.2005, 
3-4-1-3-05, para. 20. 
34  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 181, 199 f.; M. Borowski. Die Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit des Grundgesetzes. Tübin-
gen: Mohr, 2006, p. 685 ff. 
35  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 44 
ff. An abstract of the distinction of rules and principles can be found in: R. Alexy. 
Grundrechtsnorm und Grundrecht. – W. Krawietz et al. (eds.). Politische Herrschafts-
strukturen und neuer Konstitutionalismus. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2000, p. 103. Cf. the 
recent volumes: J.-R. Sieckmann (ed.). Die Prinzipientheorie der Grundrechte. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2007; L. Clérico, J.-R. Sieckmann (eds.). Grundrechte, Prinzipien und 
Argumentation. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009; M. Borowski (ed.). On the Nature of Legal 
Principles. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2010; G. Pavlakos (ed.). Law, Rights and Discourse. 
Oxford, Portland: Hart, 2007; M. Klatt (ed.). Institutionalized Reason. Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012; M. Klatt (ed.). Prinzipientheorie und Theorie der Abwägung. 
Tübingen: Mohr, 2013. 
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3 April 2002. The SC indicated, in relation to both questions, that the answer 
might be ambiguous: 
“The Constitutional Review Chamber observes first of all that the first sentence of 
§12(1) of the Constitution does not expressly refer to a subjective right. It states 
only that everyone is equal before the law. […] The wording of the first sentence 
expresses, above all, the equality upon application of law and means a requirement 
to implement valid laws in regard to every person impartially and uniformly.”36  
Although the SC considered that §12(1) does not expressis verbis indicate a 
subjective right, it said: “Nevertheless, these words embrace the right of a person 
not to be treated unequally.”37 The SC also affirmed that the right to equality is 
also binding on the legislature:  
“The Chamber shares the opinion that the first sentence of §12(1) of the 
Constitution is to be interpreted as also meaning equality in legislation. Equality 
in legislation requires, as a rule, that persons who are in similar situations must be 
treated equally by the law.”38 
The question of the subjectivity of the equality principle has not been considered 
by the courts since the aforementioned decision. However, the SC has from then 
on repeatedly affirmed that the first sentence of §12(1) of the Constitution is to 
be interpreted as also meaning equality in legislation.39  
The SC is correct with regard to both of these fundamental questions. Whereas 
the subjectivity issue also concerns the general question of the subjectivity of 
constitutional rights, which will not be analysed here, one could ask whether 
legislative equality is a fundamental precondition for the proper functioning of 
the equality principle. To answer this question it should first be pointed out that 
if the equality principle were to apply only to the exercise of executive and 
judicial powers, the protection of fundamental rights would be superficial. It is 
evident that all laws should be applied equally to everyone and that binding the 
legislature is the main aim of the equality principle, as a right deriving from the 
Constitution. This leads to the second argument: according to §14 of the Con-
stitution, it is the primary duty of the legislature to guarantee the rights and 
freedoms provided in the Constitution. Since the equality principle is also 
provided in the Constitution, it is the duty of the legislature to guarantee it. Thirdly, 
if the principle of equality were not to cover legislative equality, discriminatory 
Acts of Parliament, for example in relation to taxation, would be possible. The 
                                                 
36  CRCSCj 03.04.2002, 3-4-1-2-02, para. 16. 
37  CRCSCj 03.04.2002, 3-4-1-2-02, para. 16. 
38  CRCSCj 03.04.2002, 3-4-1-2-02, para. 17. 
39  SCebj 14.11.2002, 3-1-1-77-02, para. 22; 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 36; 10.12.2003, 
3-3-1-47-03, para. 24; 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, paras. 38 f.; 02.06.2008, 3-4-1-19-07, para. 21; 
CRCSCj 03.04.2002, 3-4-1-2-02, para. 17; 24.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 17; 02.05.2005, 
3-4-1-3-05, para. 17; 20.03.2006, 3-4-1-33-05, paras. 26, 32; 26.09.2007, 3-4-1-12-07, paras. 
18 f.; 01.10.2007, 3-4-1-14-07, para. 13; 30.09.2008, 3-4-1-8-08, para. 20. 
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requirement that everyone is equal before the law is, in its narrowest sense, 
fulfilled if the executive power applies a discriminatory law equally to everyone. 
However, this result would be unsatisfactory and would not be in accordance with 
the idea of §12 of the Constitution. Fourthly, according to the preamble to the 
Constitution, the Estonian state is founded first and foremost on liberty. Since the 
main obligation of all state powers is to guarantee liberty, §12(1) serves, amongst 
other ideals, that of equal freedom for everyone and therefore must necessarily 
also bind legislative powers. Fifthly, in the travaux preparatoires of the 
Constitution, it was indisputable that the equality principle should also bind the 
legislature.40 For these reasons the existence of the equality principle as a fully 
developed constitutional right is beyond dispute.41 
 
 
2. Legal and factual equality 
The SC decided in 2005 that the guarantee of full factual equality for individuals 
exercising the right to vote is infeasible in principle and not required by the 
Constitution.42 In 2003, it had considered legal equality in relation to the relevant 
statutory regulation.43 Thus, the SC differentiates between these two basic 
categories. However, it has not yet given its view on whether the principle of 
equality includes both – factual and legal equality –, or legal equality only.  
It is indisputable that the principle of equality is primarily designed to produce 
legal equality,44 but whether, and to what extent, it also aims to create factual 
equality is much more problematic.45 The equality-paradox states that if factual 
                                                 
40  L. Hänni. – V. Peep (ed.). Põhiseadus ja Põhiseaduse Assamblee. Tallinn: Juura, 1997, 
p. 977 f. 
41  Cf. the European Court of Justice made recently a recapitulating clarification in respect of 
Art. 20 of the Charter too, ECJ 17.10.2013, Case C-101/12, Herbert Schaible v. Land Baden-
Württemberg, paras. 76–78: “Equality before the law, set out in Article 20 of the Charter, is a 
general principle of European Union law which requires that comparable situations should not 
be treated differently, and that different situations should not be treated in the same way, unless 
such different treatment is objectively justified […] According to the case law of the Court a 
difference in treatment is justified if it is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that 
is, if the difference relates to a legally permitted aim pursued by the legislation in question, 
and it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment […] Since a European Union 
legislative act is concerned, it is for the European Union legislature to demonstrate the 
existence of objective criteria put forward as justification and to provide the Court with the 
necessary information for it to verify that those criteria do exist […].” 
42  CRCSCj 01.09.2005, 3-4-1-13-05, para. 24. However, the English translation of the decision 
is misleading because it uses the term ‘actual equality’ instead of the correct ‘factual equality’. 
43  CRCSCj 16.09.2003, 3-4-1-6-03, para. 24. 
44  ALCSCj 20.10.2008, 3-3-1-42-08, para. 25. Cf. instead of many F. Schoch. Der Gleich-
heitssatz. – Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1988, p. 866; M. Borowski. Grundrechte als Prinzi-
pien. 2. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007, p. 396. 
45  M. Borowski. Die Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit des Grundgesetzes. Tübingen: Mohr, 
2006, p. 682 with further rerferences to both positions. 
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equality is sought, one must also be prepared to accept legal inequality.46 Thus, 
if one wants to guarantee legal equality and inequality at the same time via the 
principle of equality, the equality provision has to be interpreted in a manner that 
infers that two contrary requirements derive from it simultaneously. On the one 
hand, the state ought to treat persons equally in a legal sense; on the other hand, 
legally equal treatment is (indirectly) prohibited.47 If we interpret the 
requirements as principles, such an interpretation is not logically excluded.48 But 
this seems to be technically inexpedient: there must be really good reasons for 
interpreting a provision in this manner, which will result in two contrary 
requirements emerging. Alexy, in his theory of constitutional rights, defends the 
theory of factual equality because he seeks the subjectification of the principle of 
the social state.49 To cope with the constitutional issues in a modern society, this 
subjectification of the social state must be considered as necessary, although the 
principle of equality might not be the best way to achieve this. It seems more 
appropriate to interpret the social state principle itself in a way that includes a 
subjective dimension, or alterna- tively to recognise the subjectivity of granting 
minimum social rights in the Constitution.50 Moreover, if one claims the 
promotion of factual equality, at least as a secondary function of the principle of 
equality, then justification is necessary as to why factual equality must be 
internally bounded and pursued only to a limited extent, in marked contrast to 
legal equality. But defenders of the theory of factual equality simply assume that 
the principle of equality should be interpreted in the act-related sense first and 
                                                 
46  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 277. As a matter of fact, this is not a logical paradox in the strict sense but rather a collision 
of two opposing principles – that of legal equality and that of factual equality. This has been 
clearly demonstrated by M. Borowski. Grundrechte als Prinzipien. 2. ed. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2007, p. 397 ff. 
47  The legal equality is act-related and the factual equality consequence-related, R. Alexy. 
A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 276; 
M. Borowski. Grundrechte als Prinzipien. 2. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007, p. 396. 
48  Jürgen Habermas takes “the dialectic between legal and factual equality [for] an inconspi-
cuous motor of legal development”, see J. Habermas. Between Facts and Norms. Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1996, p. 416. On the contrary, Christian Starck considers it illogical, cf. C. Starck. – 
H. von Mangoldt, F. Klein, C. Starck (eds.). Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Vol. 1, 6. ed. 
München: C. H. Beck, 2010, Art. 3(1) recital 5. 
49  Cf. R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 284. 
50  The Estonian Constitution CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 16. The German 
Constitutional Court deduces now from Art. 1(1) in conjunction with Art. 20(1) of the German 
Constitution a fundamental right to a subsistence minimum that is in line with human dignity, 
cf. BVerfG 09.02.2010, joined cases 1 BvL 1, 3, 4/09, Hartz IV, paras. 132 ff. (BVerfGE 125, 
175, 221 ff.), available here: 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/ls20100209_1bvl000109en.html, 
and BVerfG 18.07.2012, joined cases 1 BvL 10/10, 2/11, Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, paras. 
62 ff. (BVerfGE 132, 134, 166 ff.), available here:  
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/ls20120718_1bvl001010en.html. 
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foremost,51 which congruously leads to the burden of argumentation in favour of 
legal equality,52 or that legal equality enjoys a prima facie priority.53 However, 
the most important objection to be raised is the particular potential risk that lies 
in the combination of factual equality with the requirement of unequal treatment. 
Alexy himself describes the individual right to factually unequal treatment as a 
critical point.54 In fact, if one combines the alleged requirement of factual equality 
with the supposed requirement of unequal treatment, one would enable the 
Constitutional Court to supplant the legislature in many areas and exercise 
massive judicial discretion in determining the relevant factual differences for 
requiring a statutory exception, or even to create an alternative regulatory 
scheme. Such an interpretation would in the most extreme case leave the gates 
wide open for a transition from a parliamentary state to an immoderate 
constitutional-court state (verfassungsgerichtlicher Jurisdiktionsstaat).55,56 
Without being able to answer this fundamental question exhaustively here, it 
seems possible to conclude that §12(1) of the Constitution requires legal equality 
alone and that the principle of equality provides a sufficiently contoured scope 
for protection. The principle of factual equality does not follow from the principle 
of equality, but from the fundamental social right (§28(2) of the Constitution) and 
from the principle of the social state (§10 of the Constitution), assuming of course 
that it is a principle at all. There is no need to strive for factual equality from the 
general principle of equality, but it is necessary to specify the basis of the 
principle of equality more precisely; otherwise, its omnipotence and 
                                                 
51  Cf. R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 280. 
52  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 283. 
53  R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 61; M. Borowski. 
Die Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit des Grundgesetzes. Tübingen: Mohr, 2006, p. 397. 
54  R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p. 280. 
55  E.-W. Böckenförde. Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen. – E.-W. Böckenförde. Staat, Ver-
fassung, Demokratie. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1991, p. 190. Böckenförde has embraced the 
concept of the ‘verfassungsgerichtlicher Jurisdiktionsstaat’. However, a moderate Consti-
tutional Court is not negative, but a necessary condition of the constitutionalism. Only the 
immoderate constitutional-court state, i.e. if the Constitutional Court excesses its jurisdiction, 
raises the question of a possible violation of the competence of the legislature. 
56  In relation to the problem of competence see: R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 282 ff. However, Alexy points to the theories of 
factual equality, but the essence of the competence problem does not concern the question of 
which theory of factual equality is right, but rather the question whether the principle of factual 
equality can be legitimately assigned to the principle of equality at all. The problem of the 
shifting of legislative competence from Parliament to the Constitutional Court begins with the 
assignment of the principle of factual equality to the scope of protection of the principle of 
equality. The constellation becomes really problematic in combination with the assumption of 
unequal treatment, as a constitutional requirement. 
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omnipresence57 raises the risk of its degradation. The principle of equality is not 
a tool to solve all cases, but serves structurally the subjectification of the principle 
that (constitutional) law shall be applied equally to all persons. So an intermediate 
conclusion is that the principle of equality promotes legal equality, but not factual 
equality.58 Implementation of factual equality requires that the fundamental social 
right and/or the principle of the social state be addressed. However, the sharp 
doctrinal separation of legal and factual equality is relativised in practice when 
the SC combines them in cases where it strives for factual equality on the basis 
of a fundamental social right in conjunction with the principle of equality.59 
Ultimately, the principle of equality is in practice involved in striving for factual 
equality, but this is a question of the ancillary application of the equality principle, 
as we shall see below. 
 
 
3. Unequal treatment for non-equals  
In one case, the SC held that the requirement of unequal treatment for non-equals 
was infringed.60 The complainant had lost 100% of his hearing in one ear and 
99% in the other ear. However, this was not recognised by the Social Insurance 
Agency as a disability within the meaning of puuetega inimeste sotsiaaltoetuste 
seadus [the Social Benefits for Disabled Persons Act]61 because the complainant 
did not require assistance from others. The complainant challenged the decision, 
which had been made on the grounds that he did not seek help from other persons, 
because he wanted to know whether he was exempt from the language test, which 
forms part of the naturalisation process. Kodakondsusseadus [the Citizenship 
Act]62 recognised the intermediate degree of disability as a ground for exemption 
from the otherwise mandatory language test in the naturalisation process.  
                                                 
57  Cf. F. Schoch. Der Gleichheitssatz. – Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1988, p. 864. 
58  See also F. Schoch. Der Gleichheitssatz. – Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1988, p. 866 f.; 
P. Martini. Art. 3 Abs. 1 GG als Prinzip absoluter Rechtsgleichheit. Köln et al.: Heymanns, 
1997, p. 249 f. This means especially that no reverse discrimination can be justified with the 
principle of equal treatment itself but needs for its constitutional justification (dependent on 
the statutory reservation of the infringed constitutional right) either a substantial ground in the 
Constitution beyond the principle of equality (constitutional right with no statutory 
reservation) or at least a legitimate, i.e. constitutionally compliant, reason (constitutional right 
with the simple statutory reservation). The question of possible justifications in the case of an 
infringement of a freedom right with a qualified statutory reservation will not be discussed in 
detail here. 
59  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03. 
60  SCebj 10.12.2003, 3-3-1-47-03, para. 26. 
61  RT I 1999, 16, 273 (in Estonian). An English translation of a later version of the law is 
available here: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/518122017011/consolide/current. 
62  RT I 1995, 12, 122 (in Estonian). An English translation of a later version of the law is 
available here: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/521032019009/consolide/current. 
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The SC en banc decided, in a concrete norm control procedure which was 
presented to the plenary by the Administrative Law Chamber, that the Citizenship 
Act was partially unconstitutional because it violated the principle of equality.63 
The court considered two issues in terms of the general principle of equality: first, 
the unequal treatment relevant to the question of potential exemption from the 
language test for those with hearing impairments, depending on whether they need 
help from other people or not; and, secondly, the equal treatment of the 
hearingimpaired who are not exempted from the language test compared to 
people who can hear normally (and are also not exempted from the language test). 
But was the identification of the second infringement necessary? To put the 
question more generally, is there a constitutional requirement regarding unequal 
treatment for non-equals. “Treat the same similarly and differences differently”, 
said both Plato and Aristotle,64 and this has been repeated by the SC, as well as by 
the most influential Constitutional Court in Europe, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court.65 The SC considered the individual characteristics of the 
person to be relevant, stating that equals should be treated equally and non-equals 
unequally.66 This general statement is of course correct, but it is doubtful whether 
the requirement of unequal treatment for non-equals can serve as a control 
scheme for the principle of equality.  
First, the requirement of unequal treatment is redundant because complaints 
regarding equal treatment can be re-phrased as complaints regarding unequal 
treatment, i.e. for every disapproved equal treatment, one can find a relevant 
unequal treatment.67 A good example is the judgment of the SC of 7 June 2011 
considered above,68 where the issue was whether a rule that equated the over65s 
                                                 
63  We shall leave out of focus here whether such a question was in this particular court 
procedure admissible at all. Although the wording of §15(1) PS and the Constitutional Review 
Court Procedure Act seem to insist that the criterion ‘relevant in the case’ is a strict one and 
similar to the parallel criterion of Art. 100 of the German Constitution, it seems according to 
the case law of the SC to be rather similar to the interpretation of the European Court of Justice 
as to whether a referral for preliminary ruling in the sense of Art. 267 TFEU is required. The 
SC, in assessing the admissibility test, was neither particularly strict nor excessively 
consistent. 
64  Plato. Laws. VI 757; Aristotle. Politics. III 9 (1280a); id. Nichomachean Ethics. V 3 (1131a); 
cf. R. Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 263. 
65  Cf. BVerfG 17.12.1953, case 1 BvR 147/52, Beamtenverhältnisse (BVerfGE 3, 58, 135); 
22.01.1959, case 1 BvR 154/55, Armenrecht (BVerfGE 9, 124, 129 f.) 
66  CRCSCj 03.04.2002, 3-4-1-2-02, para. 17. 
67  P. Martini. Art. 3 Abs. 1 GG als Prinzip absoluter Rechtsgleichheit. Köln et al.: Heymanns, 
1997, p. 219 ff.; W. Rüfner. Der allgemeine Gleichheitssatz als Differenzierungsgebot. – 
B. Ziemske (ed.). Staatsphilosophie und Rechtspolitik. München: C. H. Beck, 1997, p. 271 ff., 
279; M. Sachs. Der allgemeine Gleichheitssatz. – K. Stern. Staatsrecht. Vol. IV/2. München: 
C. H. Beck, 2011, p. 1479 with further references in fn. 239. See also for a detailed approach 
to the other direction M. Borowski. Grundrechte als Prinzipien. 2. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2007, p. 402; M. Borowski. Die Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit des Grundgesetzes. 
Tübingen: Mohr, 2006, p. 685 ff. 
68  SCebj 07.06.2011, 3-4-1-12-10. 
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with recipients of disability benefit for the allowed maximum duration of any 
sickness benefit was constitutional. It would have been easy to form comparison 
groups of the over65s, and of the recipients of disability benefit in respect of the 
allowed maximum duration of sickness benefit and to consider the violation of 
the requirement of unequal treatment. The SC, however, did not examine the 
unequal treatment of the aforementioned comparison groups, but instead looked 
at the requirement of equal treatment of over65s with younger people. In addition, 
the case of the naturalisation process also points to this redundancy. The court 
noted that, on the one hand, the hearing-impaired with recognised intermediatel-
evel disability and those with normal hearing are different, but are treated equally 
in the naturalisation process. On the other hand, however, the hearing-impaired 
are equal, but the law provides exemption from the language test only if the 
hearing loss is recognised as an intermediate-level disability.69 In the course of 
further examination, the SC reviewed whether the latter unequal treatment is in 
accordance with the principle of equal treatment, i.e. whether there was a 
reasonable cause for the unequal treatment.70 
Secondly, the rejection of a requirement of unequal treatment is reflective of 
historical arguments. The principle of equality was initially opposed to nobility 
privileges,71 thus directed towards bringing about legal equality. The function of 
legal equality may become obscured by the inclusion of the requirement of 
inequality, because these two principles are mutually opposed; and thus the prin-
ciple of equality threatens to mutate into a simple demand for the justification of 
norms.72 
Third, and most importantly, the requirement of unequal treatment for none-
quals would lead to an issue in its implementation regarding the separation and 
balance of powers and competences.73 While the application of the requirement 
of equal treatment subsists in the control of unequal treatment by the legislature 
and thus the principle is clearly directed to the promotion of legal equality, the 
objective of the requirement of unequal treatment remains undefined. Just one 
equal treatment issue has to be found in relation to two persons or groups and 
almost any legislative omission could be reviewed, because the SC would be in a 
position almost freely to determine the direction of its supervision. The aim of 
                                                 
69  SCebj 10.12.2003, 3-3-1-47-03, para. 26. 
70  SCebj 10.12.2003, 3-3-1-47-03, para. 27. 
71  S. Huster. Rechte und Ziele. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1993, p. 25 with further refe-
rences; M. Sachs. Der allgemeine Gleichheitssatz. – K. Stern. Staatsrecht. Vol. IV/2. 
München: C. H. Beck, 2011, p. 1444 ff, 1479 ff. 
72  A. Podlech. Gehalt und Funktionen des allgemeinen verfassungsrechtlichen Gleichheits-
satzes. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1971, p. 57. 
73  SCebj 12.07.2012, 3-4-1-6-12, para. 173: “§152 of the Constitution obliges the SC to 
verify whether the activities of the legislature and the executive are in accordance with the 
Constitution. However, by performing this duty the SC must consider the principle of 
separation and balance of powers and the competences of state bodies established by the 
Constitution. The SC must verify whether the activities of the legislature are constitutional, 
but it cannot decide on matters entrusted to the Riigikogu by the Constitution.” 
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the requirement of unequal treatment for non-equals must lie not only in some-
thing that the Constitution commands, but may well be everything permitted or 
possible under the Constitution. The determination of the objective of unequal 
treatment intended by the SC must simply not be unconstitutional. Only that 
which is prohibited by the Constitution can be excluded as a suitable objective in 
the first place. Thus, the discretion granted by the principle of equality is given 
not to the legislature but to the Constitutional Court and the principle of equality 
is inverted. Furthermore, it would not be correct to allow the complainant or 
applicant to determine the objective in a binding manner. This would leave the 
equality doctrine to chance and procedurally contradict the general principle of 
law ‘iura novit curia’. Therefore, using the requirement of unequal treatment for 
non-equals, the SC could legislate exceptions or even new sets of rules without 
particularly high standards of justification and, therefore, without the necessary 
legitimation. The only requirement is that the objective is not clearly unconsti-
tutional. However, in constitutionalism, the law-making powers must belong to 
the legislature and not to the Constitutional Court, even if the Constitutional 
Court must have wide law-nullifying powers and even the power to disapprove 
of a Parliamentary omission of a constitutional obligation.  
The legal existence of the constitutional requirement of unequal treatment for 
non-equals must therefore be denied primarily because of the principle of 
separation and balance of powers. Günter Dürig, one of the most important 
German constitutional lawyers of the 20th century, wrote, in his influential com-
mentary on the article of equality, that the right to equality defines an egalitarian 
standard.74 This can be affirmed with a little clarification: there is no such thing 
as a right to unequal treatment deriving from the principle of equality. 
 
 
4. Statutory reservation  
The question of the statutory reservation of the principle of equality was another 
riddle in Estonia for a long time. The statutory reservation has to be more closely 
scrutinised for two reasons: first, it determines the circle of legitimate aims for 
infringements of the equality principle, i.e. for unequal treatments; and, secondly, 
it points out that every infringement needs to be justified on a formally consti-
tutional legal basis. The SC considered the question of the statutory reservation to 
be one of the fundamental questions that had to be clarified by the SC en banc.75  
The origin of this debate dates back to 2003. Barely was the doctrine of the 
equality principle born, when the SC expressed, somewhat misleadingly, that the 
general equality right had no statutory reservation.76 This conception would have 
meant that only other constitutional rights, or other constitutional values, could 
                                                 
74  G. Dürig. – T. Maunz, G. Dürig (eds.). Grundgesetz-Kommentar. München: C. H. Beck, 
1973, Art. 3(1)1 recital 22 ff. 
75  CRCSCr 07.03.2011, 3-4-1-12-10, paras. 52 f. 
76  SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, paras. 27 f. 
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have been legitimately considered as justifications for unequal treatment. 
However, the SC in 2003 distinguished between two different applications of the 
equality principle: the application of the principle of equality in conjunction with 
the constitutional principle of lex mitior (§23(2) 2nd sentence of the 
Constitution);77 and the application of the principle of equality alone.78 The SC 
has even referred to it later and, in 2004, confirmed the statement regarding the 
statutory reservation.79 Elsewhere, the SC held that the principle of equality is a 
right with a simple statutory reservation, which means that any Act of Parliament 
would suffice as a legal basis for unequal treatment.80  
Today it is regarded as settled law that the general principle of equality in the 
Estonian Constitution has a simple statutory reservation. The SC en banc declared 
that the principle of equality has a simple statutory reservation and this has 
subsequently been repeated by the Constitutional Review Chamber.81 The 
clarification is welcome. The main reason that the SC is right is that the alter-
native interpretation of the principle of equality (i.e. that the principle of equality 
as a constitutional right does not have a statutory reservation at all) would 
excessively limit the catalogue of legitimate aims for any constitutional unequal 
treatment. The principle of equality has, as a general constitutional right, an 
extremely wide scope and embraces all people and all spheres of life.82 Therefore, 
conversely, an open list of possible justifications is needed and should include all 
constitutional norms and legitimate objectives pursued by the legislature.83 
Furthermore, the wording of the first sentence of §12(1) of the Constitution insists 
that equality exists ‘before the law’. It too can be regarded as a pointer towards 
the simple statutory reservation.  
On the other hand, the dimension of the formal protection of the equality 
principle is in the background. The principle of equality preponderantly plays an 
important role in entitlement situations where the possibility of formal protection 
                                                 
77  §23(2) second sentence PS: “If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, the law 
makes provision for a lighter penalty, the lighter penalty applies.” Cf. SCebj 17.03.2003,  
3-1-3-10-02, paras. 19–34. 
78  SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, paras. 35 ff. 
79  Confirming the lack of the statutory reservation for the same norm combination: SCebr 
[hereinafter: ruling of the SC en banc] 28.04.2004, 3-3-1-69-03, para. 28; SCebj 02.06.2008, 
3-4-1-19-07, para. 23. In a further case the SC dealt with the principle of equality as if it had 
no statutory reservation: SCebj 19.04.2005, 3-4-1-1-05, paras. 16, 24, 36. 
80  Cf. CRCSCr 07.03.2011, 3-4-1-12-10, para. 53. The Constitutional Review Chamber of 
the SC noted that, according to the established jurisprudence of the SC, the equality right has 
been treated as being similar to the rights with a simple statutory reservation. 
81  SCebj 07.06.2011, 3-4-1-12-10, para. 31; CRCSCj 27.12.2011, 3-4-1-23-11, para. 41; also 
substantively CRCSCj 14.05.2013, 3-4-1-7-13, para. 41, and SCebj 26.06.2014, 3-4-1-1-14, 
para. 113. 
82 Cf. SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 36; CRCSCj 06.03.2002, 3-4-1-1-02, para. 13; 
01.10.2007, 3-4-1-14-07, para. 13. 
83  Cf. M. Borowski. Grundrechte als Prinzipien. 2. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007, p. 448; 
S. Huster. Rechte und Ziele. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1993, p. 239. 
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is already logically questionable because the relevant legal question lies in the 
lack of the law. How can the formal constitutionality of something that does not 
(yet) exist be supervised? However, if the principle of equality is applied in 
conjunction with freedoms, it would systematically be subordinated to the 
relevant legal freedom.84 In such cases of ancillary application, the argument of 
equality should be considered in the context of proportionality in the narrow sense, 
as we will see below.85 The SC has reviewed the formal constitutionality of an 
original unequal treatment only three times in its case law.86 
 
 
5. Incomparability  
In 2008, an unexpected turn was taken in the case law of the SC, in the form of 
an incomparability thesis. In four particular cases, the SC denied the violation of 
the principle of equality because the groups formed were allegedly not 
comparable. In the first case, the SC found that persons who have committed a 
traffic law misdemeanour are not comparable with persons who have committed 
a traffic law offence.87 In the second case, the SC found that individuals who have 
performed support functions in the intelligence or security services and those 
individuals who have performed support functions outside the intelligence or 
security services are not comparable.88 In the third case, the SC held that people 
who commit a crime with a motor vehicle which they own and people who use a 
motor vehicle owned by another person or by joint owners when committing a 
crime, are not compa- rable with each other, when the SC examined the 
constitutionality of the confiscation of the vehicle used in the crime.89 In the 
fourth case, the SC found that prisoners and persons who are free are not 
comparable in relation to a prohibition on prisoners accessing certain webpages.90  
The SC denied any infringement in these cases, meaning that there would be 
no need for further justification of any unequal treatment. The starting point of 
                                                 
84  Cf. CRCSCj 06.03.2002, 3-4-1-1-02, para. 18; 12.06.2002, 3-4-1-6-02, para. 15. 
85  E.g. CRCSCj 1601.2007, 3-4-1-9-06, para. 32. 
86  CRCSCj 30.09.2008, 3-4-1-8-08, para. 18 – the SC takes the examination of the formal 
constitutionality before the brackets, whereas the resolution of the decision indicates that the 
unconstitutionality lies in an omission of the legislature. SCebj 07.06.2011, 3-4-1-12-10, para. 
40 – the SC examines the formal constitutionality using general formulae within the exami-
nation of the principle of equality, the resolution of the decision declares the supervised 
provision partially invalid for material reasons. CRCSCj 14.05.2013, 3-4-1-7-13, para. 40 – 
the SC examines the formal constitutionality very briefly within the examination of the 
principle of equality, on the basis that there is no evidence of any breach of procedural norms 
in the law-making procedure, whereas the resolution of the decision declares the supervised 
provision invalid for material reasons. 
87  SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, paras. 50, 54. 
88  SCebj 301.2008, 3-3-1-101-06, para. 23. 
89  SCebj 12.06.2008, 3-1-1-37-07, para. 24. 
90  SCebj 07.12.2009, 3-3-1-5-09, para. 28. 
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the SC in these cases was that the question of whether the unequal treatment is 
justified or not could arise only when the individuals or groups who are treated 
differently are comparable with each other. The comparability presupposes that 
the persons or groups “are in an analogous situation from the aspect of concrete 
differentiation”,91 although the SC does not give any further explanation of the 
meaning of this point.  
However, Judge Jüri Põld criticised the doctrine of the SC and wrote, in his 
dissenting opinion in 2008, that it is inconceivable that a group could be so 
extraordinary as to be totally incomparable with anyone.92 Shortly thereafter, the 
Constitutional Review Chamber gave up the theory of incomparability, agreeing 
explicitly that, in principle, everybody is comparable to everybody else.93 
Paradoxically, the SC en banc repeated the incomparability theory subsequently, 
in the aforementioned case, without any reference to the opinion of the 
Constitutional Review Chamber.94 Therefore, the question of which opinion 
should be followed still remains.  
The European Court of Justice,95 the European Court of Human Rights96 and 
the German Federal Constitutional Court97 have all deployed the incomparability 
thesis in at least some cases where the equality principle came under conside-
ration. It is doubtful, however, whether the declaration of incomparability can be 
a sufficient justification for denying any violation of the equality principle. It has 
theoretically been proven that there is nothing in a particular case that it is 
incomparable, something can always be compared with something else.98 It is 
important to emphasise that there are justification deficits, in cases where unequal 
treatment claims are rejected on the basis of the incomparability thesis. 
Transparency and procedural justice are improved if the SC makes its reasons 
public and names them after an affirmation of the unequal treatment. For all these 
                                                 
91  SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, para. 40; 03.01.2008, 3-3-1-101-06, para. 23. 
92  Dissenting opinion of Justice Jüri Põld, joined by Justices Tõnu Anton, Jüri Ilvest, Indrek 
Koolmeister, Julia Laffranque and Harri Salmann, to the SCebj 03.01.2008, 3-3-1-101-06. 
93  CRCSCj 30.09.2008, 3-4-1-8-08, para. 24. 
94  SCebj 07.07.2009, 3-3-1-5-09, para. 28. 
95  E.g.: ECJ 06.07.1982, Case C-188/80, France et al. v. Commission, para. 21; 12.10.2004, 
Case C-313/02, Nicole Wippel, para. 64; 26.10.2006, Case C-248/04, Koninklijke Coöperatie 
Cosun UA, para. 72. See also M. Rossi. EU-GRCharta Art. 20. Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz. – 
C. Calliess, M. Ruffert (eds.). EUV/AEUV. 4. ed. München: C. H. Beck, 2011, recital 20 f. 
96  E.g.: ECtHR 26.04.1979, Case 6 538/74, Sunday Times v. UK, para. 72; 29.04.2008, Case 
13 378/05, Burden v. UK, para. 62; 16.03.2010, Case 42 184/05, Carson et al. v. UK, para. 85; 
04.11.2010, Case 14 480/08, Tarkoev v. Estonia, para. 61. C. Grabenwarter, K. Pabel. 
Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. 5. ed. München: C. H. Beck, 2012, § 26 recital 6. 
97  See also M. Sachs. Besondere Gleichheitsgarantien. – J. Isensee, P. Kirchhof (eds.). 
Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vol. VIII. 3. ed. Heidelberg: 
C. F. Müller, 2010, §182 recital 33 ff. 
98  See also V. Afonso da Silva. Grundrechte und gesetzgeberische Spielräume. Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2002, p. 170 ff. 
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reasons, one has to agree with the position of the Constitutional Review Chamber, 
and Jüri Põld, and hope that the SC en banc clarifies the ambiguity in the future. 
 
 
6. Formation of the comparison groups  
Since the formation of the comparison groups determines the unequal treatment 
that has to be justified, such formation is one of the keys for finding the right 
solution in an equality case. To analyse an unequal treatment, the two elements 
‘genus proximum’ and ‘differentia specifica’ are widely used.99 However, the step 
from these abstract criteria to a concrete comparison of two persons, or groups of 
persons, which has to be justified, is rather difficult. Constructions like the 
characterising tree of Adalbert Podlech,100 or the theory of transitive action-
related predicates,101 are not really helpful in determining the formation of the 
correct comparison groups.  
The SC had some difficulties with the formation of comparison groups, 
particularly in the Judgment of 8 March 2011.102 It was an abstract judicial 
review, on the subject of a municipal statute of Tallinn, which introduced a child-
birth allowance as a voluntary community-based social service. The childbirth 
allowance is paid to the parents of a child born in Tallinn, on the condition that 
both parents are residents of Tallinn before the birth of the child and at least one 
of the parents has, based on the Population Register data, resided in Tallinn for at 
                                                 
99  Cf. esp. W. Heun. – H. Dreier. (ed.). Grundgesetz-Kommentar. Vol. 1, 3. ed. Tübingen: 
Mohr, 2013, Art. 3, recital 24; M. Sachs. Der allgemeine Gleichheitssatz. – K. Stern, Staatsrecht. 
Vol. IV/2. München: C. H. Beck, 2011, p. 1513 in fn. 419 with further references. 
100  A. Podlech. Gehalt und Funktionen des allgemeinen Gleichheitssatzes. Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1971, p. 70, 264: “Kennzeichnender Baum einer behandelten Klasse heißt jeder 
Klassenbaum, der die behandelte Klasse, eine nächste Einschlußklasse der behandelten 
Klasse und die Restklasse der behandelten Klasse hinsichtlich der nächsten Einschlußklasse 
als Glieder enthält.” Podlech gives an example of a right and wrong characterising tree on p. 
68-69. According to him, the correct differentiation has to derive from the legal treatment of 
the case. However, the legal treatment is not a suitable criterion for the differentiation. 
101  S. Kempny, P. Reimer. Die Gleichheitssätze. Tübingen: Mohr 2012, p. 51 f.: “Eine Ung-
leichbehandlung liegt vor, wenn jemand (der Verpflichtete) ein transitives handlungs-
bezogenes Prädikat in Bezug auf eine bestimmte Person (den Gleichzubehandelnden) ver-
wirklicht und er dasselbe Prädikat nicht zugleich auch in Bezug auf eine andere bestimmte 
Person (die Vergleichsperson) verwirklicht.” This theory may describe the formation of a 
comparison pair correctly, but it does not contain any normative statement as to how the 
particular action-related predicate shall be found. 
102  CRCSCj 08.03.2011, 3-4-1-11-10. Ironically, on the day before this decision, on 
07.03.2011 the Constitutional Review Chamber forwarded a case to the SC en banc because 
the judges of the Constitutional Review Chamber had fundamental disagreements related to 
the interpretation of §12(1) of the Constitution, and considered it necessary to harmonise the 
case law related to the application of the equality principle (CRCSCr 07.03.2011, 3-4-1-12-10, 
para. 58). It would have been preferable either to forward this case too to the SC en banc or to 
postpone the decision until the decision of the SC en banc in the other case. 
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least one year prior to the birth of the child. According to information from the 
local government of Tallinn the objectives of the childbirth allowance were to 
support the families living in Tallinn in the case of a birth of a child to foster 
strong families, to promote births in families with cohabiting parents and to 
ensure that the income tax of both parents flows into the budget of Tallinn. 
Furthermore, the local government explained that the childbirth allowance is paid 
beyond the requirements of the municipal statute in question, even to the child’s 
mother when no father is listed on the birth-certificate, or where the birth 
certificate was issued according to the testimony of the mother and the mother 
resided in Tallinn for at least one year prior to the birth of the child. The 
Chancellor of Justice,103 who initiated the constitutional review proceedings, 
requested a declaration that the municipal statute was unconstitutional because 
the principle of equality had been breached. He argued that, according to the 
regulations, children were treated differently depending on whether only one or 
both parents are residents of Tallinn.  
During the proceedings, a key issue was how the groups for comparison 
should be formed. The Chancellor of Justice argued that the main purpose of the 
childbirth allowance was to support the new-born, and therefore the children born 
in Tallinn with both parents as residents, and those with only one parent resident, 
should be compared. The representatives of the city replied that the parents 
should be the comparison groups, because in this case there would be no problem 
favouring Tallinn residents, since the childbirth allowance is a voluntary 
community-based social service. The Constitutional Review Chamber also dealt 
with the question of how the comparison groups should be formed. It decided that 
“children and their parents who are registered as residents of Tallinn, and children 
and their parents, one of whom is not registered as a resident of Tallinn”, were 
                                                 
103  The monocratic institution of Chancellor of Justice is an exceptional one. Heiki Loot was 
the first to propose a tripartite division of the functions of the Chancellor of Justice (protocol 
of the meeting of the Commission for the Legal Expertise of the Constitution from 14-15 
November 1997, not yet published). The first function of the Chancellor is to exercise 
supervision over the constitutionality and legality of the proceedings of the legislative and 
executive power. To perform this function the Chancellor of Justice has four wide-reaching 
competences. The Chancellor has the right to speak before the Parliament (Riigikogu) and 
during the sessions of the Government (§141(2) PS), to lodge a complaint against any state 
organ, to submit a direction to the Riigikogu to bring forward an Act within 20 days in 
accordance with the Constitution (§142(1) PS) and also to appeal to the SC, if his request was 
not fulfilled (§142(2) PS). The second function is the ombudsman function (PS §139(1) and 
(2) PS). This function includes the right to receive individual complaints, and to analyse and 
make suggestions to improve administrative governance. His third function is that of State 
Prosecutor. (§139(3) PS). The Chancellor of Justice has the right to decide whether to bring a 
question of removal of immunity before the Parliament. According to the Constitution, this 
immunity is granted to members of the Parliament (§76 PS), the President (§85 PS), the 
Ministers (§101 PS), the Auditor General (§138 PS), and to all the judges (§153 PS). In 
addition, the Chancellor of Justice has an immunity, which can be waived in cases where the 
right to decide over his immunity belongs to the Parliament and the President has the right to 
propose removal. 
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the right comparison groups.104 The SC also noted that the constitutionality of 
this requirement had not been contested. Therefore, the SC formed new 
comparison groups, “children who have been registered as residents of Tallinn 
from birth with their parents who are registered as residents of Tallinn 
continuously until the child reaches the age of one, and children with their 
parents, one of whom is not continuously a resident of Tallinn until the child 
reaches the age of one”.105  
By deploying these comparison groups, the SC avoids tackling the question 
posed by the Chancellor of Justice as to whether unequal treatment of children 
with regard to the childbirth allowance can be justified in the light of the principle 
of equality. Furthermore, it is evident that the Chancellor of Justice saw potential 
problems regarding the treatment of children and parents where only one parent 
was a Tallinn resident at the time of the birth. Accordingly, his request included 
an explicit proposal for judicial review of the municipal statute in respect of (a) 
children and parents where both parents were registered as residents of Tallinn, 
and (b) those children and parents where one parent was registered as a resident 
of Tallinn.106 Even if we take the comparison groups formed by the SC as the 
starting point, it would still be necessary to carry out the analysis of the other 
unequal treatment as well. Additionally, the result of the SC’s formation of the 
comparison groups is that there are no longer serious doubts regarding the 
constitutionality of the childbirth allowance rules. If parents are included in the 
group of beneficiaries of the childbirth allowance, it will be difficult to question 
the preferential treatment of the Tallinn residents. However, a tougher question 
remained outside the scope of the decision. If the SC had compared only the two 
groups of children with each other instead, namely children born in Tallinn whose 
parents are both properly registered in Tallinn, and children born in Tallinn whose 
mother, but not father, is properly registered in Tallinn, it would have had 
difficulties finding plausible reasons as to why the latter might be excluded from 
childbirth allowance benefits. According to the rahvastikuregistri seadus 
[Population Register Act],107 a new-born child will be automatically registered at 
the residence of the mother, and it therefore becomes impossible for a child to 
obtain the childbirth allowance in another town. The child simply gets no 
childbirth allowance at all.  
As we have seen, the comparison groups chosen eventually influenced the 
operative part of the judgment decisively. But how can this issue be effectively 
addressed? First, the comparison pairs or groups must always consist of persons, 
but not of situations.108 This is because, the principle of equality being orientated 
                                                 
104  CRCSCj 08.03.2011, 3-4-1-11-10, para. 52. 
105  CRCSCj 08.03.2011, 3-4-1-11-10, para. 53. 
106  Cf. CRCSCj 08.03.2011, 3-4-1-11-10, para. 8 (this part of the decision does not appear in 
the translated version). 
107  RT I 2000, 50, 317 (in Estonian). 
108  Cf. e.g. M. Borowski. Grundrechte als Prinzipien. 2. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007, 
p. 454. 
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towards legal equality and legal equality influencing only the extent of legal 
rights, it is only the extent of these rights that can be subject to equalisation. Given 
that these legal rights are held only by persons, the comparison pairs or groups 
must always consist of persons, not situations. Where only situational comparison 
groups can be identified, legal equalisation cannot occur, but merely a process of 
legal attribution, assessment, and evaluation. A comparison of facts is therefore 
always an indirect comparison of persons, as holders of constitutional rights.109 
Secondly, to find a helpful criterion for the formation of the correct comparison 
groups, the theory of Dieter Schmalz is worthy of consideration. According to 
that, concrete unequal treatment is always essential, which is most likely 
questionable.110 In other words, the comparison groups that indicate a violation 
of the principle of equality are the most likely be to be subjected to scrutiny. Only 
in this way can the right questions, in the context of the principle of equality, be 
asked and interesting answers obtained. 
 
 
7. Special equality rights 
The wording of the second sentence of §12(1) of the Constitution contains an 
open catalogue of discrimination prohibitions, similar to the historic example of 
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter: the ECHR). 
The openness of the catalogue was the main reason why the relationship between 
the first and second sentences was disputed. The prevailing opinion saw the first 
sentence of §12(1) of the Constitution as the guarantee of the general principle of 
equality.111 Consequently, the second sentence of §12(1) of the Constitution was 
treated as a source of special principles of equality.112 The SC case law left room 
for an interpretation, later adopted by the SC, that §12(1) of the Constitution was 
in part a uniform equality principle.113  
Another problem was that the catalogue in the 2nd sentence of §12(1) of the 
Constitution contains, in addition to the classic discrimination prohibitions such 
as sex, several partly overlapping grounds, such as race, skin-colour or origin; 
                                                 
109  S. Huster. Rechte und Ziele. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1993, p. 18 f. in fn. 22. It remains 
an open question whether the people compared must always be entitled to fundamental rights. 
110  D. Schmalz. Grundrechte. 4. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001, recital 569; P. Martini. Art. 
3 Abs. 1 GG als Prinzip absoluter Rechtsgleichheit. Köln et al.: Heymanns, 1997, p. 257. 
111  R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 56; M. Ernits. 
§12. – Ü. Madise et al. (eds.). Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. 3. ed. Tallinn: Juura, 2012, para. 
1.2.1. Also clear statements of the SC: CRCSCj 06.03.2002, 3-4-1-1-02, para. 13; 12.06.2002, 
3-4-1-6-02, para. 10; 30.09.2008, 3-4-1-8-08, paras. 19 f.; SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, 
para. 35. 
112  R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 63 f.; M. Ernits. 
§12. – Ü. Madise et al. (eds.). Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. 3. ed. Tallinn: Juura, 2012, para. 
1.2.2. 
113  CRCSCj 21.06.2005, 3-4-1-9-05, para. 13; 08.03.2011, 3-4-1-11-10, paras. 62, 66, SCebj 
03.01.2008, 3-3-1-101-06, para. 20. 
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and some completely indeterminate grounds, such as financial or social circum-
stances; and also some grounds that can be influenced by the subject of the con-
stitutional right itself, such as language. For that reason alone, it was difficult to 
treat all the discrimination prohibitions uniformly and, similarly, to establish 
constitutional rights that are guaranteed, without any statutory reservation. The 
SC has only once mentioned discrimination based on sex, without elaborating the 
structure of the particular discrimination prohibition.114  
In its judgment of 7 June 2011, the SC en banc cut the seemingly Gordian 
knot and re-ordered the doctrine of the special principles of equality. It dismissed 
the then prevailing interpretation of the 2nd sentence of §12(1) of the Constitution 
and reformulated §12(1) of the Constitution as a uniform equality principle. The 
SC created a new criterion for scrutinising unequal treatment:  
“The list of prohibitions against discrimination of the fundamental right comprised 
in §12(1) of the Constitution is not exhaustive and is therefore an example. That 
the list is an example is also indicated by the fact that the characteristics in the list 
are of different levels of importance. In addition to the characteristics irrespective 
of the people’s intentions, the list in the second sentence also includes language, 
which can usually be learned, and religion and opinions, which can be changed to 
some extent. If unequal treatment is based on the characteristics irrespective of the 
people’s intentions (e.g. race, age, disability, genetic characteristics, and also 
native language), better reasons must generally be found as justification.”115 
According to the new doctrine, one must ask whether the differentia specifica is 
dependent on the will of the person: if the differentia specifica is dependent on 
the will, then the requirements for justification of the particular unequal treatment 
will be lower; whereas if there is no dependence on the will, then the requirements 
will be higher. The question that interests us at this point is whether, after this 
judgment, there are any special equality rights that differ from the general right. 
According to the wording of the relevant provisions there are several specific 
equality rights in the Constitution beyond the 2nd sentence of the above-
mentioned §12(1). Specifically, §9(1) requires the equal application of 
everyone’s constitutional rights to both citizens and non-citizens; §27(2) declares 
spouses to be equal; §30(1) provides a right to equal opportunities when citizens 
apply for positions in government agencies and local authorities; §32(1) contains 
a property-related specific equality right; §60(1) lays down the principles of 
generality and uniformity for parliamentary elections; and §156(1) provides for 
the same electoral principles at local level. These requirements of equal treatment 
differ from the prohibitions of discrimination in the 2nd sentence of §12(1), in 
the sense that they are grounds of discrimination that are not generally prohibited, 
but are instead prohibited in particular circumstances. The theory of will 
dependence cannot, therefore, be applied simply to these more specific 
guarantees.  
                                                 
114  SCebj 20.11.2009, 3-3-1-41-09, paras. 21, 42, 51. 
115  SCebj 07.06.2011, 3-4-1-12-10, para. 32. 
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The subject matter of the judgment of the Constitutional Review Chamber on 
1st September 2005 concerned the constitutionality of internet voting in the then 
imminent municipal elections. The SC reviewed, among other alleged violations, 
the violation of electoral equality, describing it as a special case in relation to the 
general principle of equality:116 
“The principle of uniform elections, being one of the pillars of democratic 
statehood, means that all voters must have equal possibilities to influence the 
voting results. In the context of active right to vote the principle of uniformity 
primarily means that all persons with the right to vote must have an equal number 
of votes and that all votes must have equal weight upon deciding the division of 
seats in a representative body.”117 
The Court found unequal treatment in the different methods of voting. Although 
electoral equality has no statutory reservation, the SC did not consider the legiti-
macy of the infringing purposes, but held that the aim was to increase partici-
pation in elections and to introduce new technological solutions for legitimate 
purposes.118 The SC then decided the case by weighing the intensity of the 
infringement, on the one hand, against the importance of the aims pursued, on the 
other.119 Thus, it is important that the SC did not require a constitutional principle 
for the justification of an infringement of electoral equality, which is guaranteed 
without any statutory reservation, but held that any purpose is legitimate provided 
that it is in accordance with the Constitution.  
The doctrine of the special equality principles, as developed by the SC, can be 
summarised as follows. The SC considers, in principle, that there are no stand-
alone special equality rights; and that the specific guarantees cover only sub-
segments of the general principle of equality. The SC clearly expressed this when 
it described electoral equality as a special case of the general principle of equality. 
There are no specific requirements as to the legitimacy of the infringement 
purposes; and the catalogue of valid justification grounds encompasses all 
legitimate objectives that may be pursued by the legislature. In the case of a 
prohibition of discrimination, the requirements for the justification are lower 
where the unequal treatment ground is dependent on the will of the person, and 
higher where this is not the case. 
 
 
  
                                                 
116  CRCSCj 01.09.2005, 3-4-1-13-05, para. 21. 
117  CRCSCj 01.09.2005, 3-4-1-13-05, para. 16. 
118  CRCSCj 01.09.2005, 3-4-1-13-05, para. 32. 
119  CRCSCj 01.09.2005, 3-4-1-13-05, para. 23. The SC concluded that Internet voting was 
constitutional. It did not, however, address the really interesting issues as to whether the 
freedom and the secrecy of voting are sufficiently protected from the risk of manipulation and 
being compromised. 
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8. Original and ancillary equality application 
In 2002, the SC indicated that it will not apply the equality principle if the 
contested measure violates a freedom right, because the application of the 
relevant freedom right will prevail.120 This subsidiarity doctrine lays down a 
necessary precondition for the ancillary application of equality rights in cases 
dealing with freedom rights. Since the equality principle is not to be applied 
separately, but cannot be ignored either, it must be considered by the application 
of the principle of proportionality, while still making sure of the constitutionality 
of the infringement of the freedom right.  
By 2003, the SC en banc had combined the application of the equality right 
with a constitutional procedural guarantee of lex mitior (§23(2) (2nd sentence) of 
the Constitution).121 Subsequently, it applied the combination of the equality 
principle with other constitutional rights in a number of cases.122 As a result, two 
different manifestations of the equality principle can be observed in the case law 
of the SC. First, the principle of equality functions as an autonomous consti-
tutional right;123 secondly, it is applied in conjunction with other constitutional 
rights, or even in the context of application of other constitutional rights.124 The 
first alternative can be called the original, and the second the ancillary, equality 
application, since in the latter case the equality right fulfils only an ancillary 
function relative to the other constitutional right.  
The ancillary application may occur, for example, if the SC applies the 
equality principle in conjunction with a fundamental social right in the context of 
a self-executing constitution-based claim from a complainant in proceedings 
against the State.125 It may also be that the SC applies a (criminal) procedural 
constitutional right in conjunction with the principle of equality, and considers 
                                                 
120  CRCSCj 06.03.2002, 3-4-1-1-02, para. 18; repeated in CRCSCj 12.06.2002, 3-4-1-6-02, 
para. 15. 
121  §23(2) second sentence PS: “If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, the law 
makes provision for a lighter penalty, the lighter penalty applies.” Cf. SCebj 17.03.2003,  
3-1-3-10-02, Resolution para. 1, Reasons paras. 19–34. 
122  Esp. CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, paras. 25, 40. E.g. to the application of the equality 
principle within the framework of proportionality SCebr 28.04.2004, 3-3-1-69-03, paras. 28 
ff.; SCebj 02.06.2008, 3-4-1-19-07, paras. 24 ff.; CRCSCj 16.01.2007, 3-4-1-9-06, para. 32. 
123  E.g. CRCSCj 30.09.2008, 3-4-1-8-08, paras. 19 ff.; SCebj 7.06.2011, 3-4-1-12-10, paras. 
27 ff. 
124  SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, paras. 19–34; 02.06.2008, 3-4-1-19-07, paras. 21, 23 ff.; 
09.12.2013, 3-4-1-2-13, paras. 114, 163; 26.06.2014, 3-4-1-1-14, paras. 106–109, 113–115, 
117 ff.; SCebr 28.04.2004, 3-3-1-69-03, paras. 27 ff.; CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, paras. 
14 ff. Unfortunately the SC does not follow the subsidiarity doctrine in the latest en banc 
decision which deals with pensions of judges. On the justification level, the SC puts emphasis 
on the principle of equality instead of guarantee of property, which might have delivered 
weightier arguments in proper application (SCebj 26.06.2014, 3-4-1-1-14, paras. 117–127). 
125  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, paras. 25, 40. 
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the equality arguments in the context of proportionality in the narrow sense.126 
Finally, the principle of equality itself may be considered as an additional 
argument in relation to proportionality in the narrow sense.127 When this is put 
together with the principle of subsidiarity in the equality test, expressed earlier in 
respect of the examination of freedom rights,128 the idea becomes apparent that 
equality arguments will always be taken into account in relation to the proportio-
nality test. Since every infringement – i.e. every adverse influence upon the 
particular right – needs justification and the proportionality test is the core of 
substantial justification, the equality principle must always be taken into account 
if there is an infringement and there is no room left for a separate equality test, 
going beyond that as to proportionality.  
However, where circumstances are reversed, i.e. if the right holder seeks to 
obtain something from the state or any other addressee of the right, the structure 
of this right seems to be fundamentally different from that of civil and political 
rights. In this case, there seems to be no room for the proportionality test, but 
there is enough for the original equality test instead. This suggests that the 
original equality application becomes relevant only in cases where the right is 
directed at positive State action or an entitlement. On the other hand, one can 
even argue that equality is oriented to the ancillary application in infringement 
circumstances because of its subsidiary nature. 
 
 
  
                                                 
126  SCebr 28.04.2004, 3-3-1-69-03, paras. 28 ff.; SCebj 02.06.2008, 3-4-1-19-07, paras. 24 ff. 
127  E.g. in CRCSCj 16.01.2007, 3-4-1-9-06, para. 32, the SC ruled that the principle of 
equality should have been taken into account in circumstances where a local authority refused 
to initiate proceedings for preparation of a construction development plan: “As the 
administrative act issued upon refusal to initiate the preparation of a detailed plan is one issued 
on the basis of discretion, a local authority must, when deciding on the initiation of the 
preparation and adoption of a detailed plan, on a case-by-case basis, consider the influence of 
its decision – taken in the public interest – on other persons’ fundamental rights and interests, 
whether the infringements of the related rights are proportional and whether a decision meets 
the requirements of equal treatment.” Cf. also SCebj 13.11.2012, 3-1-1-45-12, para. 29; 
09.12.2013, 3-4-1-2-13, para. 114. 
128  CRCSCj 06.03.2002, 3-4-1-1-02, para. 18; 12.06.2002, 3-4-1-6-02, para. 15. 
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9. Different intensities of judicial review 
By April 2002, the criterion of reasonable cause was defined by the SC, that being 
the standard justification of unequal treatment.129 In 2004, the SC stated that 
unequal treatment is arbitrary when it is manifestly inappropriate, thus defining 
the criterion for arbitrariness.130 In 2008, the SC made clear that, to ascertain 
whether unequal treatment is reasonable, i.e. proportional in the narrow sense, it 
is necessary to weigh the objective of unequal treatment against the gravity of the 
unequal situation that has been created.131 Finally, in 2011, the SC prescribed that 
the justification of any given unequal treatment shall be reviewed in the light of 
the principle of proportionality, rather than in that of the reasonable cause 
criterion:  
“The result of the verification of the arbitrariness, i.e. relevant and reasonable 
justification, and the proportionality, i.e. the appropriateness, necessity and 
reasonableness to achieve the legitimate objective, is the same in terms of 
constitutionality. Consequently, in the interests of the uniform application of the 
verification scheme for fundamental rights, a verification of proportionality 
corresponding to §11 of the Constitution shall be conducted […].”132  
The question arises as to whether this case law of the SC has to be considered as 
inconsistent, or whether it is possible to find a uniting systemic element that 
allows for combinations of these elements, even the SC itself observes that it has, 
in 2011, replaced the arbitrariness and reasonableness criteria with the proportio-
nality test, in the interests of uniform application of the control scheme. Taking a 
closer look, it seems that the SC has rather used three different equality tests, 
corresponding to three different test intensities: the test of arbitrariness, the test 
of reasonableness, and the full proportionality test. These three intensities of 
judicial review correspond to different scopes of the assessment prerogative of 
the legislature: the stricter the judicial review, the narrower the assessment 
prerogative; and the looser the judicial review, the wider the assessment 
prerogative of the legislature.  
There are three arguments for this attempted systematisation. To begin with, 
the uniform application of the control scheme of constitutional rights cannot be a 
suitable argument for abolishing different test intensities that depend on different 
levels of assessment prerogative for the legislature in relation to differing subject 
matters. There are substantial reasons for different test intensities, e.g. criminal 
                                                 
129  CRCSCj 03.04.2002, 3-4-1-2-02, para. 17. 
130  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 37. 
131  CRCSCj 30.09.2008, 3-4-1-8-08, paras. 24, 32. 
132  SCebj 07.06.2011, 3-4-1-12-10, para. 35. 
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sanctions on the one hand133 and electoral rights on the other.134 The criteria of 
arbitrariness, reasonableness, and proportionality are structurally different and 
fulfil different functions. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether there is anything 
like a uniform control scheme for all constitutional rights, as the SC assumed.135 
Finally, the control scheme is a result of an analysis of particular constitutional 
rights and not a purpose in itself. Therefore, the assumption arises that three 
different test intensities continue to exist and that the SC chose an unfortunate 
formulation in 2011.  
First, as we have seen, the SC applied the arbitrariness test in its social law 
judgment of 21 January 2004.136 In the passages quoted above, the SC recognised 
the broad discretion of the legislature in organising social benefit schemes and 
held that unequal treatment is arbitrary if it is manifestly inappropriate.137 
Consequently, in cases applying the arbitrariness test, the justification of unequal 
treatment presupposes that the unequal treatment is not manifestly or evidently 
inappropriate.  
In the majority of equality cases, the SC focuses on the reasonableness138 (and 
the appropriateness)139 of the cause. The cause is reasonable if it is proportional 
in the narrow sense.140 It is not about the evidence, but about balancing. Proportio-
nality, in the narrow sense, is the third stage of the proportionality test and can 
therefore also be described as the balancing test.  
                                                 
133  Cf. CRCSCj 25.11.2003, 3-4-1-9-03, para. 21: “The Constitutional Review Chamber 
points out that the legislator has wide discretion in determining a punishment corresponding 
to necessary elements of an offence. Terms and rates of punishments are based on value 
judgments accepted by society, which the legislator is competent to express. Also, in this way 
Parliament can form the penal policy of the state and influence criminal behaviour.” 
134  Cf. SCebj 01.07.2010, 3-4-1-33-09, para. 67: “Democracy is one of the most important 
principles of organisation of the Estonian state. [...] In the opinion of the Supreme Court en 
banc, the right to vote and the right to stand as a candidate, the freedom of activity of political 
parties, and the freedom of political expression [are] fundamental rights without which 
democracy would be impossible [...].” 
135  See, for different schemes, M. Ernits. II peatüki sissejuhatus [Introduction to Chapter II]. – 
Ü. Madise et al. (eds.). Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. 3. ed. Tallinn: Juura, 2012, para. 10. 
136  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03. 
137  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 37. 
138  CRCSCj 30.09.1998, 3-4-1-6-98, para. II; 20.06.2000, 3-3-1-30-00, para. 3; SCebj 
17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02, para. 36; 10.12.2003, 3-3-1-47-03, para. 27; 20.11.2009, 3-3-1-41-09, 
para. 51. 
139  CRCSCj 03.04.2002, 3-4-1-2-02, para. 17; 02.05.2005, 3-4-1-3-05, para. 20; 20.03.2006, 
3-4-1-33-05, para. 26; 26.09.2007, 3-4-1-12-07, para. 19; 01.10.2007, 3-4-1-14-07, para. 13; 
30.09.2008, 3-4-1-8-08, paras. 27, 32; SCebj 14.11.2002, 3-1-1-77-02, para. 22; 27.06.2005, 
3-4-1-2-05, para. 39; 03.01.2008, 3-3-1-101-06, para. 20. 
140  CRCSCj 30.09.2008, 3-4-1-8-08, para. 32. 
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Finally, the SC introduced the full proportionality test and assessed suitability, 
necessity and proportionality in the narrow sense.141 This can also be described 
as a full examination of the merits.  
One slight problem is that the SC has not been particularly clear so far as 
regards the intensity of the test. For example, it has deployed the test of 
reasonableness, for the test of arbitrariness.142 Moreover, it has also used, at least 
partly, the terminology of the reasonable cause in an arbitrariness test143 and, 
additionally, in a full proportionality test.144 In some cases the choice of criteria 
is difficult to comprehend. The SC merely applied the reasonableness test in a 
sex discrimination case,145 whilst, in an electoral equality case, it left the criterion 
open but also asked for a reasonable cause to justify the infringement.146 In both 
cases, the more stringent criterion of the full proportionality test would have been 
appropriate.  
However, one has to agree in principle with the essence of the case law of the 
SC that different unequal treatments have to be justified differently and that we 
can broadly distinguish three different test intensities. Clearly, there is an inverse 
relationship between the scope of legislative discretion and the intensity of 
scrutiny of the SC. The more intensely the SC scrutinises, the smaller the scope of 
legislative discretion, and vice versa. This also applies to the justification of 
unequal treatments. When it comes to unequal treatment with a potentially 
significant influence on the State budget, the legislature must be granted a wider 
assessment prerogative. In comparison, it is also true that, in the case of unequal 
treatment on grounds that are independent of the will of the person, the full 
proportional- ity test is appropriate. But in most cases the reasonable – i.e. pro-
portionate – cause, in its narrow sense, must be sufficient to justify the unequal 
treatment. 
                                                 
141  SCebj 07.06.2011, 3-4-1-12-10, paras. 35, 43 ff.; 03.07.2012, 3-1-1-18-12, paras. 43 ff.; 
CRCSCj 27.12.2011, 3-4-1-23-11, paras. 61 ff.; 14.05.2013, 3-4-1-7-13, paras. 44 ff. The SC 
had applied the criterion of proportionality in the context of the equality principle once 
already, in 2001: CRCSCj 22.02.2001, 3-4-1-4-01, para. 16: “The Supreme Court finds no 
violation of §12(1) of the Constitution. In the present case the regulatory framework of the 
law does not proceed from the characteristics of an individual but from the peculiarities of 
administrative offences. The procedure can not be the same for all administrative offences. 
Violation of parking arrangements is a specific offence, the proceedings in matters concerning 
such offences are effected under simplified procedure. Bearing in mind the specific character 
and large number of the offences such simplified procedure is both reasonable and 
proportional.” 
142  CRCSCj 03.04.2002, 3-4-1-2-02, para. 17; 20.03.2006, 3-4-1-33-05, para. 26; SCebj 
14.11.2002, 3-1-1-77-02, para. 22; 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05, para. 39. 
143  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, paras. 37, 40. 
144  SCebj 03.07.2012, 3-1-1-18-12, paras. 43 ff., 50. 
145  SCebj 20.11.2009, 3-3-1-41-09, para. 51. 
146  Cf. CRCSCj 01.09.2005, 3-4-1-13-05, paras. 21 ff. 
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10. Coherence 
The idea of the coherence or logic or justice of the system (Systemgerechtigkeit) 
is both criticised147 and advocated148 in the German academic debate.149 The 
German scholar Hasso Hoffmann includes coherence, together with the principles 
of proportionality, legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations, as an 
element of the rule of law.150 All these components arise from differentiation and 
concretisation of constitutional rights, the separation and balance of powers, the 
principle of legality and the guarantee of judicial protection. Furthermore, it has 
even been applied by the European Court of Justice151 and also applies to Estonian 
constitutional doctrine. Thus, coherence is a legal principle derived from the 
principle of equality.  
But what does coherence mean? Substantially, it helps the general principle 
of equality to bind the legislature to its self-created structures.152 Thereafter, the 
legislature has a lot of leeway in the creation and design of laws. But, if the 
legislature creates a system of rules, the logic of its work provides a framework 
                                                 
147  See U. Battis. Systemgerechtigkeit. – R. Stödter, W. Thieme (eds.). Hamburg, Deutschland, 
Europa. Tübingen: Mohr, 1977, p. 11 ff.; C. Gusy. Der Gleichheitssatz. – Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1988, p. 2508; W. Heun. – H. Dreier (ed.). Grundgesetz-Kommentar. Vol. 1, 3. 
ed. Tübingen: Mohr, 2013, Art. 3 recital 37; U. Kischel. Systembindung des Gesetzgebers und 
Gleichheitssatz. – Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 124 (1999), p. 174 ff., 197 ff.; P. Martini. Art. 
3 Abs. 1 GG als Prinzip absoluter Rechtsgleichheit. Köln et al.: Heymanns, 1997, p. 288 ff., 296; 
F.-J. Peine. Systemgerechtigkeit. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1985, p. 211 ff., 230 ff., 255 ff. 
148  See B.-O. Bryde, R. Kleindiek. Der allgemeine Gleichheitssatz. – Jura 1999, p. 41; 
C. Degenhart. Systemgerechtigkeit und Selbstbindung des Gesetzgebers als Verfassungs-
postulat. München: C. H. Beck, 1976, p. 49 ff., 79 ff.; P. Kirchhof. Allgemeiner Gleichheits-
satz. – J. Isensee, P. Kirchhof (eds.). Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land. Vol. VIII, 3. ed. Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 2010, § 181 recital 209 ff.; L. Osterloh. – 
M. Sachs (ed.). Grundgesetz. 6. ed. München: C. H. Beck, 2011, Art. 3 recital 98; J. Pietzcker. 
Der allgemeine Gleichheitssatz. – D. Merten, H.-J. Papier (eds.). Handbuch der Grundrechte. 
Vol. V. Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 2013, § 125 recital 23 ff.; F. Schoch. Der Gleichheitssatz. – 
Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1988, p. 878 f.; C. Starck. – H. von Mangoldt, F. Klein, C. Starck 
(eds.). Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Vol. 1, 6. ed. München: C. H. Beck, 2010, Art. 3(1) 
recital 44 ff. 
149  For the German debate, with further references, see M. Sachs. Der allgemeine Gleich-
heitssatz. – K. Stern, Staatsrecht. Vol. IV/2. München: C. H. Beck, 2011, p. 1527 ff. 
150  H. Hoffmann. Verfassungsrechtliche Perspektiven. Tübingen: Mohr, 1995, p. 239. The 
latter two elements of this list recall the early equality case law of the Estonian SC, where the 
Court used the arguments of legal certainty and legitimate expectations next to the principle 
of equality. 
151  ECJ 29.03.1979, Case C-113/77, NTN Toyo Bearing Company et al. v. Council, para. 21: 
“The Council, having adopted a general regulation with a view to implementing one of the 
objectives laid down in Article 113 of the Treaty, cannot derogate from the rules thus laid 
down in applying those rules to specific cases without interfering with the legislative system 
of the Community and destroying the equality before the law of those to whom that law 
applies.” 
152  B.-O. Bryde, R. Kleindiek. Der allgemeine Gleichheitssatz. – Jura 1999, p. 41. 
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of analysis that imposes stricter requirements for justification of regulations that 
appear as exceptions, or at least do not correspond to the system of rules set down 
by the legislature.153 But the truly interesting question here is the formal meaning 
of coherence. It has been characterised154 as a burden of proof,155 burden of 
argumentation,156 a question of control intensity,157 and as a maxim of inter-
pretation.158 Coherence cannot be a question of the burden of proof, because the 
justification of unequal treatment is not a question about the facts of the case, but 
about legal value assessments. Josef Franz Lindner discusses coherence as a 
maxim of interpretation and deduces from it three aspects: the principle of con-
sistency, the principle of consequence, and the principle of compensation.159 
However, coherence concerns the question of justification of unequal treatment: 
either the test of arbitrariness, the test of reasonableness, or the full proportio-
nality test. All these tests concern weighing or balancing, but not interpreting, a 
law. Nevertheless, all three requirements seem to have a connection with coherence 
and they should be considered as deriving from the principle of equality itself; the 
burden of argumentation and question of control intensity remain. Coherence 
seems to constitute an argumentation burden in favour of equal treatment. This does 
not mean that the legislature is banned from developing, adjusting, modifying or 
abandoning any existing regulatory complex. However, every development, 
modulation, modification, abandonment etc. of existing regulatory complexes is 
more complicated, because the legislature is obliged to provide weightier reasons 
for a statutory novelty or breakthrough.160 In this sense, the coherence 
requirement intensifies the control of the equality right and influences the control 
of intensity. Thus, coherence constitutes a maxim of interpretation within the 
scope of the protection of the equality principle. On the level of justification of 
unequal treatment, it constitutes a burden of argumentation and thus imposes a 
further check upon the equality principle.  
The application of this principle can already be seen in the 1998 case analysed 
above, in which the SC, examining a restriction on compensation available in 
respect of property unlawfully expropriated in Soviet times and subsequently 
destroyed, declared the principle of equality to be the minimum criterion that had 
to be upheld; and deduced from it a general rule that all entitled subjects, regard-
less of the character of the expropriated property and its condition, must be treated 
                                                 
153  Ibid. 
154  See, for further opportunities of its characterisation, U. Kischel. Systembindung des 
Gesetzgebers und Gleichheitssatz. – Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 124 (1999), p. 193. 
155  C. Degenhart. Systemgerechtigkeit und Selbstbindung des Gesetzgebers als Verfassungs-
postulat. München: C. H. Beck, 1976, p. 22 ff. 
156  F. Schoch. Der Gleichheitssatz. – Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1988, p. 878 f. 
157  R. Wendt. Der Gleichheitssatz. – Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1988, p. 786. 
158  J. F. Lindner. Theorie der Grundrechtsdogmatik. Tübingen: Mohr, 2005, p. 157 f. 
159  Ibid. 
160  F. Schoch. Der Gleichheitssatz. – Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1988, p. 878 f. 
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equally.161 Perhaps the most important decision on the principle of coherence is 
the social law judgment of 21 January 2004, where the SC underlines: “A state, 
having created social security systems and provided for social assistance, must 
also ensure the observance of the fundamental right to equality, expressed in 
§12(1) of the Constitution.”162 Although the SC does not deal more 
comprehensively with the principle of coherence in this judgement, the key 
question for the judgment was whether a deviation from the system would be 
permissible. The decision is also particularly noteworthy because the SC found 
that the principle of equality was violated because of a lack of coherence, even 
though the lowest intensity test for social matters was applied.163  
The SC formulates the idea of coherence more clearly in a judgment on the 
parental benefit scheme. In this case the employer had paid the complainant part 
of his salary more than a year late. The Social Insurance Agency re-determined 
the parental benefit and, instead of taking the salary into account in the applicant’s 
favour, considered it to her disadvantage as supplementary income exceeding the 
permissible upper limit, and therefore reclaimed a part of the previously paid 
parental benefit. The SC held this to be a violation of the principle of equality and 
declared the parental benefit scheme invalid to this extent. The SC stated, inter 
alia:  
“The parental benefit is a benefit dispensed by the state to persons. The 
Constitutional Review Chamber is of the opinion that, upon giving and restricting 
the right to receive the parental benefit the state as a whole, including the 
legislator, must observe the principle of equal treatment. […] Bearing in mind that 
the unequal treatment of [name of the complainant], as compared with those 
parents who received their wages in a timely manner, may result in an unfair 
outcome, the complexity of administration, asserted by the state by way of 
justification, does not outweigh the infringement of the fundamental right to 
equality.”164 
The idea of coherence also influences the decision if the SC finds that a particular 
action (tax differentiation of subsidised and non-subsidised operators) does not 
achieve its purpose (promotion of culturally highly valuable, as opposed to 
culturally low value, concerts and performances) and therefore “the norm was not 
appropriate in the light of its actual effect”.165 Elsewhere, the SC found the 
calculation of the pension-relevant period of employment ‘by way of exception 
from the general rule’ to be unconstitutional.166 Finally, the SC criticised the 
                                                 
161  CRCSCj 30.09.1998, 3-4-1-6-98, para. III. 
162  CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, para. 17. The Court summarises in the facts of the case 
also the arguments of the Chancellor of Justice, who had substantiated his application, also, 
with that principle (para. 7). 
163  Cf. CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03, paras. 17, 37, 40. 
164  CRCSCj 20.03.2006, 3-4-1-33-05, paras. 25, 30. 
165  CRCSCj 26.09.2007, 3-4-1-12-07, para. 21. 
166  CRCSCj 30.09.2008, 3-4-1-8-08, para. 34. 
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financing model of local governments as follows: ‘For instance, according to the 
purpose of §28 of the Constitution, a situation in which the principal social rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution and for which the local authority is responsible, 
vary substantially in different regions of the state due to differences in the 
economic capacity of those local authorities, is unacceptable.’167 As a 
consequence of this finding, the legislature is required to establish a framework 
that guarantees by and large similar social benefits in all municipalities. This can 
only be justified assuming the constitutional requirement of coherence. 
 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
The general principle of equality is one of five general constitutional rights in 
Estonian constitutional rights catalogue.168 Coming from an equality-oriented 
society the courts had some difficulties at first with the application of the principle 
of equality. In the past 15 years, however, the SC has made a moderate number 
of decisions, which have already covered the whole spectrum of the equality 
doctrine.  
The overall picture presented by the equality doctrine and principle is positive. 
Although the principle of equality hides expansive potential within it, the SC has 
practised a moderate level of self-restraint in its judgments. Notably, the doctrinal 
interest of the SC should be highlighted, which has clearly manifested itself in the 
equality case law. Both the original and the new doctrines are functioning tools 
used in practice to solve equality cases coherently, consistently, and adequately 
to justify solutions. Although the new doctrine is not entirely complete, the 
remaining problems are rather minor in nature and can easily be dealt with in 
subsequent practice. However, it is vital that the new doctrine does not dismantle 
doctrinal foundations and hence derogate from key achievements of the former 
equality doctrine. The consistent application of the scheme of infringement and 
justification is noteworthy, in terms of the wide scope of protection, the ancillary 
application of the principle of equality in the context of other rights, the 
identification of various test intensities and the tendency towards coherence. The 
scheme of infringement and justification, and the wide scope of protection, 
guarantee the broadest possible legal equality, whilst restrictions upon that 
equality are transparent. The ancillary application of the principle of equality, in 
the context of other rights, helps equality arguments to have an even broader 
relevance. Different test intensities are evidence of the precise application of 
equality across the entire legal system.  
According to the argument advanced here, the principle of equality is a 
requirement for the equal implementation of (constitutional) law. One has a 
subjective right to equal treatment under the law as far as the Constitution 
                                                 
167  SCebj 16.03.2010, 3-4-1-8-09, para. 67. 
168  Cf. R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses. – Juridica eriväljaanne 2001, p. 49 ff., 
56 ff., 68 ff., 73 f., 76 f. 
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reaches, no matter which of the three branches of government, as defined in the 
separation and balance of powers doctrine, is concerned. This is complemented 
by the ancillary application and coherence requirements. This latter requirement 
ultimately imposes on the legislators a self-binding, more far-reaching, obligation 
of systemic justification and thus narrows the area of arbitrariness in democratic 
constitutionalism.  
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Kokkuvõte 
Põhiseadus kui süsteem 
Antiigist valgustusajani oli valdav empiiriline põhiseaduse mõiste. Empiirilise 
mõiste kohaselt on põhiseadus viis, kuidas võimu teostatakse. Alates valgustus-
ajast sai valitsevaks normatiivne põhiseaduse mõiste. 
Normatiivses tähenduses põhiseadust saab määratleda mitmel erineval viisil. 
Lihtsaim viis on kirjeldada valdava enamuse kehtivate põhiseaduste tuuma. 
Kõige abstraktsema kirjeldava määratluse kohaselt on põhiseadus riigi norma-
tiivne põhikord. 
Eelistatavam viis põhiseadust määratleda on analüütiline. Formaalses ana-
lüütilises mõttes on põhiseadusel kaks peamist tunnust: ülim kehtivusjõud ja 
raskendatud muudetavus. Tegemist on positivistliku määratlusega. Materiaalses 
analüütilises mõttes on põhiseadusel vajalik seos inimõigustega ning mõiste 
koosneb järgnevatest määratlevatest tunnustest: võimude lahusus ja tasakaalus-
tatus, kohtu sõltumatus, halduse seaduslikkus, põhiõigused, demokraatia ja põhi-
seaduslikkuse järelevalve. See on põhiseaduse mittepositivistlik määratlus. 
Mõnel juhul ei pruugi riigil olla põhiseadust materiaalses tähenduses, vaid 
ainult formaalses ja/või kirjeldavas tähenduses. Järeldus, et riigil puudub põhi-
seadus materiaalses tähenduses, osutab sellele, et konkreetses õigussüsteemis 
esineb inimõiguste rakendamisega probleeme. 
Õigussüsteemi vaatleme osaleja perspektiivist. Reeglite süsteemina nõuab 
õigussüsteem tingimata konsistentsi, st vastuolude kõrvaldamist. Kuna õigus-
süsteem sisaldab ka põhimõtteid, siis nõuab see tingimata ka koherentsi, st head 
tasakaalu süsteemi kõigi printsiipide vahel. Menetluste süsteem määrab kindlaks 
printsiipide ja reeglite kohaldamise viisid. Kokkuvõttes eksisteerib õigussüsteem 
siis, kus on olemas kõik kolm elementi – õiguslikud printsiibid, reeglid ja menet-
lused – ning nõutakse nii konsistentsi kui ka koherentsi. 
Põhiseadus on normide ja menetluste süsteem, kus on olulisel kohal printsiibid, 
mis võivad kollideeruda ja nõuavad seetõttu adekvaatset proportsionaalsuse 
teooriat. Põhiseaduslikule süsteemile on omased konsistentsi ja koherentsi 
nõuded. Viimane eeldab eelkõige seose loomist normide vahel ja argumentat-
siooni ammendavust. 
Praktikas ei tohiks ükski põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalve kohus lakata taotle-
mast põhiseaduse süsteemsust. Seda tehes ei pruugi probleemid piirduda üksnes 
printsiipidevaheliste seostega, vaid probleemiks võib kujuneda koguni reeglite-
vaheliste vastuolude vältimine. Lõpuks võib põhiseaduslik süsteem lakata täie-
likult eksisteerimast. Kui seadusandja ei ole täitnud oma positiivseid kohustusi 
ning jõustatud normide kogum sisaldab olulisi lünki või ei täida oma eesmärki, 
on õiguslik regulatsioon ebasüsteemsuse tõttu põhiseadusega vastuolus. Kui 
põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalve kohus seda sallib, rikub ta ise põhiseadust, jättes 
tähelepanuta koherentsi nõude. Kui õigusteadlane sellisele praktikale vastu ei 
seisa, siis kaob koos põhiseadusliku süsteemi kadumisega ka riigiõigusteadus. 
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Sellisel juhul oleks põhiseadusliku süsteemi asemel tegemist põhiseadusliku rap-
soodiaga Immanuel Kanti mõistes. 
Sissejuhatavale osale järgnevate, varem artiklitena avaldatud või avaldamiseks 
vastu võetud peatükkide eesmärk on kinnitada ideed, et põhiseadus on süsteem, 
ning näidata süsteemse käsitluse eeliseid. Iga uus konstruktiivselt kriitiline käsit-
lus võib tuua päevavalgele põhiseadusliku süsteemi mõne uue väärtusliku seose 
ja aidata laiendada kasutatavate argumentide ringi. Esimeses peatükis kaitseb autor 
põhiseaduse süsteemsuse keskseid teoreetilisi aluseid. Järgnevates peatükkides 
demonstreerib autor, et idee põhiseadusest kui süsteemist võimaldab saavutada 
põhiseadusõiguse konsistentsemat ja koherentsemat õpetust ning seeläbi 
paremaid õiguslikke lahendusi praktilistele põhiseaduslikele juhtumitele. 
Esimene peatükk käsitleb printsiibiteooriat. Printsiibiteooria on teooria printsii-
pide ja reeglite erinevast loogilisest struktuurist ning nende erinevatest rakendamis-
õpetusest, iseäranis kollideeruvate printsiipide kaalumisest. Eesti Riigikohus 
hakkas printsiibiteooriat rakendama ja kollideeruvaid põhiseaduse printsiipe 
kaaluma 1997. aastal. Selle kohtupraktika lähtekohaks ja aluseks oli 1997. aastal 
valminud, kuid alles 2001. aastal avaldatud Robert Alexy süstemaatiline mono-
graafia põhiõigustest Eesti põhiseaduses. Esimeses peatükis käsitletakse kuut 
peamist argumenti, mida on esitanud Eesti kriitikud printsiibiteooria jätkuva 
kohaldamise ja eriti põhiseaduslike printsiipide kaalumise vastu Riigikohtus. 
Esiteks eksisteerib kriitikute sõnul põhiseadus ainult raamkorrana, mitte 
materiaalse põhikorrana, ning põhiseaduse käsitlemine väärtuste süsteemina toob 
endaga kaasa ülekonstitutsionaliseerimise. Teiseks on reeglite ja printsiipide 
eristamine kriitikute sõnul ebaadekvaatne, kolmandaks toob printsiibiteooria 
rakendamine endaga kaasa lahkumise põhiseaduse teksti pinnalt ning neljandaks 
viib proportsionaalsuse põhimõtte kohaldamine põhiseaduse toime peatamiseni. 
Viiendaks on proportsionaalsuse põhimõte kriitikute arvates puhtalt formaalne 
suunis, mistõttu võrdub kollideeruvate printsiipide kaalumise nõue lihtsalt 
nõudega igal juhul eraldi otsustada, kui kaugele ulatub ühe või teise normi 
kehtivusala. Lõpuks väidavad nad, et kuna ei ole olemas universaalset „siniste 
esemete teooriat”, siis ei ole olemas ka põhiõiguste universaalset teooriat. Enamik 
neist argumentidest leiab kajastamist ka rahvusvahelises diskursuses 
printsiibiteooria üle. 
Esimene peatükk kinnitab, et printsiipide ja reeglite eristamine pakub põhi-
seaduslikkuse järelevalvele toimivat põhimudelit. Printsiibiteooriast lähtudes 
tuleb põhiseaduspärasuse materiaalne tuum selgitada enamasti välja proportsio-
naalsuse põhimõtte abil ning põhiseaduslike juhtumite lahendamise keskne 
meetod on kaalumine. Eesti kriitikute esitatud kuus peamist argumenti ei suuda 
kummutada printsiibiteooriat. Esiteks ei ole põhiseadus üksnes raamkord ning 
samuti ei too põhiseaduse käsitlemine väärtuste süsteemina endaga kaasa üle-
konstitutsionaliseerimist. Põhiseadus on nii raamkord kui ka materiaalne põhi-
kord ning põhiseaduse jõustamiseks on demokraatlikus põhiseadusriigis mööda-
pääsmatu selle sisuline järelevalve. Teiseks on reeglite ja printsiipide eristamine 
piisav. Peandumise (Sollen; Ought) struktuuri kindlaksmääramine on osa 
tõlgendamisprotsessist. Kolmandaks ei põhjusta printsiibiteooria rakendamine 
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põhiseaduse teksti pinnalt lahkumist. Põhiseadus sisaldab jätkuvalt rangeid 
määranguid, mida tuleb järgida, ja niivõrd, kuivõrd põhiseaduse tekst on keele-
liselt või struktuurselt avatud, pakub printsiibiteooria meetodit avatuse oluliseks 
vähendamiseks. Neljandaks ei peata proportsionaalsuse põhimõtte rakendamine 
põhiseaduse toimet. Eeldusest, et kaalumine on mõistlik, ei järeldu, et põhiseadus 
on ülearune. Viiendaks ei ole proportsionaalsuse põhimõte puhtformaalne suunis 
ning kollideeruvate printsiipide kaalumine ei võrdu lihtsalt suunisega otsustada. 
Kaalumist kasutades saab jõuda ratsionaalselt ühe tulemuseni küll mitte igal 
üksikul juhul, kuid siiski piisaval arvul juhtudel, et õigustada kaalumist kui 
meetodit. Ja lõpuks on olemas universaalne põhiõiguste teooria. Sellise teooria 
heaks näiteks on Robert Alexy printsiibiteooria, mis pakub põhiseaduslikkuse 
järelevalve teostamiseks struktuuri, mis muudab arutluskäigu ratsionaalsemaks. 
Teises peatükis analüüsitakse rahvusvahelise ja teiste riikide õiguse kasutamist 
võrdlevate argumentidena Riigikohtu praktikas. See peatükk käsitleb põhiseadus-
liku süsteemi võrdlevõiguslikku mõõdet. Riigikohus kasutab argumendina küll 
teiste riikide õigust, kuid konkreetsele allikale viitamise täpsus jätab enamjaolt 
soovida. Uurimus toob välja, et võrdlevatel argumentidel on olnud oluline roll 
Eesti põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalve arengus, eelkõige katalüsaatorina, mis aitas 
Eesti riigiõiguslikku mõtlemist kaasajastada. Õiguse üldpõhimõtetel, eriti 
proportsionaalsuse põhimõttel, on märkimisväärseid sarnasusi mitmete teiste 
arenenud Euroopa õigussüsteemides tunnustatud põhimõtetega. Viited teistele 
õigussüsteemidele, eriti teiste Euroopa riikide põhiseadustele ja põhiseadus-
likkuse järelevalve lahenditele, on tõendiks Eesti õigussüsteemi avatusest. Riigi-
kohtu 2009. aasta skeptiline avaldus, mille järgi ei saa võrdleva õiguse 
argumentidest tuletada Eesti kohtute jaoks siduvaid käitumisjuhiseid, oli siiski 
üsna vaieldav samm vastupidises suunas. 
Kolmanda peatüki fookuses on üks olulisemaid Riigikohtu varaseid otsuseid 
aastast 1994. Peatükis analüüsitakse selle kohtuotsuse olulisust Eesti põhiseadus-
liku süsteemi jaoks. Sellest kohtuotsusest tulenevad põhiseadusliku süsteemi 
kolm olulist elementi. Esiteks kehtestas Riigikohus parlamendireservatsiooni 
põhimõtte, mille kohaselt on seadusandja kohustatud otsustama olulisi küsimusi 
ise ega saa neid edasi delegeerida täitevvõimule. Teiseks tuletas Riigikohus põhi-
seadusest üldise põhiõiguse korraldusele ja menetlusele, millel on olnud oluline 
roll Eesti õigusriikluse kujunemisel. Peatükk käsitleb sellega seoses kriitiliselt 
aastatel 2004–2005 aset leidnud nn liiklusseaduse saagat, kus Riigikohus jättis 
korduvalt rahuldamata halduskohtute algatatud põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalve 
menetlused liiklusseaduse muudatuste osas, millega seadusandja kaotas sisuliselt 
võimaluse vaidlustada kohtus juhtimisõiguse peatamist liiklusrikkumise 
järelmina. Kolmandaks leidis Riigikohus juba 1994. aastal, et seadusandja 
põhjustatud rikkumiste kõrval võivad ka seadusandlikud tegematajätmised olla 
järelevalve esemeks. Sellest tulenevalt sisaldab Eesti põhiseadus ka seadusandja 
positiivseid kohustusi, mis on täitmisele pööratavad. 
Neljas peatükk käsitleb võrdsuse põhimõtet ja selle arendamist Riigikohtu 
praktikas. Erinevalt eelmistest peatükkidest on viimases peatükis luubi all ühe 
konkreetse põhiõiguse süsteem. Uurimus näitab, et võrdsuse põhimõte on täies 
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ulatuses rakendatav, põhiõiguste kandja saab sellele tugineda kui subjektiivsele 
õigusele ning see seob ka seadusandjat. Analüüsist selgus, et faktilise võrdsuse 
nõuet ei ole soovitatav tuletada võrdsuspõhiõigusest, vaid pigem sotsiaalriigi 
põhimõttest. Samuti tulenes sellest, et nõuet kohelda ebavõrdseid ebavõrdselt ei 
tuleks käsitada võrdsuspõhiõiguses sisalduva normatiivse nõudena. Võrdsuspõhi-
õigust tuleb tõlgendada nõudena kohelda õiguslikult võrdseid võrdselt. Lisaks 
leidis kinnitust, et võrdsuse põhimõtte piiriklausel on lihtne piiriklausel. Nägime, 
et võrdluspaarid või -rühmad peavad alati koosnema inimestest, mitte aga olu-
kordadest, ning et järelevalves tuleb alati keskenduda sellele ebavõrdsele kohtle-
misele, mille põhiseaduspärasus on kõige tõenäolisemalt küsitav. Samuti nägime, 
et võrdsuse põhimõtet saab rakendada kas originaarselt või aktsessoorselt, ning 
et koherents ehk süsteemiõiglus on võrdsuspõhiõiguse oluline nõue. 
Demokraatlik põhiseadusriik, st riik, kus kehtivad inimväärikuse, demokraatia 
ja õigusriigi aluspõhimõtted, on olemas põhiõigused, võimude lahusus ja tasa-
kaalustatus ning toimiv põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalve, on iidse põhimõtte sub 
lege rex olulisim väljendus ajaloos. Süstemaatiliselt on demokraatlik põhiseadus-
riik inimõiguste institutsionaliseering ja empiiriliselt 1992. aastast saati Eestis 
meid ümbritsev tegelikkus. Käesolev töö annab oma tagasihoidliku panuse selleks, 
et see nii ka jääks. 
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CRCSCj 17.06.1998, 3-4-1-5-98 – Tehingud metsamaterjaliga 
CRCSCj 30.09.1998, 3-4-1-6-98 – Omandireform III 
CRCSCj 04.11.1998, 3-4-1-7-98 – KOV volikogu liikme keelenõue 
CRCSCj 23.11.1998, 3-4-1-8-98 – Sotsiaalmaksuseaduse rakendamise juhend 
CRCSCj 22.12.1998, 3-4-1-11-98 – Parkimine Tallinna vanalinnas 
CRCSCj 17.03.1999, 3-4-1-1-99 – Turgudel ja tänavatel kauplemise üldeeskiri 
CRCSCj 17.03.1999, 3-4-1-2-99 – Omandireform IV 
CRCSCj 09.02.2000, 3-4-1-2-00 – Narva transiit 
CRCSCj 28.04.2000, 3-4-1-6-00 – Alkoholiseadus (Kauplus Mõisavahe) 
CRCSCj 12.05.2000, 3-4-1-5-00 – Isikliku sõiduauto ametisõiduks kasutamise kulud 
CRCSCj 08.02.2001, 3-4-1-1-01 – Välismaalase kinnisvara omandamise luba 
CRCSCj 22.02.2001, 3-4-1-4-01 – Parkimistrahv 
CRCSCj 05.03.2001, 3-4-1-2-01 – Välismaalaste seadus II (välisriigi kaadrisõja-
väelane) 
CRCSCj 22.03.2001, 3-4-1-5-01 – Omandireform VI (Maa enampakkumisega erasta-
mise kord II) 
CRCSCj 03.05.2001, 3-4-1-6-01 – Perekonnanime muutmine (Arendi Elita von Wolsky) 
CRCSCj 06.03.2002, 3-4-1-1-02 – Käibemaksuseadus I (OÜ SIVI) 
CRCSCj 03.04.2002, 3-4-1-2-02 – Karistusreform I (Vill)  
CRCSCj 10.04.2002, 3-4-1-4-02 – Kauplemine Tallinna kesklinnas (AS Liaania) 
CRCSCj 12.06.2002, 3-4-1-6-02 – Käibemaksuseadus II (AS Gizmo) 
CRCSCj 15.07.2002, 3-4-1-7-02 – Valimisliidud I 
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CRCSCj 05.11.2002, 3-4-1-8-02 – Maksuintressi määr määruses 
CRCSCj 24.12.2002, 3-4-1-10-02 – Nõukogu liikmete palgaandmete avalikustamine 
CRCSCj 17.02.2003, 3-4-1-1-03 – Omandireform VII (Maa enampakkumisega erasta-
mise kord III) 
CRCSCj 14.04.2003, 3-4-1-4-03 – Täitemenetluse seadustik (OÜ Laanepüü) 
CRCSCj 16.09.2003, 3-4-1-6-03 – Omandireform VIII (Maa hindamise seadus) 
CRCSCj 25.11.2003, 3-4-1-9-03 – Karistusnormi sanktsiooni alammäär 
CRCSCj 19.12.2003, 3-4-1-22-03 – Kohtutäiturite tasu määrad 
CRCSCj 21.01.2004, 3-4-1-7-03 – Sotsiaalhoolekande seadus II 
CRCSCj 25.03.2004, 3-4-1-1-04 – Määruskaebus väärteomenetluses 
CRCSCj 30.04.2004, 3-4-1-3-04 – Asjaõigusseaduse rakendamise seadus (tehnorajatised) 
CRCSCj 21.06.2004, 3-4-1-9-04 – Välismaalaste seadus III (valeandmed) 
CRCSCj 18.11.2004, 3-4-1-14-04 – Tallinna parkimistasu 
CRCSCj 02.12.2004, 3-4-1-20-04 – Üüri piirmäärad 
CRCSCj 10.12.2004, 3-4-1-24-04 – Liiklusseaduse saaga III (Bernardov) 
CRCSCr 23.03.2005, 3-4-1-6-05 – Susi individuaalkaebus 
CRCSCj 02.05.2005, 3-4-1-3-05 – Aknaalused (Sotsiaalliberaalide fraktsioon) 
CRCSCj 13.06.2005, 3-4-1-5-05 – Kuressaare alkoholireklaam 
CRCSCj 21.06.2005, 3-4-1-9-05 – Töötava pensionäri vanaduspension 
CRCSCj 01.09.2005, 3-4-1-13-05 – E-valimised 
CRCSCj 20.03.2006, 3-4-1-33-05 – Vanemahüvitis I 
CRCSCo 11.05.2006, 3-4-1-3-06 – Euroarvamus 
CRCSCr 09.05.2006, 3-4-1-4-06 – ABTG individuaalkaebus 
CRCSCj 16.01.2007, 3-4-1-9-06 – Ehitusseadus (infrastruktuuri rajamiskohustus) 
CRCSCj 31.01.2007, 3-4-1-14-06 – ORAS § 7 lg 3 (III) 
CRCSCj 13.02.2007, 3-4-1-16-06 – Mitte-eluruumide erastamine 
CRCSCj 02.05.2007, 3-4-1-2-07 – Ehitise teenindamiseks vajaliku maa määramine 
CRCSCj 26.09.2007, 3-4-1-12-07 – Käibemaksuseadus III (MTÜ Muusikaliteater) 
CRCSCj 01.10.2007, 3-4-1-14-07 – Teenistusest vabastamine vanuse tõttu 
CRCSCj 26.11.2007, 3-4-1-18-07 – Pakendiaktsiis (Kadarbiku Köögivili) 
CRCSCj 30.09.2008, 3-4-1-8-08 – Endise punaväelase pensionistaaž 
CRCSCj 19.03.2009, 3-4-1-17-08 – Riigikontrolli seadus (KOV-i kätte usaldatud riigivara) 
CRCSCr 20.05.2009, 3-4-1-11-09 – Reinomägi individuaalkaebus 
CRCSCj 09.06.2009, 3-4-1-2-09 – Tallinna valimisringkonnad I 
CRCSCj 26.06.2009, 3-4-1-4-09 – Maksukorralduse seadus 
CRCSCj 17.07.2009, 3-4-1-6-09 – Määruskaebuse riigilõiv (Riigilõivu määr I) 
CRCSCj 30.09.2009, 3-4-1-9-09 – Kaevandamisluba (maapõueseadus) 
CRCSCr 07.12.2009, 3-4-1-22-09 – Paala individuaalkaebus III 
CRCSCj 15.12.2009, 3-4-1-25-09 – Riigilõivu määr II 
CRCSCr 22.12.2009, 3-4-1-16-09 – Tallinna valimisringkonnad II 
CRCSCr 10.06.2010, 3-4-1-3-10 – Paala individuaalkaebus IV 
CRCSCr 07.03.2011, 3-4-1-12-10 – Pensionäri haigushüvitise piirangud 
CRCSCj 08.03.2011, 3-4-1-11-10 – Tallinna laste sünnitoetus 
CRCSCj 04.04.2011, 3-4-1-9-10 – Vahistatu lühiajaline kokkusaamine 
CRCSCj 27.12.2011, 3-4-1-23-11 – Vanemahüvitis II 
CRCSCj 14.05.2013, 3-4-1-7-13 – Vanemahüvitis III 
CRCSCj 15.10.2013, 3-4-1- 47-13 – Valimisliit Jõhvi Noored 
CRCSCr 23.01.2014, 3-4-1-43-13 – Paala ja Raatsini individuaalkaebus 
CRCSCj 05.05.2014, 3-4-1-67-13 – Sotsiaalhoolekande seadus III 
192 
CRCSCr 07.11.2014, 3-4-1-32-14 – VEB-Fond II 
CRCSCj 06.01.2015, 3-4-1-34-14 – Jäätmeseadus  
CRCSCj 02.02.2015, 3-4-1-33-14 – Sotsiaalhoolekande seadus IV 
CRCSCj 20.12.2016, 3-4-1-3-16 – Haldusreform I 
CRCSCr 27.01.2017, 3-4-1-14-16 – Chauhani individuaalkaebus 
 
1.3. Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 
ALCSCr 24.03.1997, 3-3-1-5-97 
ALCSCr 13.04.1998, 3-3-1-14-98 
ALCSCj 20.06.2000, 3-3-1-30-00 
ALCSCj 20.12.2001, 3-3-1-61-01 
ALCSCj 27.03.2002, 3-3-1-17-02 
ALCSCj 17.06.2002, 3-3-1-32-02 
ALCSCr 08.10.2002, 3-3-1-56-02  
ALCSCj 26.11.2002, 3-3- 1-64-02 
ALCSCr 16.01.2003, 3-3-1-2-03 
ALCSCr 27.01.2003, 3-3-1-6-03 
ALCSCr 20.05.2003, 3-3-1-37-03 
ALCSCj 20.06.2003, 3-3-1-49-03 
ALCSCr 22.12.2003, 3-3-1-77-03 
ALCSCj 23.02.2004, 3-3-1-1-04 
ALCSCr 17.06.2004, 3-3-1-17-04 
ALCSCj 25.10.2004, 3-3-1-47-04  
ALCSCj 18.11.2004, 3-3-1-33-04 
ALCSCr 03.03.2005, 3-3-1-1-05 
ALCSCr 27.09.2005, 3-3-1-47-05  
ALCSCr 22.12.2005, 3-3-1-73-05 
ALCSCj 22.03.2006, 3-3-1-2-06 
ALCSCj 28.03.2006, 3-3-1-14-06 
ALCSCj 09.05.2006, 3-3-1-6-06 
ALCSCj 11.12.2006, 3-3-1-61-06  
ALCSCj 19.12.2006, 3-3-1-80-06  
ALCSCj 10.01.2007, 3-3-1-85-06 
ALCSCj 05.03.2007, 3-3-1-102-06 
ALCSCj 10.05.2007, 3-3-1-100-06 
ALCSCj 20.10.2008, 3-3-1-42-08 
ALCSCr 21.06.2010, 3-3-1-85-09 
ALCSCj 10.12.2010, 3-3-1-72-10 
ALCSCr 04.05.2011, 3-3-1-11-11 
ALCSCj 02.10.2014, 3-3-1-47-14 
1.4. Criminal Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 
CLCSCj 12.12.1995, III-1/3-47/95 
 
1.5. Dissenting opinions 
Dissenting opinion of Justice Uno Lõhmus to the CRCSCj 05.10.2000, 3-4-1-8-00  
193 
Dissenting opinion of Justice Eerik Kergandberg, joined by Justices Jaak Luik and Hele-
Kai Remmel, to the SCebj 17.03.2003, 3-1-3-10-02 
Dissenting opinion of Justice Indrek Koolmeister to the SCebj 25.10.2004, 3-4-1-10-04 
Dissenting opinion of Justice Indrek Koolmeister, joined by Justices Tõnu Anton, Julia 
Laffranque, Jüri Põld and Harri Salmann, to the SCebj 25.10.2004, 3-3-1-29-04 
Dissenting opinion of Justice Julia Laffranque, joined by justices Tõnu Anton, Peeter 
Jerofejev, Hannes Kiris, Indrek Koolmeister and Harri Salmann, to the SCebj 
19.04.2005, 3-4-1-1-05 
Dissenting opinion of Justices Tõnu Anton, Indrek Koolmeister, Julia Laffranque, Jüri 
Põld and Harri Salmann to the SCebj 27.06.2005, 3-4-1-2-05 
Dissenting opinion of the Justice Jüri Põld, joined by Justices Tõnu Anton, Jüri Ilvest, 
Indrek Koolmeister, Julia Laffranque and Harri Salmann, to SCebj 03.01.2008, 3-3-
1-101-06  
Dissenting opinion of Justices Villu Kõve, Peeter Jerofejev and Henn Jõks to the SCebj 
21.06.2011, 3-4-1-16-10 
Dissenting opinion of Justices Henn Jõks, Ott Järvesaar, Eerik Kergandberg, Lea Kivi, 
Ants Kull and Lea Laarmaa to the SCebj 12.07.2012, 3-4-1-6-12 
 
1.6. Administrative Courts 
Tallinn Administrative Court judgment 08.02.2005, 3-1368/2004  
Tallinn Administrative Court judgment 05.03.2004, 3-799/2004  
Tallinn Administrative Court judgment 19.05.2004, 3-1298/2004  
Tallinn Administrative Court judgment 25.06.2004, 3-1473/2004  
Tallinn Administrative Court judgment 01.09.2004, 3-1763/2004; 
Tartu Administrative Court judgment 22.12.2004, 3-480/04 and 3-509/04  
Tartu Administrative Court judgment 28.12.2004, 3-461/04 
Jõhvi Administrative Court judgment 28.12.2004, 3-249/2004  
Jõhvi Administrative Court judgment 30.12.2004, 3-254/2004 and 3-255/2004  
Jõhvi Administrative Court judgment 10.02.2005, 3-309/2004 
 
 
2. Court of Justice of European Union 
ECJ 29.03.1979, C-113/77 – NTN Toyo Bearing Company et al. v. Council 
ECJ 06.07.1982, C-188/80 – France et al. v. Commission  
ECJ 12.10.2004, C-313/02 – Nicole Wippel 
ECJ 26.10.2006, C-248/04 – Koninklijke Coöperatie Cosun 
CJEU 17.10.2013, C-101/12 – Herbert Schaible v. Land Baden-Württemberg 
 
 
3. European Court of Human Rights 
ECtHR 06.09.1978, 5029/71 – Klass etc. v. Germany 
ECtHR 26.04.1979, 6538/74 – Sunday Times v. UK  
ECtHR 23.09.1998, 68/1997/852/1059 – Malige v. France 
ECtHR 26.10.2000, 30210/96 – Kudla v. Poland 
ECtHR 26.10.2000, 30985/96 – Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria 
ECtHR 29.04.2008, 13378/05 – Burden v. UK 
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ECtHR 16.03.2010, 42184/05 – Carson et al. v. UK 
ECtHR 04.11.2010, 14480/08 – Tarkoev v. Estonia 
 
 
4. German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
BVerfG 23.10.1951, 2 BvG 1/51 (BVerfGE 1, 14) – Südweststaat  
BVerfG 23.10.1952, 1 BvB 1/51 (BverfGE 2, 1) – SRP-Verbot 
BVerfG 17.12.1953, 1 BvR 147/52 (BVerfGE 3, 58) – Beamtenverhältnisse 
BVerfG 22.01.1959, 1 BvR 154/55 (BVerfGE 9, 124) – Armenrecht  
BVerfG 10.12.1980, 2 BvF 3/77 (BVerfGE 55, 274) – Berufsausbildungsabgabe 
BVerfGE 09.02.2010, 1 BvL 1, 3, 4/09 (BVerfGE 125, 175) – Hartz IV 
BVerfGE 18.07.2012, 1 BvL 10/10, 2/11 (BVerfGE 132, 134) – 
Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz 
 
 
5. Others 
U.S. Supreme Court 23.02.1803, 5 U.S. 137 – Marbury v. Madison 
Constitutional Court of Latvia 23.04.2009, 2008-42-01 
 
 
III. Legal acts 
1. Estonian Legal Acts2 
Administrative Procedure Act. – RT I 2001, 58, 354 
Amendment Act of the Act of the Police of Estonian Republic. – RT I 1993, 20, 355 
Amendment Act of the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure, Penal Code and the Traffic 
Act. – RT I 2005, 40, 311 
Arrangements for Action of the Armed Unit. – RTL 2002, 144, 2107 
Citizenship Act. – RT I 1995, 12, 122 
Code of Misdemeanour Procedure. – RT I 2002, 50, 313; I 2005, 40, 311 
Constitution of Republic of Estonia. – RT 1992, 26, 349; I, 15.05.2015, 2 
Constitution of Republic of Estonia Amendment Act. – RT I 2003, 64, 429 
Constitution of the Republic of Estonia Implementation Act. – RT 1992, 26, 350 
Constitutional Review Court Procedure Act. – RT I 2002, 29, 174; I, 23.12.2013, 57 
Health Insurance Act. – RT I 2002, 62, 377 
Internal Rules of Prisons. – RTL 2000, 134, 2139; 2007, 13, 192 
Penal Code. – RT I 2001, 61, 364; 2004, 88, 600 
Pension Act. – RT I 2001, 100, 648 
Border Regime Rules. – RT I 1997, 69, 1126; I 2004, 77, 529 
Population Register Act. – RT I 2000, 50, 317 
Republic of Estonia Principles of Ownership Reform Act. – RT 1991, 21, 257 
Social Benefits for Disabled Persons Act. – RT I 1999, 16, 273 
Social Welfare Act. – RT I 1995, 21, 323; I 2001, 98, 617 
State Liability Act. – RT I 2001, 47, 260; I 2006, 48, 360 
                                                 
2  Available in English at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/. 
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Traffic Act. – RT I 2001, 3, 6; I 2007, 4, 19 
Traffic Rules. – RT I 2001, 15, 66; I 2005, 41, 336 
 
 
2. Legal Acts of European Union 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. – 2016/C 202/02, OJ C 202, 
07.06.2016, p. 389–405. – Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0389.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2016:20
2:FULL 
 
 
3. Other legal acts 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. – Available at: https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf 
Constitution of Finland. – Available at: 
https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf 
Constitution of the United States of America. – Available at: 
https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm 
Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789. – Available at: 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais/Constitution/Declaration-des-Droits-
de-l-Homme-et-du-Citoyen-de-1789 (English translation available at: 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp) 
Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the 
first Chapter of the Constitution of Massachusetts from 1780. – Available at: 
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm  
Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention, 1958 (No. 108) – Available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_IL
O_CODE:C108 
Spanish Constitution. – Available at: 
http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/
const_espa_texto_ingles_0.pdf 
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